11–20 of 83 posts
Would these kind of attacks be made redundant by Galileo?
GPS spoofing can be done as a replay attack; record the signal at the airport, rebroadcast at the Kremlin louder than the direct satellite signal and voilà, your receiver says you’re at the airport.
As it’s just a replay attack of the original signal, encryption can’t help.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
I would like to think that, having done research on GPS spoofing and being generally interested in GPS, I would have heard of this before if it were routinely done anywhere in the world. It sounds like you don't have this from an online source but from first-hand experience. Did anyone write this up? Is there local news about it perhaps?
I did not dig up for a detailed technical write up, but have a plenty media sites mentions (sorry for original Russian content): Just news, mentioning this, back to 2016 https://lenta.ru/articles/2016/11/07/gpsoff/ Nice write up, also from 2016 https://meduza.io/feature/2016/10/19/teleportatsiya-iz-kreml... News from Jan, 2018 https://snob.ru/news/156463 Nov, 2018 https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/2018/11/12/786…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
I did not dig up for a detailed technical write up, but have a plenty media sites mentions (sorry for original Russian content): Just news, mentioning this, back to 2016 https://lenta.ru/articles/2016/11/07/gpsoff/ Nice write up, also from 2016 https://meduza.io/feature/2016/10/19/teleportatsiya-iz-kreml... News from Jan, 2018 https://snob.ru/news/156463 Nov, 2018 https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/2018/11/12/786…
Wow, this is really happening. I'm surprised to hear this, very interesting, thanks!
Perhaps there is some reserved field, or usually ignored message, that can be used to insert digital signatures. The DoD will keep the master key, so the signatures could be easily verified, but spoofing them would be nearly impossible.
One thing the Manning leaks taught me is that if it can be done, it is being done. GPS spoofing is demonstrably effective at a variety of tasks including straight-up stealing military drones, therefore it is being done across the globe.
Would it be possible to upgrade GPS satellites so the signal would contain digital signatures, while retaining backwards compatibility? GPS uses NMEA data messages, which are plaintext. Perhaps there is some reserved field, or usually ignored message, that can be used to insert digital signatures. The DoD will keep the master key, so the signatures could be easily verified, but spoofing them would be nearly impossibl…
Tl;dr: nope.
Would it be possible to upgrade GPS satellites so the signal would contain digital signatures, while retaining backwards compatibility? GPS uses NMEA data messages, which are plaintext. Perhaps there is some reserved field, or usually ignored message, that can be used to insert digital signatures. The DoD will keep the master key, so the signatures could be easily verified, but spoofing them would be nearly impossibl…
Look here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19652414 Tl;dr: nope.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Look here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19652414 Tl;dr: nope.
All modern digital signature systems protect against replay attacks (by signing sequential counters, timestamps or other state information, or using cypher block chaining).
There is no such thing in GNSS systems. They are the ground truth. There is no way to combat a replay attack without some second source which would obviate much of what a GNSS delivers.
One thing the Manning leaks taught me is that if it can be done, it is being done. GPS spoofing is demonstrably effective at a variety of tasks including straight-up stealing military drones, therefore it is being done across the globe.
Aren't military drones using the military GPS profile with encrypted messages? Those cannot be easily spoofed, AFAIK.
However a replay attack that uses a valid signal received at some other locate re-broadcast at a second place is not affected by encryption. You can imagine lots of clever ways to use a re-broadcast attack to draw a drone off course.