I just wanted to note that Dominic Gates and the Seattle Times have been the gold standard for reporting on the 737 MAX. Really great work by them on reporting a technical subject so non-experts can understand.
Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit limiting ability to shut off MCAS
11–20 of 341 posts
Re: Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit limiting ability to shut off MCAS
#12> As various warnings went off in the cockpit, they never reached the conclusion to use the runaway stabilizer procedure. We continue to put the microscope on Boeing but this is why there is a person in the cockpit: to oversee the planes automated systems. There were multiple failures, and while we pick apart Boeing, we have not done the same to the pilots.
The pilots are dead, how do you propose fixing their failures? Or do you mean we should also focus the standard checklists and procedures? Are we not doing that also? I think the article sufficiently tried to cover those as well.
Re: Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit limiting ability to shut off MCAS
#13> As various warnings went off in the cockpit, they never reached the conclusion to use the runaway stabilizer procedure. We continue to put the microscope on Boeing but this is why there is a person in the cockpit: to oversee the planes automated systems. There were multiple failures, and while we pick apart Boeing, we have not done the same to the pilots.
Read up on the extensive reporting on both accidents. They never reached that conclusion because it was absolutely unexpected, as a result of Boeing’s stealth changes to the aircraft.
There was an article recently where they put very experienced pilots in a simulator under the same conditions and they all failed.
Re: Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit limiting ability to shut off MCAS
#14Earlier quoted context omitted.
One of the lessons learned is that the FAA is no longer a credible institution.
Gotta love deregulation. How many institutions are left? Any? CFPB, EPA, HUD, Interior are all run by people that don’t believe in their missions. It’s all about undermining from inside. Who protects the public when private rights of collective action are forbidden by arbitration agreements and the government has been captured by private interests?
The problem is that only Boeing is left in the US. Lockheed, Douglas, General Dynamics are all out of manufacturing civil airplanes. It's the lack of free market (the decision between Boeing and Airbus is most often a political one), not the lack of regulation that led to this. Boeing is too big to fail now. Regulators are always stupid, but free market is smart.
Re: Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit limiting ability to shut off MCAS
#15It has been fascinating to watch layer after layer peel back around all of this. Bad design decisions forced from chasing the bottom dollar, optional, critical safety features with the warning indicator and now these switches. > Boeing declined to detail the specific functionality of the two switches That's also interesting- I assume they are in CYA mode and wouldn't discuss anything that could be sensitive to the cu…
Boeing declined to detail the specific functionality of the two switches
It seems like that's really the crux of the problem. They made changes that they didn't feel it was necessary to tell their customers about. Just another step along the "I know you bought this product from us, but it's still our product at the end of the day" timeline that we're stuck on.
Further, I'll bet that it transpires that no one entity inside Boeing is really to blame for this mess. The engineers in charge of the AOA indicator subsystem didn't know that someone else in the company was going to drive a safety-critical component from it. And that engineering group may not have realized that the AOA data they were getting came from only one of the two sensors. My guess is that Boeing not only hid this information from their customers, they hid it from themselves.
The problem will have to be addressed at the top, but I don't agree with those who say that blaming, firing, or jailing the CEO is going to be helpful. The culture that allowed this to happen will have grown organically over time.
Re: Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit limiting ability to shut off MCAS
#16Earlier quoted context omitted.
One of the lessons learned is that the FAA is no longer a credible institution.
Gotta love deregulation. How many institutions are left? Any? CFPB, EPA, HUD, Interior are all run by people that don’t believe in their missions. It’s all about undermining from inside. Who protects the public when private rights of collective action are forbidden by arbitration agreements and the government has been captured by private interests?
Gotta love deregulation.
Remind me, when's the last time we had a major fatality incident in the US domestic passenger airline business?
And how does that compare with the prevailing state of affairs before "deregulation?"
Difficulty: answer with numbers, please, rather than insults, downvotes, or political attacks.
Re: Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit limiting ability to shut off MCAS
#17> As various warnings went off in the cockpit, they never reached the conclusion to use the runaway stabilizer procedure. We continue to put the microscope on Boeing but this is why there is a person in the cockpit: to oversee the planes automated systems. There were multiple failures, and while we pick apart Boeing, we have not done the same to the pilots.
The pilots are dead, how do you propose fixing their failures? Or do you mean we should also focus the standard checklists and procedures? Are we not doing that also? I think the article sufficiently tried to cover those as well.
The aviation industry does that all the time. If the pilots have any fault, the NTSB will say so. We should not shy away from that conclusion, either, the point of the investigation is not to find blame, it is to prevent future accidents.
Re: Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit limiting ability to shut off MCAS
#18> As various warnings went off in the cockpit, they never reached the conclusion to use the runaway stabilizer procedure. We continue to put the microscope on Boeing but this is why there is a person in the cockpit: to oversee the planes automated systems. There were multiple failures, and while we pick apart Boeing, we have not done the same to the pilots.
That's because this is HN. Playing the blame game is what we get to do. The NTSB will analyze all factors and if the pilots had any contribution to the crashes that will be noted. This is why aviation has become so safe. If the investigators just looked for blame like we do, planes wouldn't be nearly as safe as they are today.
Re: Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit limiting ability to shut off MCAS
#19> As various warnings went off in the cockpit, they never reached the conclusion to use the runaway stabilizer procedure. We continue to put the microscope on Boeing but this is why there is a person in the cockpit: to oversee the planes automated systems. There were multiple failures, and while we pick apart Boeing, we have not done the same to the pilots.
The core of the discussion precisely revolves around Boeing wilfully making it more difficult for the person in the cockpit to oversee the planes' automated systems.
It would not be invalid to observe that the first Lion Air crew dealt successfully with the malfunction, and ask why the second crew did not. Every aspect of these accidents should be investigated.
Re: Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit limiting ability to shut off MCAS
#20It strikes me how a seemingly insignificant decision at the time - to position fuselage slightly higher above the ground - gave Airbus a strategic advantage 50 years later. It forced the competitor into a services of unexplainable and reckless decisions that break basic principles of reliable engineering. Which in turn led to a very visible disastrous business consequences: Boeing had to silently reduce 737 MAX production despite having secured orders for over 5000 planes. A case to be studied in business schools.