A New Way of Voting That Makes Zealotry Expensive

I think by any objective measure the US has seen an explosive growth in regulation the last 30 years.

I really wish I had an objective measure around to demonstrate this with...

Very unreliably. You will only be able to influence policies that are nearly 50/50, but if they are 50/50, that is because there is widespread disagreement over which option is better. This means there is a fairly high chance that your "sabotage" vote ironically results in better policy. Think about it: the issue is 50/50, and you have the decisive vote. Half of the voters are wrong. What do you think the odds are that you're in the half that knows what it's doing?

My analysis is that odds that the average saboteur would vote for a bad policy ought to be roughly proportional to the proportion of honest voters that pick the good policy. Unfortunately, these odds are a toss-up when the saboteur's influence is maximized.

> Why do that, when we can just sabotage things?

To get results. Your gripes are understandable enough not to be dismissed, and if you can make a credible threat of sabotage, you may be able to cause a reform and perhaps get your freedom back before the end of the term. Sabotage can be a valid tactic to get what you want, especially if you're in desperate straits, but I don't see how your stunts are supposed to achieve anything at all, let alone anything that cannot be achieved more efficiently through collaboration.

> You don't get to force me into this, and complain when I fight back.

Was I actually complaining, though? When I say your behavior in this situation would be sociopathic, I mean it as a statement of fact. Notice that I followed the remark with "that's part of the risk in the system," clearly indicating that I am willing to eat that loss. I'm not complaining. I'm accounting. (Also, I genuinely think you would be working against your own interests.)

> People do not have to react the way that you want them to, or that you find fair.

I know many people won't react the way I want them to. I know some people will act like sociopaths. This is a variable to quantify: if enough people would turn into madmen if they were forced to do this, well, that invalidates conscription, and it's back to the drawing board. Likewise, if a large number of people think my system is immoral, okay, sure, let's do something else.

I mean, I'm not married to the specifics: I think it is important to make sure that the sample is statistically unbiased, and conscription is the easiest way to do this, but if we can get close enough on a voluntary basis, hey, that's even better.

I do maintain that your reaction would be disproportionate and ultimately immoral. Again, though, I'm not complaining about it, because that would be pointless: you do you. But I'm taking note of it so that I can account for the seriousness of the threat.

Edit: And if the threat is serious enough, you win, really. I would oppose conscription and you wouldn't have to sabotage anything (well, if I had my way). Just want you to know I am listening, even if I disapprove of your behavior.

n = people in each group

b = individual vote budget

Each Group Votes Independently: n * sqrt(b) votes

If a group colludes s.t. group A gives (1/2)b votes to group B's issue and vice versa you get: 2 * n * sqrt((1/2)b)) votes which simplifies into Sqrt(2) * n * sqrt(b).

Yet coordinating between these two groups becomes more difficult and costly, growing somewhere between n (perfect coordination) and n^2 (total decentralization). Thus, regardless of how you coordinate it will always be more expensive than the influence you gain which grows at sqrt().

Even in this simple assumption collusion becomes a negative value decision.