The previous flight had exactly the same issue. This is what that pilot wrote in the logs; After parking, the PIC informed the engineer about the aircraft problem and entered IAS (Indicated Air Speed) and ALT (altitude) Disagree and FEEL DIFF PRESS (Feel Differential Pressure) light problem on the Aircraft Flight Maintenance Log (AFML). The PIC also reported the flight condition through the electronic reporting syste…
One wonders, when the prior flight landed with the stab trim system switched off, who switched it back on before the next departure? And was there no question raised as to why it was off? It's not normal to have that system switched off at any time. There are even guards over the switches to ensure they are only operated deliberately.
Cockpit voice recorder of Lion Air jet depicts pilots' frantic search for fix
171–180 of 272 posts
Re: Cockpit voice recorder of Lion Air jet depicts pilots' frantic search for fix
#172Earlier quoted context omitted.
MCAS problems weren't a memory item for any pilot, the memory item is Runaway Stabilizer and exhibits different behaviour to MCAS. Which is to say that they'll be receiving sim training for Runaway Stabilizer, learn what to expect (wheel moves continuously, hard nose down, etc), and then in real life have MCAS cause the same issue but in a substantively different way (change, delay, change, delay, etc). Without the b…
> That's a problem. That's a TRAINING problem. Isn't the root problem still related to the fact that the AoA sensors were returning wrong information and the MCAS was simply reacting to that in a dangerous and non-obvious way? I guess the pilots should be aware of this type of system reaction but still it seems like something that should be fixed at a higher level than training (indicators, backup AoA sensors, detect…
If you'll excuse the expression, everyone is going to get poop on them after this one is over.
Re: Cockpit voice recorder of Lion Air jet depicts pilots' frantic search for fix
#173Earlier quoted context omitted.
MCAS problems weren't a memory item for any pilot, the memory item is Runaway Stabilizer and exhibits different behaviour to MCAS. Which is to say that they'll be receiving sim training for Runaway Stabilizer, learn what to expect (wheel moves continuously, hard nose down, etc), and then in real life have MCAS cause the same issue but in a substantively different way (change, delay, change, delay, etc). Without the b…
> That's a problem. That's a TRAINING problem. Isn't the root problem still related to the fact that the AoA sensors were returning wrong information and the MCAS was simply reacting to that in a dangerous and non-obvious way? I guess the pilots should be aware of this type of system reaction but still it seems like something that should be fixed at a higher level than training (indicators, backup AoA sensors, detect…
Re: Cockpit voice recorder of Lion Air jet depicts pilots' frantic search for fix
#174Earlier quoted context omitted.
No, the failure mode is not two pilots consciously fighting against each other. The failure mode is two pilots who are UNAWARE they are commanding contradicting inputs. Airbus negligently averages these inputs. This is legacy tech debt because the physical design didn’t leave room to link the two controls. Now they are stuck because they feel they can’t change and have some planes that (dangerously) average the input…
> Airbus negligently averages these inputs. On an Airbus, in case of dual input the pilots get a voice alarm and a warning lights up right in front of them. Also the stick has a switch to take priority, in case the other pilot continues to give dual input.
Re: Cockpit voice recorder of Lion Air jet depicts pilots' frantic search for fix
#175Earlier quoted context omitted.
This is not true, on the released FDR data, it shows clearly that the pilot flying corrected the MCAS system's trim down adjustments at every cycle (each 10 seconds) for most of the level flight. So at least the PF must have been aware of this. It's a bit weird if they didn't talk about it though, maybe it was obvious to both pilots and they were concentrating on if they were keeping altitude and airspeed at all (the…
This got my attention too. For at least 6 minutes, the crew were coping with the problem - the aircraft was holding altitude and speed, if erratically, and they must have been getting the trim back to approximately where it should have been, or else MCAS would have driven the stabilizer to the point where it overrode the elevator authority. In about the last minute of that recording, the pattern changes: the pilot tr…
Also notable is that engines spool-up about the same point to what looks like full takeoff thrust.
They must have identified an issue just after going flaps 0 because there is no other reason to go to back to flaps 5 (which incidentally disables MCAS). Why on earth they didn't drop flaps again and head back to the airport is a bit of a mystery to me.
I can't imagine the Captain handing control of a aircraft which was obviously a handful to a co-pilot and then looking straight down at the checklist, surely he'd have given guidance about the trim and waited to ensure the co-pilot was handling the aircraft?
Re: Cockpit voice recorder of Lion Air jet depicts pilots' frantic search for fix
#176Earlier quoted context omitted.
Agreed. It reminds me of the final scene of Grizzly Man, when Herzog listens to the audio recording of the bear enthusiast and his girlfriend being mauled to death. Herzog puts the headphones down, visibly shaken, and comments (paraphrasing): nobody should have to listen to that.
He actually says to the mother: Jewel, you must never listen to this.
Re: Cockpit voice recorder of Lion Air jet depicts pilots' frantic search for fix
#177The previous flight had exactly the same issue. This is what that pilot wrote in the logs; After parking, the PIC informed the engineer about the aircraft problem and entered IAS (Indicated Air Speed) and ALT (altitude) Disagree and FEEL DIFF PRESS (Feel Differential Pressure) light problem on the Aircraft Flight Maintenance Log (AFML). The PIC also reported the flight condition through the electronic reporting syste…
This happened to me a while ago involving trim, and I'll try and go through my thought process and why it takes a little while in the cockpit to figure things out:
- Autopilot is engaged, holding a heading of X, altitude of Y and I've got a power setting for speed Z
- My hands are off the stick, and I'm planning the next 20 mins of the flight.
- The nose has slowly started creeping downwards, I don't notice until I look up a few seconds later
- I glance at the altimeter and see we're now Y-300ft, and descending at 500ft/min.
- I check the altitude hold on the autopilot flight director; see yes, it is still set to Y, and am rather confused, as the stick is fairly pulled back to pull the airplane up (autopilot), so the pitch hasn't changed that much.
- Airspeed is slow, and I'm even more confused - how are we both descending and slowing down.
- Glance over to the passenger, she's fast asleep, a bit restless but not touching the yoke or rudder.
- ATC comes over the radio asking if we're descending and what our intentions are.
- It's only been about 30 seconds but we're now Y-900feet, at a decent rate of of -1400ft, the AoA indicator is starting to beep as we're now in the warning arc, speed is Z-20kts.
- Unsure of what's actually happening, I push in full mix/throttle to keep our airspeed up.
- I grab the stick (already fairly back) and attempt to get us level.
- Tell ATC over the radio I'm having difficulties with the autopilot as I disengage it.
- Feel an immediate / tremendous force on the stick pulling it forwards, have to use both hands to keep it back.
- I'm now wondering if the elevator control is broken.
- Try to start trimming it back (electronic trim), but a warning flashes on the instrument panel.
- Electronic trim usage also immediately disables the autopilot completely, so the wings are now rocking too, giving a weird sensation as I feel like I'm fighting the controls.
- Reach over to the trim wheel, realise the passengers knee is propped on it.
- Move her leg out of the way, and start wheeling it back and feel pressure easing on the stick.
- Keep trying to use the electronic trim and it kicks in, and I can see the trim position on the panel (set pretty far forward).
- Aircraft is now finally level, airspeed is increasing. Elevators / pitch control feels normal.
- Set airspeed for best rate of climb, and tell ATC I'll level off at my previous altitude. Put us into a climb.
- Re-engage the autopilot and all seems well
That was about a minute and a half. I went from 8500ft to around 6800ft in what felt like a few seconds, and it's only after I was in the climb that I realised her shuffling was knocking the trim wheel around. She had been probably doing it for the better part of an hour, and the autopilot had been opposing her inputs. I didn't pick up on the airspeed changes as we're a slow plane flying into a strong headwind so I expected to not be flying the usual speeds.
I pored over the Pilot Operating Handbook that day, and also the Garmin G3X/GFC500 to figure out what was happening and to understand the systems. The trim wheel itself doesn't disengage the autopilot, only the electric trim control does. When the servo motors can't engage (too much force), the system just shows a red X on the instrument display where the control display would be. Etc etc.
The 737MAX pilots don't have that luxury, as they're told it's just a 737 type.
Go through the above scenario, but have no knowledge of the fact that theres something moving the trim. You do not have the luxury of altitude, nor airspeed. The sensors are providing weird inputs. Plus, everything is happening around 10x faster, not a slow build up. You reset the trim, all is well for a few seconds and bam, nose down again. Reset again, it happens again. If I don't know about the MCAS, the 5 sec delay etc, my immediate thought is a faulty computer and I'll try and restart it. And so forth.
Re: Cockpit voice recorder of Lion Air jet depicts pilots' frantic search for fix
#178Earlier quoted context omitted.
Or at the very least, entered into the aircraft maintenance log. Back in my flying days, we had to enter every issue, large or small, into the aircraft maintenance logbook, and we also had to check it before each new flight to see what other crews had experienced, and whether the fault was signed off as 'fixed' or an 'up' fault that we could take into the air with us on the next flight. I believe the tighter turnarou…
It wasn’t clear to me from the article if this was the exact same plane or merely same type. But the hiding of this information on the initial reports of that incident suggest there might be some fear of corporate culpability. Perhaps the pilots DID log it and it was ignored and the plane was turned around and flown again with a faulty AoA and without passing on the “lessons learned”. Will be interesting as we learn…
Re: Cockpit voice recorder of Lion Air jet depicts pilots' frantic search for fix
#179Earlier quoted context omitted.
> That's a problem. That's a TRAINING problem. Isn't the root problem still related to the fact that the AoA sensors were returning wrong information and the MCAS was simply reacting to that in a dangerous and non-obvious way? I guess the pilots should be aware of this type of system reaction but still it seems like something that should be fixed at a higher level than training (indicators, backup AoA sensors, detect…
There's never just one cause of an airline accident. That was one of the causes, but alone it wouldn't have been sufficient. Fixing the problems at all levels is how you achieve high reliability.
Re: Cockpit voice recorder of Lion Air jet depicts pilots' frantic search for fix
#180The MAX has larger engines than previous 737s, and they are in a slightly different position. As a result, the plane has a tendency to pitch its nose up. To keep that from getting out of control if pilots flying manually aren’t attentive, MCAS automatically pushes the nose down if the sensor says the nose is too high.
See: https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-you-need-to-know-about-fly...
In other words, Boeing fixed a hardware flaw with software. I am no aeronautical engineer, but this seems wrong to me. The hardware needs to be correct in and of itself. The software layer should be for enhancing the capabilities of the hardware, not for fixing fundamental flaws in hardware.