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“I worked at Boeing for about 1.5 years in the 2008-9 time period”

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Re: “I worked at Boeing for about 1.5 years in the 2008-9 time period”

#61
post #57
post #37

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Original MCAS system used only 1 AOA sensor and switched back and forth between the two after every flight. Who the fuck thought that was a good idea??? Let's make it 10x more difficult to detect that there is a problem.

Just to explain a bit more: It uses the main pilot side AOA sensor, and pilots switch seats every flight.

So switching seats during the flight would have solved the problem?

Re: “I worked at Boeing for about 1.5 years in the 2008-9 time period”

#62
post #10

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I wonder how we, humans, collectively build extraordinary monuments while we individually rest on stilts My take is that we used to have brilliant engineers in the time where computational ressources were scarce (60s, 70 , 80s...), and they thought out their design thoroughly starting with a fucking paper and pencil. Aerospace indutries still rely on the designs from these times. But now engineering seems to be : l…

Brilliant engineers are still there. We haven’t gotten stupider as a species in 30 years. It’s the economics that changed. As people say “They don’t build stuff like they used too anymore”. First we started going cheap on the materials. Now we are going cheap on the engineers too. Why pay a senior “brilliant” engineer $$$$ when a fresh out of college “average” engineer can write the “same piece of code” for $$

> Why pay a senior “brilliant” engineer $$$$

there are very few brilliant engineer of yesterday whose job role today is to train the next generation of brilliant engineers so that their vast experience doesn't get lost in time; the brilliant engineers of today have to relearn their experience walking the same mistakes, so that even companies that pays those premiums for senior engineers will have to face the same generational problem as everyone else, because they don't want to waste highly expensive professional to something as mundane as training on the job.

Re: “I worked at Boeing for about 1.5 years in the 2008-9 time period”

#63
post #33

"I worked at Boeing for about 1.5 years in the 2008-9 time period and I can absolutely guarantee this happened." was in response to this comment: "I would be very surprised if in a few years from today a bunch of engineers don't testify that ample of warning was given to management about this. " Reddit doesn't make it easy to find what they replied to.

Yes it does. Just click on the link labeled "parent" at the bottom of any comment.

Re: “I worked at Boeing for about 1.5 years in the 2008-9 time period”

#64
post #55
post #52

> To this day, I refuse to fly on a 787. I'm sure that the Dreamliners that came off the assembly line after about a year or so were fine but there's that first year of production that, as far as I'm concerned, are ticking time bombs. I talked to many engineers who had worked on that program to know just how badly they rushed that initial production. Ouch. Anybody know where to get a list of who’s operating the plane…

Sometimes, online flight trackers estimate the registration prior to the flight and they usually have the serial number as well (otherwise you can look it up on airfleets, plane spotters etc). For some flights it's easy to estimate the registration yourself (if the only plane available is a current inbound flight). But generally, you won't get that info more than a day in advance. Airlines won't even know it more tha…

But typically the same types of planes fly the same routes, I would imagine.

Re: “I worked at Boeing for about 1.5 years in the 2008-9 time period”

#65
post #57
post #37

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Original MCAS system used only 1 AOA sensor and switched back and forth between the two after every flight. Who the fuck thought that was a good idea??? Let's make it 10x more difficult to detect that there is a problem.

Just to explain a bit more: It uses the main pilot side AOA sensor, and pilots switch seats every flight.

I can’t speak to foreign operators but in the US that most certainly does not happen. The captain flies in the left seat and the first officer flies in the right seat. Turns are taken on who is flying and the automation is selected to the side of whichever pilot is deemed the pilot flying.

Re: “I worked at Boeing for about 1.5 years in the 2008-9 time period”

#66
post #52

> To this day, I refuse to fly on a 787. I'm sure that the Dreamliners that came off the assembly line after about a year or so were fine but there's that first year of production that, as far as I'm concerned, are ticking time bombs. I talked to many engineers who had worked on that program to know just how badly they rushed that initial production. Ouch. Anybody know where to get a list of who’s operating the plane…

https://www.planespotters.net/production-list/Boeing/787 rest should be easy.

https://www.reddit.com/r/videos/comments/bdfqm4/the_real_rea... gives some background and estimates the first 'safe' plane to be SN 27.

Re: “I worked at Boeing for about 1.5 years in the 2008-9 time period”

#67
post #30

Well a decades-long oligopoly of two companies is similar to central planning in many aspects and his story indeed rings a lot of bells.

Poor Boeing, I guess they're putting all their best people and resources into off-world spacecraft.

Re: “I worked at Boeing for about 1.5 years in the 2008-9 time period”

#68

Btw, the new "fix" for the MCAS has just been announced and discussed by a 40-year experienced pilot [1]. Turns out that while we shouldn't be doing armchair analysis and assuming the worst of the engineering, management and executive team; the software fix released appears to be rather elementary and MCAS should have been designed with these safety checks in the first place. Why it wasn't is a huge concern and we wo…

The software fixes as described sound sensible and it's hard to believe they were not in the original design. Unfortunately I don't see how these changes will allow them to keep a common type rating with the 737 NG. After the updated MCAS has made its one shot trim adjustment you will now be flying an aircraft with different handling characteristics if you keep increasing the angle of attack into the stall. Surely th…

> Surely the FAA can't sign off on the common type rating and half hour of video training ??

What? Why not? They did a blood sacrifice and everything.

Re: “I worked at Boeing for about 1.5 years in the 2008-9 time period”

#69
post #37

Btw, the new "fix" for the MCAS has just been announced and discussed by a 40-year experienced pilot [1]. Turns out that while we shouldn't be doing armchair analysis and assuming the worst of the engineering, management and executive team; the software fix released appears to be rather elementary and MCAS should have been designed with these safety checks in the first place. Why it wasn't is a huge concern and we wo…

> Original MCAS system used only 1 AOA sensor and switched back and forth between the two after every flight. Who the fuck thought that was a good idea??? Let's make it 10x more difficult to detect that there is a problem.

I was wondering the same. What is the logic behind this setup? That basically means that it is no better than having one sensor. Because if any one of them breaks, you have broken sensor active on next or following flight. Also I recall there was something said about Lion Air crash that the crew on the day before experienced some flight control problems which was not communicated to the crew involved in crash? Did they use other sensor on the day before and that was faulty too, or isn't that is how it actually worked?

Re: “I worked at Boeing for about 1.5 years in the 2008-9 time period”

#70
post #20

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> But now engineering seems to be : let's ask my computing power what is the good design, with little further questioning. I see this quite often at the undergrad level. Even for the simplest problem that can be solved with a pencil and a couple of calculations, many students launch their finite element software and blindly trust the results, even if it is telling them something obviously wrong, like orders of magnit…

I don't find that particularly surprising. Engineering students want to learn how to build machines to find solutions to everything, so it's intuitive that they would place a high confidence in a solution provided by a machine.

Good observation.

There is a nice analogy to programming here. The same that one of the main tasks of the programmer is to handle errors, one of the main tasks of the engineer is to know the limitations of the tools he is using.

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