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Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit limiting ability to shut off MCAS

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Re: Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit limiting ability to shut off MCAS

#321
post #302

Earlier quoted context omitted.

And that means...?

You cannot confuse them because of the sheer size and shape difference.

The physical characteristics are not presented to you when booking your flight.

By the time you've arrived at the airport and see the MAX at your gate, it's too late and you've already paid your fare.

Re: Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit limiting ability to shut off MCAS

#322

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Normal flight is flight is fine. The issue with the new engines was that the nacelles generated lift in specific scenarios at high-angle-of-attack which changed the pitch. This doesn't mean the aircraft is fundamentally unsound, it's just a flying characteristic and can be managed just fine if the pilots knew about it and what the MCAS system was doing to counter it.

A aeroplane that NEEDS an added control system just to make it APPEAR to fly neutral is a design flaw.

Again it's only in specific scenarios, not level flight. And if control systems are not allowable then how was it certified at all?

Re: Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit limiting ability to shut off MCAS

#323
post #43

What is the endgame now for 737 MAX planes? Every airline using them has had several weeks to totally reorganize to deal with these huge missing parts of their fleets. Boeing keeps talking about fixing them and putting them back in the air, but I dunno. At this point, it should be agreed the fundamental design flaws are serious, and Boeing should have simply made a brand new plane, with much more modern controls and…

> What is the endgame now for 737 MAX planes? The bugs will be addressed and they'll still fly. Airlines have no choice, there's a limited capacity in the world for airplane construction, several thousands of orders on the books for the 737 and 320 waiting to be filled. What can an airline do? They can cut back some orders but not all orders. > I'd honestly like to see the 737 MAX taken out of service and Boeing simp…

They won't fly if customers won't fly on them. The first part of the rehab will be renaming and rebranding the product to reduce customer stigma.

Re: Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit limiting ability to shut off MCAS

#324
post #294

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The bugs will be addressed and they'll still fly. Airlines have no choice, there's a limited capacity in the world for airplane construction, several thousands of orders on the books for the 737 and 320 waiting to be filled While true I don't think that airlines and regulators will go for it, if there's even the slightest risk of an additional accident. No matter what. And Boeing's "communcation strategy" after the i…

Conversely I don’t see how they can’t be returned to the sky. Boeing has deep pockets and the US government will push behind the scenes to make sure it happens, regardless of whatever public statements they make. There is no way regulators will be able to keep this plane grounded simply on the ground of politics.

You're saying we literally can't stop our representatives/"regulators" from getting us killed anymore. Lovely.

Re: Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit limiting ability to shut off MCAS

#325
post #178

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Gotta love deregulation. I dunno, I see it as the opposite: regulation (apparently) made it impossible to just train pilots on this one new feature, instead requiring a full recertification of both the airframe and the pilots, which is incredibly expensive and unnecessary relative to what was actually required to save lives. So one way of looking at is is: regulation caused perverse incentives that ultimately got p…

That’s such a roundabout way of thinking that I’m not sure whether you believe it yourself. You’re basically saying that because shitty people don’t want to follow safety regulations we shouldn’t have them.

You should always consider incentives when thinking about regulations. Especially roundabout, second and third order consequences. Those are the ones that get you.

Having safety in mind doesn't make something unambiguously good, fit for purpose, or free of net-negative consequences. The specific content of rule determines that.

Re: Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit limiting ability to shut off MCAS

#326
post #294

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Conversely I don’t see how they can’t be returned to the sky. Boeing has deep pockets and the US government will push behind the scenes to make sure it happens, regardless of whatever public statements they make. There is no way regulators will be able to keep this plane grounded simply on the ground of politics.

You're saying we literally can't stop our representatives/"regulators" from getting us killed anymore. Lovely.

Both accidents could have been avoided if the pilots knew about the changes in handling and in MCAS and how to handle it. So this is not the kind of flaw that would make a plane uncertifiable or unflyable. Combine that with Boeing’s strong lobbying efforts and importance to the US economy, it is a certainty the planes will fly.

Re: Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit limiting ability to shut off MCAS

#327
post #6

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Gotta love deregulation. How many institutions are left? Any? CFPB, EPA, HUD, Interior are all run by people that don’t believe in their missions. It’s all about undermining from inside. Who protects the public when private rights of collective action are forbidden by arbitration agreements and the government has been captured by private interests?

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is doing just fine in their function.

[Citation needed]

Re: Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit limiting ability to shut off MCAS

#328

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> The bugs will be addressed and they'll still fly. The engines are mounted incorrectly, so much so that Boeing believed pilots need the assistance of MCAS on take-off now. The bug isn't with its algorithms, rather the need for MCAS to begin with. They can't "address" it. That's why I'll be very careful not to ever book a flight on a 737 Max, probably easier to simply stick to Airbus-only airlines: Jetblue, Alaska/Vi…

Alaska was, before they bought Virgin, famously a Boeing-only airline! (And a 737-only airline at that!)

Yet Horizon Air currently operates two types of aircraft, the Bombardier Dash 8 Q400 turboprop and the Embraer 175 regional jet. They’re a 100% subsidiary of Alaska Air Group and Alaska Air puts its code on them.

Re: Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit limiting ability to shut off MCAS

#329
post #321

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You cannot confuse them because of the sheer size and shape difference.

The physical characteristics are not presented to you when booking your flight. By the time you've arrived at the airport and see the MAX at your gate, it's too late and you've already paid your fare.

You can DDG specifications of your plane by model number and nay, they have to be unique per revision.

Re: Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit limiting ability to shut off MCAS

#330

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> MCAS was there to satisfy the type rating. MCAS is not anti-stall. MCAS's only observable intervention is to push the nose down to prevent stall, which means it is by definition anti-stall. Boeing says MCAS is an acronym for "Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System", but a better name for MCAS is "Machine Controlled Anti Stall". https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maneuvering_Characteristics_Au...

While the effect of pushing the nose down is an all-too observable effect, that its purpose is stall prevention is not directly observable. According to this article[1], the intended purpose was to restore the back-force needed to put the airplane in a stall, as the effect of the new engines was to make the control feel lighter at high AofA. The article also discusses the certification requirements with regard to acc…

One of the requirements for an airplane to receive a certification is that the pilot needs to put more and more pressure on the stick to achieve higher and higher angle of attack. If at some point the airplane starts to pitch to higher AoA without extra pressure from the pilot, that's a big no. Reason: otherwise it would be all too easy to inadvertently enter a stall condition.

Boeing 737 MAX without MCAS violates that requirement (caused by the lift generated by large engine nacelles in front of the wings). MCAS is indeed designed to restore that required back-force. Back-force that is required to prevent stalls.

I suppose one could debate whether the stall prevention effect of MCAS is direct or indirect. But I don't think it's debatable that it is designed to comply with a certification requirement that's intended to help prevent stalls.

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