737 Max: 1960s Design, 1990s Computing Power and Paper Manuals
1–10 of 133 posts
Re: 737 Max: 1960s Design, 1990s Computing Power and Paper Manuals
#2The "1990s Computing Power" comment is ignorantly harsh. The MAX (to the best of my knowledge) uses a similar AMD29050-based architecture as the 777 (where it was pioneered) and the 737-800/900. It's amply fast and very very reliable, hardware and software (setting MCAS aside which is new to MAX).
Any sane person would prefer the solid well-proven choice over the bleeding edge. People used to make similar comments about the AGC and the Space Shuttle GPCs e.g. that such-and-such-a-PC-was-faster. Yeah, so what?
Re: 737 Max: 1960s Design, 1990s Computing Power and Paper Manuals
#3The entire management chain that dictated these design compromises should be surgically removed from Boeing and prosecuted for negligence.
Of course, that will never happen.
Re: 737 Max: 1960s Design, 1990s Computing Power and Paper Manuals
#4The thing that baffles me - why the hell has there never been any innovation in the form of making it easier to diagnose a problem and move through the necessary steps in a checklist beyond fumbling through a paper manual? In a situation where seconds count, it seems illogical that this has never been improved upon. Didn’t at least one of these planes crash because the pilots are believed to have only gotten X number of steps through a list of possible reasons?
Re: 737 Max: 1960s Design, 1990s Computing Power and Paper Manuals
#5The thing that baffles me - why the hell has there never been any innovation in the form of making it easier to diagnose a problem and move through the necessary steps in a checklist beyond fumbling through a paper manual? In a situation where seconds count, it seems illogical that this has never been improved upon. Didn’t at least one of these planes crash because the pilots are believed to have only gotten X number…
The entire aviation business and safety structure is build on extraordinary rigidity to processes and approaches. In addition, automation is viewed as a threat to multiple worker groups.
Sometimes this is justified -certainly the MCAS incident is a example. Changes like the MCAS should never have been allowed to change a fundamental part of the airplane interface without considerably more processes being met. That said, sometimes opposition to enhancements is trade unionists being trade unionists.
Re: 737 Max: 1960s Design, 1990s Computing Power and Paper Manuals
#6The thing that baffles me - why the hell has there never been any innovation in the form of making it easier to diagnose a problem and move through the necessary steps in a checklist beyond fumbling through a paper manual? In a situation where seconds count, it seems illogical that this has never been improved upon. Didn’t at least one of these planes crash because the pilots are believed to have only gotten X number…
I remember hearing about the US Airways flight that had an emergency landing in the Hudson river (the film 'Sully' is based on this). The plane sunk faster than it should have because the checklist item 'close the vents' was too far down to be completed before the water landing. In response, the checklist was edited and the item was moved further to the top.
Apologies for not finding an exact link, but here is the wikipedia article for the flight: https://www.wikiwand.com/en/US_Airways_Flight_1549
Re: 737 Max: 1960s Design, 1990s Computing Power and Paper Manuals
#7Kind of unfair. Do they really think that an aircraft should be powered by the same software or hardware that powers a modern computer or smartphone? An aircraft needs incredible reliability. You don’t get that with modern software/hardware architectures.
Re: 737 Max: 1960s Design, 1990s Computing Power and Paper Manuals
#8The thing that baffles me - why the hell has there never been any innovation in the form of making it easier to diagnose a problem and move through the necessary steps in a checklist beyond fumbling through a paper manual? In a situation where seconds count, it seems illogical that this has never been improved upon. Didn’t at least one of these planes crash because the pilots are believed to have only gotten X number…
The newer airbuses actually do have electronic checklists including - for at least some steps - automatic detection that the step has been completed. You can see an example of the electronic checklist in this simulator video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jzjyr0UZKRw
Even on aircraft without fully integrated checklists, many operators have switched to using iPads instead of paper manuals as well.
Re: 737 Max: 1960s Design, 1990s Computing Power and Paper Manuals
#9Kind of unfair. Do they really think that an aircraft should be powered by the same software or hardware that powers a modern computer or smartphone? An aircraft needs incredible reliability. You don’t get that with modern software/hardware architectures.
Yeah, the B-52, adopted in 1952, is planned to be is service through the 2050s. An airframe design expected to last for over 100 years. Keep in mind that flight itself is barely 100 years old.
And paper manuals? Are they expecting to use iPads for in flight documents or something? Shall we compare failure states of paper vs tablets?
Re: 737 Max: 1960s Design, 1990s Computing Power and Paper Manuals
#10The thing that baffles me - why the hell has there never been any innovation in the form of making it easier to diagnose a problem and move through the necessary steps in a checklist beyond fumbling through a paper manual? In a situation where seconds count, it seems illogical that this has never been improved upon. Didn’t at least one of these planes crash because the pilots are believed to have only gotten X number…
As mentioned in the article, other Boeing jets do automatically present a checklist on the display when they detect a problem:
> A second electronic system found on other Boeing jets also alerts pilots to unusual or hazardous situations during flight and lays out recommended steps to resolve them.
The 737 is stuck in the past because given the choice, nobody wants to have to retrain their pilots on more modern systems.