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The inception bar: a new phishing method

jameshfisher.com

141–150 of 238 posts

Re: The inception bar: a new phishing method

#141

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The company where I first worked out of university had a custom which the CEO named ‘shemaling’. The company had quite strict security standards. It was encouraged that anyone who found an unlocked screen in the office would ‘shemale’ the wallpaper. It did the job. I never forgot again after being ’shemaled’ the first time.

Charming CEO. I'm hoping this was the 90s.

Funnily enough, it was four years ago, somewhere in continental Europe. Things were a bit freer there. I didn't stay there long. I have a lot more interesting stories from that place.

Re: The inception bar: a new phishing method

#142
post #38

I happened to have 26 tabs while loading this, and spent a minute trying to figure out how the fake bar "knew" my open tab count

In Chrome beta 74, the count is in the bottom toolbar, so a variant of this attack that were UA-aware might have an even easier time. (The padlock is no longer green, either, and the leading https:// is omitted.)

On the other hand, scrolling to the very top of the page reveals the original address bar.

A possible mitigation would be to use a custom background or gradient for the bar that a web page can't guess. I'd be tempted to suggest the Google account's picture (if Chrome is logged in), but I don't know how safe that is from cross-site shenanigans.

Re: The inception bar: a new phishing method

#143
post #71

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's like the fake "Allow Notification" dialogs on some sites. They look off to pretty much anyone paying attention, but their target market probably isn't people paying attention

What's the idea behind those? Do they just get permission before showing the real dialog, or is it more sinister than that?

If the user says no to the real dialog, you can never bring up the real dialog again.

Sites with fake dialogs in my experience ask again the next time you open the page.

Re: The inception bar: a new phishing method

#144

With a little polishing this would be quite the "exploit" - trap the user in your fake browser, actually load pages that are entered into the fake URL bar, replace content only on certain patterns... The only solution here is a proper line of death [0]. It defeats the purpose of the LoD when it dynamically shrinks from user action. [0]: https://textslashplain.com/2017/01/14/the-line-of-death/

Fun fact, subway systems have been using this concept for decades.

Joking aside, "line of death" is easily understood but I never heard the name before. Now that it has a (perfect) name I will never forget it, and that's the importance of giving technology a fitting name. My biggest pet peeve in modern UI is the hamburger menu icon. Three horizontal lines does not, in any way, indicate to the user that menu options lay behind it... and the name was downright awful. We replaced a perfect icon at the time, the "gear" (a gear references an engine, so users looking to change settings understood the analogy). But the hamburger menu tried to remove the "settings" idea and instead encompass navigation, settings, preferences, and operations into one menu icon. In my opinion, it failed, but now is so ubiquitous most people are fine with it.

Re: The inception bar: a new phishing method

#145
post #143

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What's the idea behind those? Do they just get permission before showing the real dialog, or is it more sinister than that?

If the user says no to the real dialog, you can never bring up the real dialog again. Sites with fake dialogs in my experience ask again the next time you open the page.

It’s the same reason many iPhone apps implement their own dialogues to ask about allowing notifications. If the user chooses ‘Deny’ in the system-provided one, the app can never ask again and the only way to turn notifications on later is to have the user go digging around in the Settings app, which few people will bother to do.

I take great pleasure in choosing ‘Allow’ in those custom dialogues and then ‘Deny’ when the native one pops up immediately afterwards.

Re: The inception bar: a new phishing method

#146

"Ceci n'est pas un UI." This specific example may be new, but the concept of fooling users with websites containing images of the system's own UI is not new --- for example, all the fake antivirus alert boxes. That had a relatively easy mitigation --- using non-default appearance on your system (e.g. an XP-style "you have a virus!" dialog box image would just look silly if you weren't using XP with the default theme)…

[deleted]

Re: The inception bar: a new phishing method

#147

Earlier quoted context omitted.

In high school we would screenshot the windows 98 desktop, make it the wallpaper, hide everything, and watch people fluster about.

The company where I first worked out of university had a custom which the CEO named ‘shemaling’. The company had quite strict security standards. It was encouraged that anyone who found an unlocked screen in the office would ‘shemale’ the wallpaper. It did the job. I never forgot again after being ’shemaled’ the first time.

Downvoting the comment does not downvote the CEO or the practice.

The idea is interesting, and it could've been puppies or some other corny wallpaper that did the trick.

Re: The inception bar: a new phishing method

#148

"Ceci n'est pas un UI." This specific example may be new, but the concept of fooling users with websites containing images of the system's own UI is not new --- for example, all the fake antivirus alert boxes. That had a relatively easy mitigation --- using non-default appearance on your system (e.g. an XP-style "you have a virus!" dialog box image would just look silly if you weren't using XP with the default theme)…

Someone I know would constantly leave a macbook unlocked, so I prepared a script that would turn down the volume, whisper the owner's name, open weird sfw pictures online and other mildly annoying things, but not very often (like once a week).

This was meant as a joke, and I never actually went through with it. I know the person very well but it still felt douchebaggy. But the idea was to make an app file, save it to some seemingly legitimate folder, and adding it to the autostart list.

The trick to hide the thing was to drag and drop Safari's logo onto it, and naming the app "Safan": it almost goes unnoticed when checking the Activity Monitor, thanks to the system font's proportions.

Re: The inception bar: a new phishing method

#149
I understand why this was a problem in 1995, but honestly, in 2019, with image recognition technology as advanced as it is now – especially due to efforts by Google – why can't browsers detect this? Surely "does this rectangle look vaguely like a URL bar" is an easier problem to solve than "is this a photograph of a cat"?

Sure, image recognition is CPU intensive, but even just checking once every 5 seconds or so would be enough to prevent this sort of attack and pop up a big "you are being phished" warning. And 99.99% of what occupies that UI real estate looks sufficiently unlike a search bar that a low-cost recognizer should be able to rule out phishing for normal sites fairly quickly.

What am I missing? Has this approach been tried and rejected? Is image recognition of fairly static, flat, 2D, geometric shapes actually far more CPU-intensive than I imagine?

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