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737 Max: 1960s Design, 1990s Computing Power and Paper Manuals

nytimes.com

111–120 of 133 posts

Re: 737 Max: 1960s Design, 1990s Computing Power and Paper Manuals

#111
I'm sure this conversation will be looked at during discovery in any future lawsuits:

> Boeing also designed the system to rely on a single sensor — a rarity in aviation, where redundancy is common. Several former Boeing engineers who were not directly involved in the system’s design said their colleagues most likely opted for such an approach since relying on two sensors could still create issues. If one of two sensors malfunctioned, the system could struggle to know which was right.

> Airbus addressed this potential problem on some of its planes by installing three or more such sensors. Former Max engineers, including one who worked on the sensors, said adding a third sensor to the Max was a nonstarter. Previous 737s, they said, had used two and managers wanted to limit changes.

Re: 737 Max: 1960s Design, 1990s Computing Power and Paper Manuals

#112

Regardless of how bad or good the 737 MAX was conceived, none of that matters because of regulatory capture of the FAA by way of millions of dollars of bribes paid to hundreds in Congress. Ever since the 737 NG, as the 2010 Al Jazeera report shows, Boeing has been installing substandard structural components and covering it up. No one should ever fly on an 737 NG or MAX aircraft because the regulatory environment was…

I'm on the fence on how bad the regulatory system is. Boeing has a massive incentive to make safe aircraft (they're seeing it first-hand right now), and modern commercial aircraft might be too complex for the FAA to effectively certify without input from manufacturers.

I vehemently disagree on the too complex front. If there is any inability to X going on in the FAA it is because of a culture of continual budget cuts hamstringing the ability of the agency to acquire and keep talent.

The current incarnation of the FAA is a joke. This is not some bureaucratic paper pusher organization. This is the agency responsible for the overall architecture and requirements that historically made the American Aerospace industry a force to be reckoned with when they weren't being blindsided or hamstrung by excessive political pressure by industry.

My proof?

There is nothing complicated, about the trim system of a 737 MAX. I've sat down and done a bit of research, reverse engineered the basic mechanical components of the system, and I'm just some bloke who had a few hours to kill on the weekend.

It's a highly geared mechanical gear train, with a secondary set of electrical motors, connected to a jackscrew, which drives the horizontal stabilizers while feeding back electrical actuation information back to the pilot's via the mechanical gear train. At some point, they wired in extra electrical connections from whatever black box MCAS is implemented in into the command circuit for the electric trim motor, and called it a day.

There is nothing complicated there. It's a basic composition of simple machines. The complicated part is the implementation and logistics details, in addition to making sure at some point, all those pesky details are written down, all those integrated systems are tested/verified to be of sufficient quality, and that each component has an audit trail to be referenced should investigation be necessary.

All that extra information is required specifically because it has been found to lead to increased safety over time. The FAA's duty is to ensure at a minimum, every player is living up to and respecting that standard. Something the history of budget cuts and delegation of authority to manufacturers has very clearly jeopardized.

I don't like the FAA. I'll never even be able to take the physical pilot training to fly because of the draconian nature of their medical certification regulations, but I can't even argue that they are unjustified in terms of the catastrophic outcomes that are prevented by having them there.

It is possible to hold a manufacturer to standards via external impartial audit.

It is difficult to do so if you can't even support the billets for a set of Subject Matter Experts who don't need to resort to alternative revenue streams so they can concentrate on doing one thing and doing it well.

There just needs to be the realization that at some point there must be a figure in the relationship between operator and manufacturer with the capacity, nay, responsibility to stop something which has not met the minimum standards of airworthyness.

It ain't physics that's the problem, it's the people. Machines don't lie. Even when malfunctioning, they're telling the truth in as much as the physical principles they are subject to will allow.

Re: 737 Max: 1960s Design, 1990s Computing Power and Paper Manuals

#113
post #35
post #31

Why exactly does this author think an airplane needs a lot of computing power? Airplane software does not deal with especially large amounts of data or intense computations. Faster hardware does not provide an inherent safety benefit. There is a large degree of coupling between avionics hardware and software amd updating that software is prohibitively expensive. There's just no point in doing it unless you get a tang…

Wait until they finds out what software powers the nuclear weapons of 90%+ of the world, top-tier fighter jets, "critical" infrastructure like power (including nuclear), and countless financial/banking systems. To be fair the article doesn't critique using 1990s (or earlier) hardware/software. It's merely a clickbait headline. The only reference is dismissed by the very next sentence as insignificant [Boeing could be…

> To be fair the article doesn't critique using 1990s (or earlier) hardware/software. It's merely a clickbait headline.

The "1990s home computers" power was simply an illustration of Boeing just trying to do the minimum work to move forward. Other examples that, while not bad per se, seem to indicate shortcuts:

> If one of two sensors malfunctioned, the system could struggle to know which was right. Airbus addressed this potential problem on some of its planes by installing three or more such sensors.

> Most new Boeing jets have electronic systems that take pilots through their preflight checklists, ensuring they don’t skip a step and potentially miss a malfunctioning part. On the Max, pilots still complete those checklists manually in a book.

> A second electronic system found on other Boeing jets also alerts pilots to unusual or hazardous situations during flight and lays out recommended steps to resolve them. On 737s, a light typically indicates the problem and pilots have to flip through their paper manuals to find next steps. [...] Boeing decided against adding it to the Max because it could have prompted regulators to require new pilot training, according to two former Boeing employees involved in the decision.

All of these things still get the job done, but they seem to indicate that Boeing simply wanted to do one last turn of the crank with the 737 design to compete with the A320neo, and may have rushed thing too much.

Re: 737 Max: 1960s Design, 1990s Computing Power and Paper Manuals

#114
post #48

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Of course. It's not literally a 1990's computer. But the idea that it's just somehow superior because the design is 3 decades old doesn't make any sense. 30 years ago it would have been new technology; so where was that same argument then?

It's had 3 decades of experience and bugfixes.

If new developing is happening, as it was in this case, that doesn't really matter. This problem was amplified by maintaining old technology, not mitigated by it.

Re: 737 Max: 1960s Design, 1990s Computing Power and Paper Manuals

#115

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think the argument you're making is completely false. First Premise is that there re not many avionics expers - I agree so having more of those experts able to look at review and learn from different implementations would be a good thing. Second premise is that you need to be an avionics expert to review and improve avionics software, I'm not convinced, there are many clever people out there. Third premise you can'…

I see so basically it would mean no benefits at all. Thanks for confirming. Now the other problem that I have this in this thread. The Boeing issue is not a software issue at all. Even if we chose the best case scenario for the software it would be still a physical design & lack of pilot education problem.

[deleted]

Re: 737 Max: 1960s Design, 1990s Computing Power and Paper Manuals

#116
post #74

Hm. I hesitate to defend Boeing here, but I think the outset of this article is a bit unfair. > Pilots start some new Boeing planes by turning a knob and flipping two switches. > The Boeing 737 Max, the newest passenger jet on the market, works differently. Pilots follow roughly the same seven steps used on the first 737 nearly 52 years ago: Shut off the cabin’s air-conditioning, redirect the air flow, switch on the…

> So? What does this have to do with anything? Is the goal to produce an airplane where pilots press a button "fly to destination", and the plane does it?

When you're nose down heading into the ground, taking your hand off the stick to adjust the trim can get panic-y. Especially since the MCAS may be working against your trim adjustments.

The design of the Max line seems to be just enough compete with the A320neo, and just enough to not "need" re-certification. But these two justs, together, may have cost several hundred people their lives.

Re: 737 Max: 1960s Design, 1990s Computing Power and Paper Manuals

#117
post #41

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> The "1990s Computing Power" comment is ignorantly harsh. I don't think so. You build a plane that's expected to run for decades -- if you put a 2010 computer in there now, it'll be 20 years old in 2030. That 1990's computer was put there in the 90's, does that really make it more reliable?

The amount of processing that those computers do won’t increase over time, it stays the same. So why use something you won’t need? Also, planes are extremely expensive so they don’t get thrown away, they get constant upgrades. The U2 spy plane is a good example: a 1950/60s airframe running with more modern instruments. So if the need arise they will upgrade those CPUs on the 737s.

Sometimes even the instruments are maintained. I know a consultant whose job is to repair bespoke factory and laboratory microcontrollers in situ. When we hired him he spent two weeks covering our lab in blueprints, two weeks troubleshooting, and one week programming. 25K to fix the device, but much cheaper than a new one.

Re: 737 Max: 1960s Design, 1990s Computing Power and Paper Manuals

#118
>In the recent crashes, investigators believe the MCAS malfunctioned and moved a tail flap called the stabilizer,

Fact checking at the NYT seems to be dead. The MCAS moves the entire stabilizer -- which is not a "flap" in any sense. Can they not find a pilot or some other knowledgeable person to read through an article like this before publishing it?

Re: 737 Max: 1960s Design, 1990s Computing Power and Paper Manuals

#119
post #100
post #31

Why exactly does this author think an airplane needs a lot of computing power? Airplane software does not deal with especially large amounts of data or intense computations. Faster hardware does not provide an inherent safety benefit. There is a large degree of coupling between avionics hardware and software amd updating that software is prohibitively expensive. There's just no point in doing it unless you get a tang…

>Why exactly does this author think an airplane needs a lot of computing power? I think the way you criticize the article is about as faulty as the article itself. This piece is about detailing how the 737 is an outdated design that got patched and patched till it more or less broke. The processing power is just /one/ aspect and is given as a point of reference, like the 1968 photo. I am no expert in aviation, but I…

> This piece is about detailing how the 737 is an outdated design that got patched and patched till it more or less broke. The processing power is just /one/ aspect and is given as a point of reference, like the 1968 photo.

I address that in my post and I do not fault the author for pointing out design issues. My issue is with the implication that processing power is an issue.

> Nowhere in the article does the author claim the 737 MAX crashed because it had too weak CPUs. It is, however, one indication of an obsolete design - newer jets like the A320 or the 787 have more beefy processors for a reason.

Newer jets have faster processors because they're built on a newer system. If you're developing a new system, you might as well throw in some faster hardware. The cost of the hardware itself is nothing compared to the overhead development costs for avionics.

Re: 737 Max: 1960s Design, 1990s Computing Power and Paper Manuals

#120
post #103
post #68

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The NYT fired basically their entire editorial staff in 2017. The accelerated degradation has been noticable.

This is a good and comprehensive article. You and the grandparent comment are focusing on one minor component and using it to raise FUD about the rest of the article and indeed the entire NYT now. It's a lazy form of debate. HN used to be better than this.

I never said the article was bad. I said the title was bad and specifically addressed the complaint in the title which brought me to the article in the first place.
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