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Technical Details on the Recent Firefox Add-On Outage

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Re: Technical Details on the Recent Firefox Add-On Outage

#181

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I'd hardly call that a "barrier to entry" at all Would I have to sign in to sync again to access my bookmarks, logins, etc? Are there ever issues with syncing between phone and computer (nightly to stable) or would I have to change my desktop browser as well? Does anything ever break at all? Even if the answer to these questions is "no", the fact that I'm asking them is the barrier to entry. And if any of the answe…

> Even if the answer to these questions is "no", the fact that I'm asking them is the barrier to entry. Fair enough. The answers, for the record, are indeed "yes" (but that takes, what, 30 seconds?), "no", and (at least not severely) "no". But apparently even non-Nightly Firefox for Android supports xpinstall.signatures.required = false, which is even less of a barrier to entry, so that's good news, I guess. While I…

> The answers, for the record, are indeed "yes" (but that takes, what, 30 seconds?), "no", and (at least not severely) "no".

Yeah, the last two would have been the broader deal breakers. The first one is just an issue for me personally - I don't know my sync password. I have it written down at home, but I'm not there right now.

Re: Technical Details on the Recent Firefox Add-On Outage

#182

My point of view as a long-time Firefox user that cares about privacy but also knows we live in an imperfect world: It obviously sucks that this happened but I think they handled it very well. The bug was fixed so quickly that I wouldn't even have realized it had happened if it hadn't been for the thread here on HN. My extensions hadn't even been disabled yet by the time the patch came out. And pushing out the hotfix…

They still haven't explained WHY this happened. I know it's easy to overlook a certificate's expiration date, but they should have known about this possible issue when they generated that certificate in the first place.

Re: Technical Details on the Recent Firefox Add-On Outage

#183

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Well I've just been educated on a new mechanism by which things can be remotely broken.

Just to be clear: supported version or not, this sucks, and I hope we'll have a fix for you. I wanted to point out this wasn't remotely broken, however. Even if you had no internet connection, your addons would have stopped working when the certificate expired. (Disclosure: I work for Mozilla)

Well that's reassuring! :-)

I've fixed it now anyway, in the way I specifically read that I wasn't meant to do.

Maybe you guys could inform us unsupported old version users what we should do instead of waiting for an update that can't come?

It's ok, thanks for your post. I know stuff is complicated and shit happens.

I'm much more disappointed that the latest Firefox doesn't have a working session manager than I am about this mixup. IMO that should be a core browser function.

Re: Technical Details on the Recent Firefox Add-On Outage

#184
post #139

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I view using nightly to be as much of a barrier to entry that I might as well switch to a totally different browser. If the issue had lasted longer, I would have found (someone on the internet who had found) a solution like that.

On Android, you already had the xpinstall.signatures.required option without having to install nightly. Linux too. Took me maybe 30 second to fix all my devices.

This depends on your Linux distro. The package maintainer has to set a build flag to allow disabling the signature requirement. This should be set on Debian, and probably distros downstream from Debian, but was not set on Arch Linux last I checked.

Re: Technical Details on the Recent Firefox Add-On Outage

#185

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Can you explain why you need the current time anywhere in this? Say I download a ten-year-old addon, it's signed by a valid signature from that root, with a valid signing date. What's the problem? Are we worried that someone will steal an old/expired cert and have control over a user's clock?

Imagine you have an old expired key... you take your new malicious extension, and sign it with the expired key and a time stamp that says it was signed at a time the key was still valid. Without some other verification mechanism, you can't tell the difference between this and an actual signature signed when the key WAS valid

[deleted]

Re: Technical Details on the Recent Firefox Add-On Outage

#186
Who is Satan and why there is evil Best video about this with proofs https://youtu.be/AWNM1-xYI5E

Funny monkey using phone in video Don't think just you can use phone See how he is searching and watching own monkey videos on phone http://bit.ly/2DS4p2R

See what happened when a lion was trying to kill man http://bit.ly/2H2zsKc

Best video with proofs Which showing there is creator of this universe https://youtu.be/j5HHl6-r3VU

Dogs are meeting their owners after a long time see in this video the reaction of dogs and try to control your cry http://bit.ly/2JmjuNw

Funny cats are teasing babies in video just try to control your laugh I am sure you can't http://bit.ly/2LJu58n

Re: Technical Details on the Recent Firefox Add-On Outage

#187

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Can you explain why you need the current time anywhere in this? Say I download a ten-year-old addon, it's signed by a valid signature from that root, with a valid signing date. What's the problem? Are we worried that someone will steal an old/expired cert and have control over a user's clock?

Imagine you have an old expired key... you take your new malicious extension, and sign it with the expired key and a time stamp that says it was signed at a time the key was still valid. Without some other verification mechanism, you can't tell the difference between this and an actual signature signed when the key WAS valid

How did you get ahold of an expired key?

Re: Technical Details on the Recent Firefox Add-On Outage

#188
post #90

My point of view as a long-time Firefox user that cares about privacy but also knows we live in an imperfect world: It obviously sucks that this happened but I think they handled it very well. The bug was fixed so quickly that I wouldn't even have realized it had happened if it hadn't been for the thread here on HN. My extensions hadn't even been disabled yet by the time the patch came out. And pushing out the hotfix…

I find it hard to marry up "Firefox user that cares about privacy" with being happy about the study mechanism. Don't you, from a privacy perspective, find it more than a little disturbing that the study mechanism has so much access to internal APIs in Firefox that it can install certificates without your involvement? That seems like a crazy security risk, let alone privacy risk. It's built in and enabled _by default_…

It’s funny how the mind works. We tend to accept the far greater risk of allowing automated software updates (either in-app or blindly trusting your package manager e.g. apt-get upgrade) but the Firefox Studies mechanism which does a minuscule, strict subset of what any automatic update can do is somehow a “crazy security risk”.

Re: Technical Details on the Recent Firefox Add-On Outage

#189

Earlier quoted context omitted.

In this day and age you're living on borrowed time using an old version of a web browser. This state of affairs has its good and bad, but your modern-day browser vendors don't typically maintain branches of old versions to make security and bug fixes (especially when they change things for security reasons, as with this case of old-style addons being removed). If you're going to insist on using an old unsupported ver…

Well I've just been educated on a new mechanism by which things can be remotely broken.

What did you expect to happen? You're using an online service connected to signing authorities. Of course it can be remotely broken at any time, that's how the internet works, it's all remote.

Re: Technical Details on the Recent Firefox Add-On Outage

#190

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Imagine you have an old expired key... you take your new malicious extension, and sign it with the expired key and a time stamp that says it was signed at a time the key was still valid. Without some other verification mechanism, you can't tell the difference between this and an actual signature signed when the key WAS valid

How did you get ahold of an expired key?

The whole point of key expiration is that somebody might get a hold of it (or crack it).
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