Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737 pilots 'could not stop nosedive'

It was shameful to see Boeing actively encouraging that narrative behind the scenes. Especially considering it plays on racist stereotypes equating „Africa“ with bad training/bad safety record/…. The idea of „dingy third world airline“ was ridiculous on its face, considering how bad a fit flying the most modern airliner is with it.

And it was also contradicted by the factual record of Ethopian being a competent airline on par with any in Europe or North America. Their safety rating is better than easyjet, Ryanair, Spirit, WOW, and Southwest: https://www.airlineratings.com/safety-rating-tool/

"Originally Posted by infrequentflyer789

Since this video may not be coming back I'll post a sort of transcript from memory since I was lucky enough to get to watch it. I'll try and just describe what I saw and keep my commentary/speculation to a minimum - in . Bear in mind this is a non-pilot observer's take on it from flaky memory:

There is a fair bit of intro talk then the sim.

They are in NG sim, not MAX, no surprise there. Mentour in left seat.

They start at low altitude, I think it was commented on, not at takeoff, I can't remember if they showed putting flaps up or started with flaps up and said it was just after flaps up.

No stick shaker, that I saw.

IAS disagree then simulated - or they just did the memory items, I didn't notice warning light (not that I would) and he didn't note it, there was an aural alarm but I think that was for AP disconnect

IAS disagree memory items, AP/AT OFF, FDs OFF, 75% N1, 4degrees

Throttles are pushed forward to get 75%, he comments that at low alt with denser air this is a lot of thrust and hence speed will increase

Trim runs, obviously sim doesn't have MCAS so not sure if they are simulating runaway or if he is doing it with the column switches

Comment is made that he was _expecting_ trim to run, because speed is changing, he says it will take a couple of cycles of fighting it with the switches before being definite that it is wrong

They discuss (he raises) that he is having flight control issue, they conclude it is trim that is the problem, they now run the stab trim runaway memory items finishing by hitting the switches. At this point he is clearly holding quite a bit of pressure on the column, but not obviously losing control of pitch

Now he points out that trim has only got down to (I think) 3 degrees on the indicator (zero being full nose down, I think) and that they are now going to "try something" - video captions say "don't try this at home", like we've all got a FFS in our shed or a 737 on the drive :-)

At this point the guy in the right seat uses the handle to wind the trim further _forward_. He stops when he clearly cannot wind it further - but they point out that it's still not at full nose down

Mentour is obviously struggling to keep the nose up at this point. I noticed he didn't seem to have the shoulder straps on (right seat did), possibly because he was frequently turning round to talk to the camera. That probably didn't help, but on the other hand he didn't have stick shaker or feel shift to cope with either.

Now, with Mentour pulling back, the right seat guy tries to wind the trim back with the handle - and he struggles to move it at all

They stop the sim, I think it was after stopping that he noted that at that point they were at 310 (maybe he said 340) knots.

I think there was then some further commentary, at one point I think he mentioned the rollercoaster to unload the stab and allow trimming, but commented that close to the ground the instinct is to pull back - I may be imagining that or remembering it from another video though.

And that was about it. I can try to answer questions on the video if anyone has any. The eye-opener for me wasn't the force on the control column (which was held anyway), it was that the trim couldn't be moved, in either direction. From somewhere I had got the impression that those wheels had a lot of leverage, due to the gearing, which was why a lot of turns would be required, but it seems that a lot of turns would be required and a gorilla to make them..."

This, of course, has been happening for a long time, it's just getting more and more obvious now. I feel strongly that AF 447 was an example.

It's important to understand that this is the natural result of two trends. One, software/hardware systems continue to become more and more complex, many times leading to unforeseen interactions. Two, programmers and programming management teams love to bunch up the work by things not related to the end-users: hardware component, new modules, architectural tier, underlying technology involved.

It doesn't take very much of that at all before you have a whole bunch of people all doing work of various quality in small enough isolated silos such that everybody can do a wonderful job -- and the system still kill people.

There's a lot more to add here. It's nothing new, and there are a ton of ways we've tried to fix this. My belief is that we've failed because we don't understand exactly what goes into making successful software at scale. I am quite concerned about it and I have been writing on this topic for several years. If you're interested in more, see my profile.

The airlines you mention score lower on 'Safety Rating' due to lack of IOSA certification.

"Registering for IOSA certification and auditing is not mandatory therefore an airline that does not have IOSA certification may have either failed the IOSA audit or alternatively chosen not to participate."

For a budget airline I can see them not participating for cost reasons. Does this make them less safe?