141–150 of 277 posts
Doesn't surprise me that much, Matrix doesn't seem to be too concerned with security, more with security theatre (considering you can still not easily disable read receipts in your client, a major privacy leak IMO, among other issues).
Disabling read receipts is a client feature. Yes, the currently most mature client doesn't have that feature, but nothing in Matrix precludes it.
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Disabling read receipts is a client feature. Yes, the currently most mature client doesn't have that feature, but nothing in Matrix precludes it.
There is plenty of other issues with matrix and the reference clients on top of something as simple as mandatory leaking of your presence in a chatroom. I've run a matrix homeserver for almost 3 weeks and it as an utter pain to maintain, despite not a single version upgrade and I was plagued with issues that no chat platform would have if the protocol was remotely sane. edit: That is on top of the numerous security i…
As a counterpoint, I've been running a Synapse (a Matrix homeserver) for about 1.5 years now and it's been smooth sailing throughout, including the frequent upgrades. Maybe it's different at a larger scale (my userbase is 5-10 users), but if, as you say, you did it for three weeks, I guess you didn't have magnitudes more users than I have.
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I never quite understand why there’s not a confirm version. ForwardWithConfirmation or something. I’m active when I need forwarding - would be happy to simply be prompted before it’s allowed.
If you use Yubikey with touch-to-use enabled that'll be basically what you're asking - each authentication will require touching the token.
For people in the same boat, it can be done trivially using the YubiKey Manager CLI: https://developers.yubico.com/yubikey-manager/
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Why should I disclose untrue things? I have no issue, personal or otherwise with the founder.
You edited your post? Before it said, you operated "the" single federated independent Matrix Server. And there was only one guy doing this as far as I recall.
I've not written that I operate "the" matrix server.
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I have been asked twice or more why I insisted on not using a Continuous Integration environment for publishing some software releases that are installed by third-parties. My team was automating the infrastructure to build internal software and naturally they wanted to be able to simplify things. The idea that was proposed to me was the following: once I push a new version tag to GitHub, the deployment CI server is g…
> That would mean that if someone, somehow, managed to push a tag that was pushed upstream to GitHub You have to define what the signature means. IMHO it is fine for it to mean "this software was built on our build server from a well-defined state of the source code, which is only changable by our employees and contractors, and for which we have the full change log". So I deploy the code signing key to build servers,…
One middle point between automated and manual signing is, as usual, key rotation: have the signing keys expire in a short duration of time (say 2 weeks) and manually push them every week, so that the window of attack is as small as possible.
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While you bring up valid concerns about the Matrix team's security hygiene, the point of an open standard is that anyone can (try to) spot flaws in it, and anyone can (try to) create their own implementation. I myself am waiting for a healthy ecosystem of servers and clients to spring up before starting to rely on Matrix for anything non-ephemeral - even if it takes years. Perhaps I'll even try my hand at writing a c…
I can't wait years. I need to pick up a definitive platform right now to push as an alternative to proprietary ones. It would suck to migrate all my friends to something just to ask them to move again to something else a couple years later.
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I have been asked twice or more why I insisted on not using a Continuous Integration environment for publishing some software releases that are installed by third-parties. My team was automating the infrastructure to build internal software and naturally they wanted to be able to simplify things. The idea that was proposed to me was the following: once I push a new version tag to GitHub, the deployment CI server is g…
> That would mean that if someone, somehow, managed to push a tag that was pushed upstream to GitHub You have to define what the signature means. IMHO it is fine for it to mean "this software was built on our build server from a well-defined state of the source code, which is only changable by our employees and contractors, and for which we have the full change log". So I deploy the code signing key to build servers,…
1. A release candidate X is tested in a CI
2. If tests pass, the CI sends a notification to the build server. The notification is "prep for release package "
3. Build server pulls code from the repo, matches it against "ready, CI passed" notification and builds the package/packages.
Compromise of the entire CI/dev chain would be contained as the builders act as a new pipeline entry point running in parallel of the CI using pull method. To compromise keys located on a build server one would need to either get access to it via whatever the method of remote access the server has ( which should be nearly none ) or figure out how to compromise the code running on the builders using the input from a repo that passed CI.
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There is plenty of other issues with matrix and the reference clients on top of something as simple as mandatory leaking of your presence in a chatroom. I've run a matrix homeserver for almost 3 weeks and it as an utter pain to maintain, despite not a single version upgrade and I was plagued with issues that no chat platform would have if the protocol was remotely sane. edit: That is on top of the numerous security i…
> I've run a matrix homeserver for almost 3 weeks and it as an utter pain to maintain, despite not a single version upgrade As a counterpoint, I've been running a Synapse (a Matrix homeserver) for about 1.5 years now and it's been smooth sailing throughout, including the frequent upgrades. Maybe it's different at a larger scale (my userbase is 5-10 users), but if, as you say, you did it for three weeks, I guess you d…
I can see a lot of people trashing on Matrix.org or the "hacker" themselves (the hacker opened a series of issues, detailing how he managed to get in - https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix.org/issues/created_by/m... ). However everyone seems to be missing the point - matrix seems like a pretty cool and open project. And someone taking over their infrastructure in such an open way is also great for the community. Even…
Matrix operational security is a joke and developers understanding of security is a joke. This is 2019, not 1992. Infrastructure with ssh access without hole punching for currently active authorized connections only? Decrypted signing keys accessible over the network? CI servers and developers having root access? Though the "we had to revoke all the keys so you lost access to your encrypted messages unless you backed…
This is just how it works. It's been well documented and mobile clients got updates that backs up the keys automatically. It's also effectively the same as WhatsApp and some other IMs (they just don't even save your encrypted messages). Either way - backup, or lose your history.