31–40 of 341 posts
What is the endgame now for 737 MAX planes? Every airline using them has had several weeks to totally reorganize to deal with these huge missing parts of their fleets. Boeing keeps talking about fixing them and putting them back in the air, but I dunno. At this point, it should be agreed the fundamental design flaws are serious, and Boeing should have simply made a brand new plane, with much more modern controls and…
It strikes me how a seemingly insignificant decision at the time - to position fuselage slightly higher above the ground - gave Airbus a strategic advantage 50 years later. It forced the competitor into a services of unexplainable and reckless decisions that break basic principles of reliable engineering. Which in turn led to a very visible disastrous business consequences: Boeing had to silently reduce 737 MAX produ…
When the 737 was built back in the 60s it was intended to be a small regional jet, not the continent and ocean crossing aircraft it evolved into over the years since. It originally came with a retractable staircase for passengers to embark/alight the aircraft, and having a low fuselage also made it possible to hand load the luggage in a time before widespread belt loaders.
One thing that appears concerning in the series of articles being written about the 737 Max incidents is that they suggest a culture at Boeing of speed/cost over safety. Now we can assume that the Max won't re-enter service until this issue is completely solved (I'm sure regulators will be extra-scrupulous here and customers will want cast iron re-assurance). However, is anyone going over all the other safety decisio…
Hopefully it will result in Bowing being required to make this a new plane and a lot of pilot re-certification. If it does return to the market, I wonder if they'll be forced to rebrand it. It's obviously not a 737.
So they removed a useful, granular functionality (switching off autopilot trim input while retaining electric-assisted manual trim) and made one switch simply a redundant backup, merging the previously separated functions without clear explanation. A cynical man could be inclined to think that with this change, they casually removed a possibility of pilots/airlines realizing the existence of MCAS: "we have thrown off…
I’m as negative as the next person when it comes to the 737 Max, but this is just a bit to far. Read the rest of the article and you’ll understand a logical reason why this was done and how it was communicated.
So they removed a useful, granular functionality (switching off autopilot trim input while retaining electric-assisted manual trim) and made one switch simply a redundant backup, merging the previously separated functions without clear explanation. A cynical man could be inclined to think that with this change, they casually removed a possibility of pilots/airlines realizing the existence of MCAS: "we have thrown off…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
The core of the discussion precisely revolves around Boeing wilfully making it more difficult for the person in the cockpit to oversee the planes' automated systems.
It would not be invalid to observe that the first Lion Air crew dealt successfully with the malfunction, and ask why the second crew did not. Every aspect of these accidents should be investigated.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Read up on the extensive reporting on both accidents. They never reached that conclusion because it was absolutely unexpected, as a result of Boeing’s stealth changes to the aircraft. There was an article recently where they put very experienced pilots in a simulator under the same conditions and they all failed.
But at least one aircrew in the real world actually succeeded.
> As various warnings went off in the cockpit, they never reached the conclusion to use the runaway stabilizer procedure. We continue to put the microscope on Boeing but this is why there is a person in the cockpit: to oversee the planes automated systems. There were multiple failures, and while we pick apart Boeing, we have not done the same to the pilots.
Read up on the extensive reporting on both accidents. They never reached that conclusion because it was absolutely unexpected, as a result of Boeing’s stealth changes to the aircraft. There was an article recently where they put very experienced pilots in a simulator under the same conditions and they all failed.
Apparently you haven’t read it either, otherwise you wouldn’t have said what you did. I’m not defending Boeing in the slightest, they should be tarred and feathered over this, but it’s getting really old seeing folks on HN acting like experts and not even knowing the basic facts, especially when the article they are commenting on refutes their own statements.
What is the endgame now for 737 MAX planes? Every airline using them has had several weeks to totally reorganize to deal with these huge missing parts of their fleets. Boeing keeps talking about fixing them and putting them back in the air, but I dunno. At this point, it should be agreed the fundamental design flaws are serious, and Boeing should have simply made a brand new plane, with much more modern controls and…
It has been fascinating to watch layer after layer peel back around all of this. Bad design decisions forced from chasing the bottom dollar, optional, critical safety features with the warning indicator and now these switches. > Boeing declined to detail the specific functionality of the two switches That's also interesting- I assume they are in CYA mode and wouldn't discuss anything that could be sensitive to the cu…
One of the lessons learned is that the FAA is no longer a credible institution.