141–150 of 347 posts
Earlier quoted context omitted.
A compounding problem is, if the MCAS system is disable, now the flight characteristics are completely changed. Without additional training, there's no way for the pilots to know they have to trim down.
There's no way for pilots to know they have to trim down under what conditions?
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> they were only 7,000 feet above the ground No, it's worse: the origin airport is at 7000ft elevation. They only had around 1000ft height AGL for all of the flight. So I agree that releasing the elevator at all seems surely suicidal.
They're at 12,000-14,000 feet altitude at 05:43ish, when the co-pilot reports the non-functional manual trim. So ~6,000-7,000 height. Still damn close to the ground to be comfortable letting the plane dive.
https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/flightradar24-data-regard...
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So MCAS put them in a hard to recover position which required electric trim to recover, and as soon as they turned on the electric trim MCAS turned on again and forced them into a crash? Then this is much worse than initially suggested, it means a pilot can be aware of MCAS and still be put in a extremely dangerous position due to the extreme control authority of the module.
Per the article a combination of things put them in that situation. Not just MCAS. Why is everyone so wedded to the narrative that this is the fault of MCAS and nothing else? Complex systems that have millions of man hours spent making them safer don't usually have back to back failures because of one faulty subsystem. We've incrementally refined commercial air travel to the point where single source accidents are ba…
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Why exactly? if Boeing did not updated the manuals and checklists how would pilots know that? from internet forums? Should a pilots ignore the checklists and try steps he read on the internet ? I could not find if Boeing updated their manuals/checklists after the first crash.
Yes, Boeing issued this service bulletin after Lion Air: http://www.avioesemusicas.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/TBC... And the FAA made it an emergency airworthiness directive in response. The steps on it were broadly followed by the Ethiopian flight.
Indeed looks like they did disable MCAS using the stabilizer trim cutout switches, but the aircraft was trimmed nose down when they did so. Aerodynamic loading prevented manual trimming using the trim wheels. They eventually turned electric trim back on, as they didn't really have any other options, but didn't trim back enough, and left it turned on. At this point the right airspeed indicator (which should be more re…
Yeah, from the report: > At 05:40:35, the First-Officer called out “stab trim cut-out” two times. Captain agreed and First Officer confirmed stab trim cut-out. [...] > At 05:41:46, the Captain asked the First-Officer if the trim is functional. The First-Officer has replied that the trim was not working and asked if he could try it manually. The Captain told him to try. > At 05:41:54, the First-Officer replied that it…
How does anyone expect pilots to run through these crazy scenarios and perform flawlessly unless they have done it in a simulator many times?
> The crew performed runaway stabilizer checklist and put the stab trim cutout switch to cutout position and confirmed that the manual trim operation was not working. This is very damning to Boeing. It's precisely the procedure they prescribed and intended to mitigate possible MCAS caused trim runaway. In light of the fact that they put this in place as a justification for moving the engines forward without reclassif…
Just out of curiosity, will there actually be any punishments handed out beyond just a slap on the wrist? Or is Boeing far too large of a corp to take on?
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Yes, Boeing issued this service bulletin after Lion Air: http://www.avioesemusicas.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/TBC... And the FAA made it an emergency airworthiness directive in response. The steps on it were broadly followed by the Ethiopian flight.
Am I missing it because I don't see flaps mentioned anywhere in that link.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
A compounding problem is, if the MCAS system is disable, now the flight characteristics are completely changed. Without additional training, there's no way for the pilots to know they have to trim down.
There's no way for pilots to know they have to trim down under what conditions?
If a 737 pilot can operate a 737 MAX only with MCAS, then the pilot shouldn't be able to disable it, right? What if he disables it and then the plane is stalling? There is no MCAS to help.
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I thought all jets had to be capable of performing non powered glides (as in no electrical power, not just engine power). I guess that's no longer a requirement.
The planes when setup correctly have a pretty good glide slope actually. When there is no power the pilots can deploy the apu to restore basic power for flight controls.