Live data from Hacker News

Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding

leehamnews.com

31–40 of 164 posts

Re: Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding

#31
Primary tldr's:

> Boeing hasn’t announced what the second software problem is. LNA is told it is the interface between the MCAS upgrade and the Flight Control System, but specifics are lacking.

> LNA interprets these combined events as indicative the MAX will be ground well past the Paris Air Show in June.

Re: Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding

#32

Like the Toyota unintended acceleration issue we need third parties to look at the flight control software and engineering decisions taken for the MAX line and give a an independent report. Certainly not the FAA who delegated their oversight to Boeing. 346 people died because of their ineptitude.

> 346 people died because of their ineptitude. This might be too hot of a take for HackerNews, but... look at how many people the FAA has kept safe over the past 30 years. I'm pretty sure the number of people who travel without dying is very, very high. I don't disagree that their might have been some ineptitude (I'm sure you could find that anywhere for anything since it's opinion driven), but to say the FAA is all…

I do not see anyone condemning the last 30 years of FAA, just the more recent work. Would it not be appropriate to criticize a significant fall from their earlier high standards?

And yes the numbers are not the only relevant issue. It is the manner in which the original certification was done, the failure to act swiftly after the first crash, and the inordinate delay in acting even after the second crash which together seem to paint the picture of an organization which puts the interest of the manufacturer above passenger safety.

Re: Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding

#33
post #3

Not only a longer grounding, but some airlines are canceling orders and many passengers don't want to fly in them. The 737 Max could become the Edsel of airplanes. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edsel

History suggests that people will forget this very quickly. I wouldn't be surprised to see Boeing 'rebrand' the plane as 737-8, but it probably won't be necessary.

737-8 already exists: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_Next_Generation#737...

Re: Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding

#34
post #16

Like the Toyota unintended acceleration issue we need third parties to look at the flight control software and engineering decisions taken for the MAX line and give a an independent report. Certainly not the FAA who delegated their oversight to Boeing. 346 people died because of their ineptitude.

I agree, we need someone like Michael Barr to comb thru supposedly clean safety certified Ada codebase (in reality most likely full of C++ garbage).

Is there a percentage pie chart for what was used on the MAX? Like 80% Ada, 15% C++, and 5% C? I wonder if we'll see a move to things like Spark where proof verification becomes more standard? I don't know much about avionics software, so any educated comments are welcome.

Re: Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding

#35
post #3

Not only a longer grounding, but some airlines are canceling orders and many passengers don't want to fly in them. The 737 Max could become the Edsel of airplanes. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edsel

From aviation it could be the De Havilland Comet. But that brought the whole company down. So let's hope this will not go there. Airbus having a monopoly is no ones interest.

Re: Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding

#36
post #14

Like the Toyota unintended acceleration issue we need third parties to look at the flight control software and engineering decisions taken for the MAX line and give a an independent report. Certainly not the FAA who delegated their oversight to Boeing. 346 people died because of their ineptitude.

Toyota never had an “unintended acceleration issue”—that was purely human error. A Toyota engine can’t overpower its brakes, unless there was gross negligence in the care of the brakes, i.e., they were totally inoperative. Just to make sure we’re clear on the braking thing: if you were to accelerate a Toyota sedan (any of them) to 70mph, then stomp on the brakes while holding the accelerator to the floor, the car wil…

I do not know why you are getting the downvotes, but you are correct. The DoT and independent inspectors backed up this scenario.

https://www.caranddriver.com/features/a15125313/its-all-your...

Re: Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding

#37
post #11

Like the Toyota unintended acceleration issue we need third parties to look at the flight control software and engineering decisions taken for the MAX line and give a an independent report. Certainly not the FAA who delegated their oversight to Boeing. 346 people died because of their ineptitude.

At best, stricter regulations may have resulted in a different design to comply with US regulations. The FAA is not a global organization, they don’t have oversight over any of the crashed aircraft. So, it’s tricky to place blame on US regulators for foreign crashes.

While in a de jure sense this is true, de facto the FAA effectively does have oversight over many (maybe most) commercial aircraft all over the world. Small countries in particular do not have the resources necessary to exercise meaningful oversight over every type of aircraft on the planet, and defer to FAA decisions in virtually every respect for Boeing and other American-made aircraft, and the US FAA and NTSB are involved in the investigation of virtually every incident involving a Boeing aircraft anywhere in the world.

Even larger, well-resourced geopolitical entities like the EU rely heavily on the FAA to do its job for Boeing aircraft, much as the FAA relies on the EASA to do its job for Airbus aircraft. It's not pure rubber stamping, but it's close enough that things like this can pretty easily happen if a manufacturer's home agency falls asleep at the switch.

An example of the FAA's influence: Airworthiness regulations are so closely coordinated that special numbering is used by Canada, Europe, and Japan to match the numbering of FAA airworthiness regulations for easy cross-referencing. The FAA is also delegated air traffic control responsibility for much of the world's international airspace by the ICAO.

It is basically impossible to fly a commercial aircraft on Earth without being under the – possibly very heavy – influence of US civil aviation authorities, and it would take a great many resources and serious, concerted political will by many countries to change that.

Re: Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding

#38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Three angle of attack sensors seems unnecessary to me. They simply need to make MCAS pay attention to both (2) and cut out if one disagrees with the other.

How would it know which one is the malfunctioning one?

That's not important; you disable that “autopilot feature” and sound an alarm in the cockpit explaining what the exact error is. Should be enough for the human pilots to react properly.

Re: Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding

#39
post #33

Earlier quoted context omitted.

History suggests that people will forget this very quickly. I wouldn't be surprised to see Boeing 'rebrand' the plane as 737-8, but it probably won't be necessary.

737-8 already exists: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_Next_Generation#737...

The 737-800 is a 737NG. The model number for a 737 MAX-8 is 737-8. That's why I put rebranding in quotes -- it's already the official designation for the plane. I could see them dropping the public "MAX" branding from what they print on the side of the plane and just calling it 737-8 (and -7, and -9, for the other models) everywhere.

Re: Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding

#40
post #16

Like the Toyota unintended acceleration issue we need third parties to look at the flight control software and engineering decisions taken for the MAX line and give a an independent report. Certainly not the FAA who delegated their oversight to Boeing. 346 people died because of their ineptitude.

I agree, we need someone like Michael Barr to comb thru supposedly clean safety certified Ada codebase (in reality most likely full of C++ garbage).

The problem here is not a software bug—-the software performed as designed, the design was just bad.
Post reply on HN