41–50 of 269 posts
The headline is really confusing; I thought I was perhaps reading it wrong, but it's sort of impossible to read correctly until you realize they are talking about a separate incident than the well-known crash. It would have been clearer if they had written something simpler, like "Lion Air 737 Nearly Crashed One Day Before Deadly Accident"
Runaway trim is supposed to be part of the "memory checklist" for pilots. The symptoms of MCAS are the same as runaway trim and the fix is the same (which is why Boeing didn't feel like extra pilot training was needed), so I'm curious to see the most recent investigation and hear the black box voice recorder. Did they not know they were dealing with runaway trim? Did they think it was something else? Did they forget…
A quick search indicates the CVR for Lion Air 610 was recovered. Did I miss something?
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-crash/no-public...
1. I am glad that 737 MAX has been grounded. May it stay that way, globally, until this issue is provably resolved.
2. The entire Boeing chain of management that resulted in these crashes should be publicly flogged, their remuneration & benefits clawed back & subject to a mandatory minimum prison sentence.
Who the hell am I kidding! Neither is very likely to happen in the present day US. Carry on then, I guess. Just make sure to sign your Last Will & Testament before taking that next flight.
So a single point of failure (malfunctioning sensor) can engage the horizontal stabilizer without notifying pilots, in a way that the control yoke can't override. What the hell did Boeing think was going to happen?
Do we have a confirmed source that it can't be override by pilot input? My understanding was that using the stick could overcome it with other control surfaces and that the controls for trim can be set/reset by the pilot. I think Boeing has handled the aftermath (and much of the lead up since the release of the plane) very, very poorly. I, as a layman to aviation, am not willing to bet that Boeing knew the true likel…
That's east to say from an armchair but on an aircraft everything is "safety critical" to some extent and you have to choose what gets redundancy. Something where without it you can't fly the plane sure, that make sense. The argument for considering MCAS, a system which is not necessary to fly the plane safely, to be "safety critical" is much weaker. The Lion Air crash wouldn't have happened had the pilots disabled MCAS instead of fighting it into the drink.
Suprised they don't have a lessons learned portal. Would have saved some lives.
Can you imagine if the public saw how often planes were close to disaster?
Earlier quoted context omitted.
The fault doesn't lie with the engineers who built the system...not to mention I would be very surprised if they were professionally certified. It lies with the managers who wrote the specification that said that for business reasons the new plane must not require any additional training or type certifications, and cut costs by implementing the required systems with a non-redundant sensor.
that sounds like the engineers are at fault for not refusing to stamp the thing.
Runaway trim is supposed to be part of the "memory checklist" for pilots. The symptoms of MCAS are the same as runaway trim and the fix is the same (which is why Boeing didn't feel like extra pilot training was needed), so I'm curious to see the most recent investigation and hear the black box voice recorder. Did they not know they were dealing with runaway trim? Did they think it was something else? Did they forget…
This implies that 'normal' runaway trim can be stopped by pulling the control yoke. Maybe pilots simply have no idea what is going on once they realise that action has no effect with the MCAS?
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Do we have a confirmed source that it can't be override by pilot input? My understanding was that using the stick could overcome it with other control surfaces and that the controls for trim can be set/reset by the pilot. I think Boeing has handled the aftermath (and much of the lead up since the release of the plane) very, very poorly. I, as a layman to aviation, am not willing to bet that Boeing knew the true likel…
>safety critical systems should always be redundant. That's east to say from an armchair but on an aircraft everything is "safety critical" to some extent and you have to choose what gets redundancy. Something where without it you can't fly the plane sure, that make sense. The argument for considering MCAS, a system which is not necessary to fly the plane safely, to be "safety critical" is much weaker. The Lion Air c…
Runaway trim is supposed to be part of the "memory checklist" for pilots. The symptoms of MCAS are the same as runaway trim and the fix is the same (which is why Boeing didn't feel like extra pilot training was needed), so I'm curious to see the most recent investigation and hear the black box voice recorder. Did they not know they were dealing with runaway trim? Did they think it was something else? Did they forget…