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Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg Addresses the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 Report

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171–180 of 347 posts

Re: Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg Addresses the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 Report

#171

This has been a 50 year problem in the making, and whether it's for better or worse should be more carefully studied. Because here's my understanding of the history: Through WW2 and the proliferating age of defense contractors, the government (mostly defense department, but also civilian agencies) stood almost on equal footing with contractors in their ability to design, scope, and evaluate big projects. You would se…

Can you provide evidence the FAA lacks sufficient expertise?

There is a whistleblower claiming this very thing. https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/02/senate-panel-probes-whistleb...

Claims aren't evidence. But testimony is evidence. How compelling that is depends on their credibility, qualifications, and whether there's corroborating evidence.

Re: Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg Addresses the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 Report

#172
Don’t put the blame squarely on Boeing.

It’s clear FAA lacks the expertise to regulate this kind safety issues. It’s not easy for them to have it either since the innovators are always a step ahead but it’s clear they need to shape up.

I don’t have any knowledge of the process for verification of new airplane models, but one thought as software developer would perhaps be for FAA to become more digital in their efforts. Require from manufacturers (At least for bigger models) a digital virtual model of the entire airplane that will be used for simulated tests. You could for instance test faulty signaling sensors but also the whole subseqqunt chain of events taking into account pilot actions (or lack of).

It should be a routine to replay a simulation with data from previous crashes. In this particular instance perhaps FAA would have understood the reasons of the first crash and been able to stopped the second crash from ever happening.

You could even develop methods that can generate data to be able to predict hidden issues with an existing design without a real crash ever happening.

Re: Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg Addresses the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 Report

#173

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Realistically and pragmatically speaking, you only ever get to have just one single shot at establishing and maintaining that kind of life/death level of trust. Fuck it up, and you're gone- quite literally, mind you. I wish this statement was held with as much as accountability as this comment implies. But have any of the major outlets been discussing potential prison sentences for Boeing or FAA employees / executi…

> Investors are assuming the stock is on sale and this only impacts Boring for, what, a few weeks? Reminds me of the Equifax breach. Stock tumbles then recovers. Overall, it validates that breaches are not a liability; therefore, additional resources to address future problems could be seen as a moot point. Same with Boeing. If there is no impact to the company, then why change the business model?

Equifax is not comparable to this. The difference with Equifax is that there has been little actual damage compare to how much data got compromised. With Boeing we've had hundreds who got killed.

Re: Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg Addresses the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 Report

#174

I know better than to read between the lines on a press release like this, but can't help but notice that it falls far short of accepting responsibility for the problem. He admits that MCAS "activated in response to erroneous angle of attack information" but doesn't admit that this alone directly resulted in the crashes. Rather, he implies that this sets off a chain of events which the pilots are unable to deal with…

Yep, it is full of bullshit corporate PR and crisis management. This story has just begun. FAA and Boeing hopefully will be held responsible. I don't hold my breath to see criminal charges for Boeing management, but this time, I wouldn't be completely surprised, if it happens.

Re: Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg Addresses the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 Report

#175

I know better than to read between the lines on a press release like this, but can't help but notice that it falls far short of accepting responsibility for the problem. He admits that MCAS "activated in response to erroneous angle of attack information" but doesn't admit that this alone directly resulted in the crashes. Rather, he implies that this sets off a chain of events which the pilots are unable to deal with…

Indeed, the whole press release brings to mind a couple of points from "Engineering a Safer World" which, if you're interested in this stuff, I can't recommend enough[0].

In the section "Questioning the Foundations of Traditional Safety Engineering":

  Old Assumption
  Most accidents are caused by operator error. Rewarding safe behaviour and punishing unsafe behaviours will eliminate or reduce accidents significantly.
  New Assumption
  Operator error is a product of the environment in which it occurs. To reduce operator "error" we must change the environment in which the operator works.
And:

  Old Assumption
  Major accidents occur from the chance simultaneous occurrence of random events.
  New Assumption
  Systems will tend to migrate toward states of higher risk. Such migration is predictable and can be prevented by appropriate system design or detected during operations using leading indicators of increasing risk.
In the press release we see both the "operator error" and "random events" hand-waving. Regardless of the fiduciary duty of this man, this is just not good enough.

[0] Open Access PDF: https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/engineering-safer-world

Re: Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg Addresses the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 Report

#176
post #77

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The reason this preliminary report is so damning is that it's evident that the pilots on flight 302 knew this - they realised what was happening, took the necessary steps to disable MCAS, and still couldn't stop the plane from crashing and killing everyone on board.

Read the narrative in the report. Why do you suppose that after they got the same initial signs of trouble that the Lion Air flight had (stick shaker on left side, disagreement in airspeed values, etc. immediately after takeoff) that the captain tried to engage autopilot and instructed the first officer to retract flaps and inform controllers they were proceeding to climb to FL 320 (32,000 ft). Why not instead turn b…

Of course they would have tried to land after getting the plane under control. They didn't have airspeed or altitude under control, and were following the checklists they were supposed to be following. IAS Unstable tells them to leave thrust high and flaps alone to avoid a wing stall.

Re: Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg Addresses the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 Report

#177

Earlier quoted context omitted.

How do you arrive at such a conclusion? Have you researched regulatory agencies in EU? For example they just blocked a meeger between two massive train manufacturer. Your argument sounds like a weak libertarian talking point.

It's not something I've dreamed up personally. Economists have done a lot of work in this area (Public Choice Theory) in the last 60 years. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regulatory_capture https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_choice Of course, my post above is sharpened and overgeneralized to fit in an online forum. There are more nuances. A current example in the news is Facebook asking congress to be regulated. Thi…

It sounds like you are dreaming of it tough. To make such a strong statement. It is like saying all corporations end up like Theranos or Enron eventually. Economists do a lot of research and disagree with each other violently. So I will not take your links as any proof that regulatory capture is an inevitable end. Yes it is concerning that it happens but there is absolutely no reason to believe it is the fate of all.

Re: Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg Addresses the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 Report

#178
post #134

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> At 05:40:35, the First-Officer called out “stab trim cut-out” two times. Captain agreed and First- Officer confirmed stab trim cut-out. > At 05:41:46, the Captain asked the First-Officer if the trim is functional. The First-Officer has replied that the trim was not working and asked if he could try it manually. The Captain told him to try. At 05:41:54, the First-Officer replied that it is not working. I guess the F…

Pilots are often wrong about what their aircraft is doing. In fact, that's a big reason why they crash. So yes, the First Officer said that but that is not conclusive proof that they couldn't manually trim. He may have misinterpreted the question and tried the electric trim again. Or maybe he tried turning the wheel and didn't do it right. Or maybe he needed to try again. Or maybe he needed the pilots help. Or maybe…

Bear in mind that they're at low altitude and the pilot is busy supplying maximum pull on the yoke, and therefore likely unavailable to help crank a stiff trim wheel.

Re: Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg Addresses the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 Report

#179
post #99

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, two. The standard for critical systems is 3. Two isn't good for much, if they give different readings you don't know which to believe. Either that kills you like in real life, or it kills you because of the stall problem it was invented to fix. Edit: And yes, you could do something more sensible than what they did, but that doesn't "fix" the issue, it merely mitigates it to some extent.

This seems a little overstated. As I understand it the plane isn't actually aerodynamically unstable and isn't going to stall itself without the pilot pulling into it. The main issue seems to have been software to me. I'm not saying they should avoid using a third sensor. It sounds like a good idea. But I'm not sure it's required for airworthiness, after you move from one to two.

Maybe a little overstated to avoid getting into subtleties, but I stand behind the point.

Yes, it seems the plane is probably mostly flyable if you kill the MCAS system (which is the only reasonable step to take in a two sensor system when they disagree). But

- The plane no longer handles the same, you definitely need to be alerting the pilots, and put this change into manuals and training. This isn't just a thing you should silently do in software and expect not to kill people.

- The plane no longer meets the FAA rules for the class under these conditions. Maybe that's acceptable because it is an error state, but I think that meets the definition of a "workaround" and not a "fix".

- At least one of these planes took off when one of the sensors was known to be bad from the previous flight (as I understand it). I can only assume that they don't do that when something critical to the handling of the plane is broken. This is another process bug that needs to be fixed before a software workaround might be acceptable.

I don't see any way to interpret this other than "the hardware didn't work as we thought it did", which leads me to say "hardware bug", even if you can maybe work around it with process, training, and software changes.

Re: Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg Addresses the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 Report

#180

I know better than to read between the lines on a press release like this, but can't help but notice that it falls far short of accepting responsibility for the problem. He admits that MCAS "activated in response to erroneous angle of attack information" but doesn't admit that this alone directly resulted in the crashes. Rather, he implies that this sets off a chain of events which the pilots are unable to deal with…

With the way litigation works, corporations will never admit blame for anything, since it greatly increases their legal risk. It's unfortunate, but their responsibilities lie with their shareholders, not the people who lost their lives on their planes.

> their responsibilities lie with their shareholders

This is the "shareholder value" theory, modern economists successfully brainwashed the population with. It became popular during the 1980s, "greed is good" times. It's just an ideology disguised as a science. The purpose and structure of modern corporation hasn't changed in the last hundred years or so. In 1950s and 1960s the public good, among others, role of corporations was wildly accepted. What changed is the ideologues who became more vicious and took complete control of the narrative.

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