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Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg Addresses the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 Report

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Re: Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg Addresses the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 Report

#22
Now read again what Boeing issued to the airlines and the pilots after the first crash:

https://www.avm-mag.com/faa-issues-emergency-ad-for-boeing-7...

"An erroneous AOA input can cause some or all of the following indications and effects:"

"IAS DISAGREE alert."

The whole "what to do" is then:

"Initially, higher control forces may be needed to overcome any stabilizer nose down trim already applied. Electric stabilizer trim can be used to neutralize control column pitch forces before moving the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches to CUTOUT. Manual stabilizer trim can be used before and after the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches are moved to CUTOUT."

We know now that the pilots performed what was there laconically written, and that even these actions couldn't save the plane.

Which means either:

- Boeing never actually tested how to really handle the situation described then or

- Boeing indeed tested that and knew that IAS DISAGREE procedures would also be followed and which would guarantee to make the plane uncontrollable (for details see here: https://leehamnews.com/2019/04/03/et302-used-the-cut-out-swi... how one pilot recently reconstructed that and made a video about it, which was later withdrawn on the demand of the pilot's company -- note a single pilot here did what Boeing, which is supposed to sell hundreds of billions USD worth of these planes didn't want to do), but bet on "it won't happen soon enough, we can get away with it."

I can't find that anybody can excuse either of these.

Re: Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg Addresses the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 Report

#23
post #15

It's now fairly obvious MCAS was at the root of those two crashes. But, did it save lives in other circumstances? Meaning, was there ever a case where the nose went up so much, because of the bigger motors and their different location on the wings, that the activation of MCAS prevented a stall? I'm surprised no one seems to talk about this. It's also surprising the MCAS was implemented at all, instead of an alarm. Ye…

You’re missing the point of why MCAS was implemented in the first place - for type certification & to avoid retraining.

Essentially it was an emulation layer to make what is effectively a new plane behave like an old plane. And now 300+ people are dead.

Re: Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg Addresses the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 Report

#24
post #5
post #2

,,We remain confident in the fundamental safety of the 737 MAX.'' Am I irrational for not wanting to be on the first 1-2 years of flights on 737 MAX after it gets its software update?

Well, then I'm irrational too, because I won't set foot in a 737 MAX after this shitfest. The FAA also lost a lot of trust, for rubber-stamping this. The first accident was maybe understandable. We all know that shit happens. But Boeing has zero excuses for not immediately grounding the whole fleet after, and for putting out that useless recovery procedure which didn't work in this case. They let a deadly plane fly f…

The integrity of engineering excellence should never be sacrificed for profit and/or conveniency in places where it involves human lives. Realistically and pragmatically speaking, you only ever get to have just one single shot at establishing and maintaining that kind of life/death level of trust. Fuck it up, and you're gone- quite literally, mind you.

This is some Challenger O-ring type of shitshow. Accidents are one thing; incompetency or, worse yet, callous indifference is absolutely unacceptable.

Re: Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg Addresses the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 Report

#25
post #15

It's now fairly obvious MCAS was at the root of those two crashes. But, did it save lives in other circumstances? Meaning, was there ever a case where the nose went up so much, because of the bigger motors and their different location on the wings, that the activation of MCAS prevented a stall? I'm surprised no one seems to talk about this. It's also surprising the MCAS was implemented at all, instead of an alarm. Ye…

The problem with dealing with a departure stall is they’re extremely deadly, happen faster than a person can react to, and are in general unrecoverable all because of the lack of altitude. If it was the case that you could easily deal with a departure stall in the 737-MAX then they would have seen no need to implement MCAS.

Re: Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg Addresses the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 Report

#26
post #15

It's now fairly obvious MCAS was at the root of those two crashes. But, did it save lives in other circumstances? Meaning, was there ever a case where the nose went up so much, because of the bigger motors and their different location on the wings, that the activation of MCAS prevented a stall? I'm surprised no one seems to talk about this. It's also surprising the MCAS was implemented at all, instead of an alarm. Ye…

> It's now fairly obvious MCAS was at the root of those two crashes. But, did it save lives in other circumstances?

Let's say Boeing ships a new airliner, where in 1/1,000 flights, the wings fall off for no reason.

Would you be asking the question of: "But did the wings save lives in other circumstances?"

Of bloody course, they did. Doesn't mean that they should have ever shipped an aircraft, where the wings fall off for no reason!

MCAS was a hack around a redesign of the plane. If the plane would have crashed at an even higher rate, without that hack, then the conclusion is not: "WOW, MCAS saves lives."

The conclusion is: "That airplane should never have been shipped, because it is a deathtrap."

If it would have crashed at a lower rate, without MCAS, then no, MCAS was not a net life-saver.

Boeing chose to redesign the place, making it more dangerous to operate. To mitigate the danger, they added MCAS, which was also dangerous to operate. It doesn't matter whether or not a MAX with MCAS, or a MAX without MCAS is more dangerous. What matters is that a MAX with MCAS is dangerous. Nobody put a gun to their head, and made them redesign their plane.

Re: Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg Addresses the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 Report

#28
post #24
post #5

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Well, then I'm irrational too, because I won't set foot in a 737 MAX after this shitfest. The FAA also lost a lot of trust, for rubber-stamping this. The first accident was maybe understandable. We all know that shit happens. But Boeing has zero excuses for not immediately grounding the whole fleet after, and for putting out that useless recovery procedure which didn't work in this case. They let a deadly plane fly f…

The integrity of engineering excellence should never be sacrificed for profit and/or conveniency in places where it involves human lives. Realistically and pragmatically speaking, you only ever get to have just one single shot at establishing and maintaining that kind of life/death level of trust. Fuck it up, and you're gone- quite literally, mind you. This is some Challenger O-ring type of shitshow. Accidents are on…

>The integrity of engineering excellence should never be sacrificed for profit and/or conveniency in places where it involves human lives.

That's just unrealistic. Unless you want plane and car rides to cost as much as a trip to space, after all, since everything would need to be engineered to that level of quality.

Re: Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg Addresses the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 Report

#29
post #15

It's now fairly obvious MCAS was at the root of those two crashes. But, did it save lives in other circumstances? Meaning, was there ever a case where the nose went up so much, because of the bigger motors and their different location on the wings, that the activation of MCAS prevented a stall? I'm surprised no one seems to talk about this. It's also surprising the MCAS was implemented at all, instead of an alarm. Ye…

> It's also surprising the MCAS was implemented at all, instead of an alarm.

Regulations are that "(1) The stick force vs. g curve must have a positive slope at any speed up to and including VFC/MFC; and......(a lot of other text)......During the approach to the stall, the longitudinal control pull force should increase continuously as speed is reduced from the trimmed speed to the onset of stall warning."

The Max's aerodynamics are such that as you approach a stall angle, at a certain point the force inverts and the aircraft "pitches nose up" reducing force against the stick close to the stall angle.

An alarm thus fails to meet the stick force requirement. The intention behind the MCAS is to push force against the stick throughout the approach to the stall angle to meet the requirement.

(Which obviously created a whole host of failure modes that everyone seems to have entirely missed).

Re: Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg Addresses the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 Report

#30
post #2

,,We remain confident in the fundamental safety of the 737 MAX.'' Am I irrational for not wanting to be on the first 1-2 years of flights on 737 MAX after it gets its software update?

The main thing for me is that NOW pilots will be aware that there is a piece of software running in the background that might fight them. The first thing they will all learn is how to disable it so they can actually fly the airplane. That's even without a software fix.

To me, it all comes down to to Boeing being able to self-certify their aircraft, and they knew they were sneaking the "fix" known as MCAS as a way to prevent loss of sales to A320. Super shady in my opinion.

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