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The Peculiar Blindness of Experts

theatlantic.com

11–20 of 31 posts

Re: The Peculiar Blindness of Experts

#11
post #2

Predicting anything is a gamble. One simply does not know what will happen but one makes assumptions. Let'ś take weather forecasting as an example. It is difficult to do it right for 5 days and often goes wrong for 10 days. But when you ask a group of scientist a simple question, like "Do you think that humans contribute to the rise of CO2 ?" and 97% say "yeah", then you can make a new assumption: CO2 will probably r…

> accurately forecast what happens in 80 years.

You can’t accurately forecast what the weather will be on June 28th 80 years from now, for the same reason you can’t predict if it will be raining at your house at 3:29 pm two days from now, or where some molecule of water will end up in the Mississippi River an hour from now. But you can assuredly make less specific forecasts based on current trends. You know it’s likely to rain at some point in the morning two days from now, that the water molecule will flow roughly downstream, and that average air temperatures will increase if we keep putting CO2 in the atmosphere.

Re: The Peculiar Blindness of Experts

#12

> Two days later, a team member with experience in finance saw that the hryvnia was strengthening amid events he’d thought would surely weaken it. He informed his teammates that this was exactly the opposite of what he’d expected, and that they should take it as a sign of something wrong in his understanding. This is an experience every young trader ever has had many, many times. Myself included. You see an economic…

The talking heads point is deeper than that. Not only are they paid to be interesting.

The very ability of being good at talking might be co-related with other base attributes.

For instance being good at talking might be co-related with tunnel vision, not having a bigger perspective, being able to connect things which shouldnt be, naivety, empathy and so on.

So if your process of conferring the title of expertise involves going through the university system, or performing well in debates or on a podium, you will get experts who are all wrong in exactly the same way and there is no one to offer them a different perspective.

Re: The Peculiar Blindness of Experts

#13
post #9

Interestingly, the article gives a tested recipe for creating a forecasting team. I wonder if it has been used for more important matters since, or maybe an expert committee advised against it :)

https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/6993091-the-dervish-hous...

The Dervish House from Ian McDonald has a plot thread based around that idea.

Re: The Peculiar Blindness of Experts

#14
Khosla says he doesn't do much more than write checks now because he's been wrong almost every time about which start-ups he should help with. He thinks he's working on the next big thing, but it usually flops and a different company in his portfolio is the fund returner.

Furthrr, "Expert" Hedge fund managers routinely get smoked by the index.

> Seides had already conceded the bet earlier in 2017, due to the huge disparity in performance between his basket of hedge funds and Buffett's S&P 500 index fund. After all, through the end of 2016, the S&P 500 index fund had gained more than 85%, while the average of Seides' five baskets of funds was just 22%. [0]

[0] https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.fool.com/amp/investing/2018...

Re: The Peculiar Blindness of Experts

#15

Hedgehogs (experts) know one big thing, while foxes (generalists) know many little things. However, foxes seem to be better at predicting the future than hedgehogs, because they constantly challenge their worldview and see their own ideas as hypotheses in need of testing. So maybe the reason why foxes are more successful forecasters is that they focus on learning, their "one big thing" strategy.

> However, [generalists] seem to be better at predicting the future than [experts], because they constantly challenge their worldview and see their own ideas as hypotheses in need of testing. What? No. You're implying that experts do not challenge their own beleives and ideas about the world.

I've seen this fairly often. I believe it's akin to the Dunning-Kruger effect in that experts begin to over-assess the effectiveness of the theories they hold most deeply to their expert identity the more entrenched they become in that identity.

It's usually easy to spot experts less susceptible to this problem (and more open to change) since they'll almost never consider themselves "experts" and avoid the label. They know how susceptible to change their theories could be or potential for being misguided/wrong. Their deep degree of understanding shows them just how little they truly know.

Furthermore, in our society, you must project confidence to be successful. Many experts are forced to appear confident when they're really not (does not make them less of an expert). If you're an expert and don't come off as exact, non-experts (and some experts even) may falsely assume you're not an expert because they expect you can produce an answer to some question they pose with certainty.

I believe this structure is partly to blame for the problem. Some play this confidence charade and are able to separate out the act of appearing certain, but still understanding the uncertainties they don't share and keeping them held tight.

The others get caught in this feedback loop where appearing confident and being right translates emotionally to being more confident. Their confidence is rewarded so they assume the the perspectives they have confidence in are sound the more it occurs over time. When a case comes a long that breaks that flow, they're still confident, but have positive emotional ties to those beliefs and become a victim of their own successes. Something else must be wrong because I've been rewarded so much for being right about this.

I believe those doing translational/applied sciences and engineering are more susceptible to problem than those on the theoretical side due to the way things are incentivized as a society. On the theoretical side there's a greater acceptance of being wrong (that's becoming less true as research is privatized more). On the applied side, people expect a high degree of confidence and certainty because that's what they pay for and there's little-to-no acceptance for error even though we're all human and make errors daily.

So I think the problem is really due to how society views experts and exerts its expectations upon them.

Re: The Peculiar Blindness of Experts

#16
I feel like the author intended for me to leave the article less likely to dig my heels in when acting as an expert and more likely to maintain a flexible worldview when making predictions in a scenario where there are a variety of well developed and contradicting predictive theories. And that's probably a good sentiment.

But I think it's important to recognize that foxes outperform hedgehogs only in scenarios where hedgehogs are available. That is, to weigh contradictory theories requires that those theories exist in the first place: and that's the work of experts.

So rather than ask: "should you be a fox or a hedgehog?"

I'm more interested in: How should foxes and hedgehogs be arranged so that the best predictions are made? How many contradictory predictive theories are necessary to let the foxes do their work and are there diminishing returns re: how deeply the hedgehogs have gone into their specialization?

Research in this direction could have implications re: how we fund other research.

Re: The Peculiar Blindness of Experts

#18

I feel like the author intended for me to leave the article less likely to dig my heels in when acting as an expert and more likely to maintain a flexible worldview when making predictions in a scenario where there are a variety of well developed and contradicting predictive theories. And that's probably a good sentiment. But I think it's important to recognize that foxes outperform hedgehogs only in scenarios where…

Phil Tetlock, the expert on experts whose research is discussed in the article, does raise this point. He also discusses the difference between being a good predictor, and being good at raising interesting questions. There are some videos of him and a number of other smart folks here: https://www.edge.org/event/edge-master-class-2015-philip-tet...

Re: The Peculiar Blindness of Experts

#19
post #5

I like the conclusion of the article that broad knowledge is needed to do good predictions. But, I do not see the point on going against experts. Probably the learning is that the most convinced and self-assured you are in a topic the easier is to get things wrong. Take any non-expert that is sure and vocal about a future event and probably is wrong also.

I think there is a useful distinction to be made between fields like physics, where expertise in the field makes you more likely to make accurate predictions (e.g. about when that comet is going to appear in the sky), and fields like economics, where expertise in the field actually makes you less likely to make accurate predictions than a non-expert (e.g. whether we will have a recession soon).

Consider an expert in medicine, back when the "four humours" theory of medicine was what experts used. A non-expert would think, "bleeding is bad, I don't want to bleed, I need my blood". Experts believed in bleeding their patients/victims to restore a balance of the humours. George Washington was probably killed by his doctor in this way.

Being an expert in a field only helps, when the basic theoretical models of that field have reached a certain minimum level of maturity.

Re: The Peculiar Blindness of Experts

#20

Hedgehogs (experts) know one big thing, while foxes (generalists) know many little things. However, foxes seem to be better at predicting the future than hedgehogs, because they constantly challenge their worldview and see their own ideas as hypotheses in need of testing. So maybe the reason why foxes are more successful forecasters is that they focus on learning, their "one big thing" strategy.

> However, [generalists] seem to be better at predicting the future than [experts], because they constantly challenge their worldview and see their own ideas as hypotheses in need of testing. What? No. You're implying that experts do not challenge their own beleives and ideas about the world.

That is literally what the article is arguing, and it's something I've seen often enough to be convinced about.
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