141–150 of 272 posts
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This is why I refuse to listen to these things when they're released. The thought of eavesdropping in on someone's frantic hopeless fight for survival just doesn't sit right with me.
Cockpit voice recordings are never released. You may be thinking of recordings of conversations with ATC.
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Part of the problem is that the MCAS system has a 20-second delay after the last time the pilot touched controls for the flaps, and it adjusts itself to a new position and then stops. There are no other indicators that it's happening, and since it's noncontinuous and has a delay, it would be easy to miss the only visual sign of the trim wheel readjusting itself once, especially since the wheel itself is by the pilot'…
I'm not sure that's accurate. Other descriptions of the MCAS system state that it will continually modify the trim on the horizontal stabilizer for up to 10 seconds at a time. http://www.b737.org.uk/mcas.htm
Easy to chase down a wrong line of inquiry when the symptoms only appear sporadically and can be temporarily stopped by a whole range of actions that won't permanently fix it.
Wow. This is a failure from so many parties. The pilots for not knowing the correct procedure. Boeing (who should bear the majority of the blame) for allowing sensors that are not properly redundant, purchasing sensors that appear to fault on a regular basis, not properly training, and not making sure that a problem that was well understood can never happen again, the airline for not informing the next crew of proble…
How did the pilots not think about trim controls... This is BASIC piloting. If you are experiencing pressure on the control stick you adjust trim. How were the pilots this inept?
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> How is it responsible to fly it without understanding the issue? There is not only "the issue" there are a lot of "issues" happening all the time. The problem is even knowing which are "too serious." That the single faulty sensor which didn't affect anything on the previous planes could mean the difference between the life and death was specifically not reported by Boeing. How it is responsible to certify the plane…
> That the single faulty sensor which didn't affect anything on the previous planes could mean the difference between the life and death was specifically not reported by Boeing. We're not talking about a faulty sensor, we're talking about an uncontrolled dive. The airline is not at fault for not connecting the two, but that only means they had information of an uncontrolled dive from an unknown cause , and still flew…
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I don't understand do you think they're listening to music or something? Having a headset on doesn't stop you hearing noises in a cockpit. How did you think all the other verbal alarms and callouts worked if they can't hear anything?
Those all go into the headset as well AFAIK. Many pilots use noise cancelling headphones.
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No, the failure mode is not two pilots consciously fighting against each other. The failure mode is two pilots who are UNAWARE they are commanding contradicting inputs. Airbus negligently averages these inputs. This is legacy tech debt because the physical design didn’t leave room to link the two controls. Now they are stuck because they feel they can’t change and have some planes that (dangerously) average the input…
>Now they are stuck because they feel they can’t change and have some planes that (dangerously) average the inputs, and some that are physically linked. This is a really weird way to construe the situation. The accident report doesn't conclude that the handling of dual inputs was a factor, and it's clear from the transcripts that it wasn't. Airbus has no reason to change this. Merely linking sidesticks would be point…
Is there a case where the averaging of inputs has been proved catastrophic?
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> why it would continue to drive the nose of the plane down even when the pilot is reefing on the stick to pull up well this other crash was caused by a pilot puling up a plane all the way to its ceiling and stalling it, so there's that, so things can go wrong whether if you do and if you don't allow for easy control overrides. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447#Third_in... the trick seems to find th…
The AF 447 crash is one of the reasons MCAS was created. It's the exact scenario MCAS was designed to prevent: High altitude, high-speed, nose-up stall. This was more likely than the NG and dinosaur generations of 737 due to the engine relocation forward and up (causing a pitch-up moment due to thrust). AF 447 should never have happened. The copilot crashed the plane, and the pilot and pilot on break had no indicatio…
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>Now they are stuck because they feel they can’t change and have some planes that (dangerously) average the inputs, and some that are physically linked. This is a really weird way to construe the situation. The accident report doesn't conclude that the handling of dual inputs was a factor, and it's clear from the transcripts that it wasn't. Airbus has no reason to change this. Merely linking sidesticks would be point…
The commenter appears to have a vested interest in making Airbus look bad, otherwise the comment cannot be logically understood. Is there a case where the averaging of inputs has been proved catastrophic?
After parking, the PIC informed the engineer about the aircraft problem and entered IAS (Indicated Air Speed) and ALT (altitude) Disagree and FEEL DIFF PRESS (Feel Differential Pressure) light problem on the Aircraft Flight Maintenance Log (AFML).
The PIC also reported the flight condition through the electronic reporting system of the company A-SHOR. The event was reported as follows:
Airspeed unreliable and ALT disagree shown after takeoff, STS also running to the wrong direction, suspected because of speed difference, identified that CAPT instrument was unreliable and handover control to FO. Continue NNC of Airspeed Unreliable and ALT disagree. Decide to continue flying to CGK at FL280, landed safely runway 25L.
STS is the speed trim system. The pilot didn’t explicitly note that they set STAB TRIM to CUT OUT to correct the problem, perhaps because he thought it was obvious?
But then reading the log of the previous flight;
After three automatic AND trim occurrences, the SIC commented that the control column was too heavy to hold back.
At 14:25:46 UTC, the PIC declared “PAN PAN” to the Denpasar Approach controller due to instrument failure and requested to maintain runway heading.
At 14:28:28 UTC, the PIC moved the STAB TRIM switches to CUT OUT. The PIC re-engaged the STAB TRIM switches to NORMAL, but almost immediately the problem re-appeared. The PIC then moved the STAB TRIM switches back to CUT OUT and continued with manual trim without auto-pilot until the end of the flight.
This implies it took almost three minutes for the previous crew to figure out the STAB TRIM needed to be CUT OUT after finding the trim is so wrong that they can’t hold the stick back.
Clearly this is not a memory item for these pilots.
[1] - https://reports.aviation-safety.net/2018/20181029-0_B38M_PK-...