Earlier quoted context omitted.
I guess the biggest problem is that the mitigation isn't future-proof. Someday, there might be other command-line tools besides cURL that can be used for this kind of attack. A better fix would be to just drop all incoming IPv4 packets that have the "evil" bit set. ( https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3514.txt ) Extending this protection to IPv6 is left as an exercise for the reader.
Ah, but what about packets that aren't evil, just gullible and manipulated by some third party?
Cisco Fixes RV320/RV325 Vulnerability by Banning “curl” in User-Agent
61–70 of 322 posts
Re: Cisco Fixes RV320/RV325 Vulnerability by Banning “curl” in User-Agent
#62Of all the security post-mortems I’ve ever wanted to read, it’s sad I’ll probably never get to read this one and its tale of how a team of well-paid comfortable engineers got together and decided this patch was a good idea.
Having been involved in meetings where "stop ship" was the phrase of the day, I'd bet money that the following at least vaguely resembles a real conversation: Engineer Alice: We should really fix this properly. Manager: How sure are you that the proper fix won't break something else for $BIG_CUSTOMERS who are responsible for $OBSCENE percent of this product line's revenue? Engineer Bob: Uh, ten percent on a good day?…
The answer is "no", though. This exchange sounds like the decision was between "fixing it cleanly" and "fixing it with a hack", which is roughly equivalent with fixing the problem at the expense of technical debt. But this change does not fix the problem at all.
Re: Cisco Fixes RV320/RV325 Vulnerability by Banning “curl” in User-Agent
#63Earlier quoted context omitted.
I guess the biggest problem is that the mitigation isn't future-proof. Someday, there might be other command-line tools besides cURL that can be used for this kind of attack. A better fix would be to just drop all incoming IPv4 packets that have the "evil" bit set. ( https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3514.txt ) Extending this protection to IPv6 is left as an exercise for the reader.
Ah, but what about packets that aren't evil, just gullible and manipulated by some third party?
Re: Cisco Fixes RV320/RV325 Vulnerability by Banning “curl” in User-Agent
#64I don't see what the fuss is about. This is an effective mitigation, given that software can't just arbitrarily lie about its user agent.
libcurl is open source, I would imagine it'd not be difficult to make it "lie."
Re: Cisco Fixes RV320/RV325 Vulnerability by Banning “curl” in User-Agent
#65I don't see what the fuss is about. This is an effective mitigation, given that software can't just arbitrarily lie about its user agent.
Re: Cisco Fixes RV320/RV325 Vulnerability by Banning “curl” in User-Agent
#66Earlier quoted context omitted.
the could be accomplished just by having User-Agent: mobile, all the other data in the user-agent are useless for this purpose.
Well at least we acknowledged there's some utility. Now consider that mobile devices are different as well..
Re: Cisco Fixes RV320/RV325 Vulnerability by Banning “curl” in User-Agent
#67Earlier quoted context omitted.
the could be accomplished just by having User-Agent: mobile, all the other data in the user-agent are useless for this purpose.
There is presumably some way, at least hypothetically, to fix the mess that User-Agent has become. (Everybody is 'Mozilla' now! And yet somehow a unique snowflake 'Mozilla' that lets you be tracked...) But it's not quite that. It's not that a device is "mobile" instead of "stationary" that matters. It's maybe that it's a touch screen. It's maybe that it's a small screen. (With an especially uneven aspect ratio?) Mayb…
Re: Cisco Fixes RV320/RV325 Vulnerability by Banning “curl” in User-Agent
#68Re: Cisco Fixes RV320/RV325 Vulnerability by Banning “curl” in User-Agent
#69User agents shouldn't exist any more. They serve only to help unsuspecting users be fingerprinted.