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How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system

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Re: How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system

#91

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Looking back a hundred or more years when the market was more free, your vision of how things might work does not hold. There were no insurance markets for potential injury due to riding a horse, no private certification of stables that lent horses to ensure animals were fit and free of issues of temperament that might cause them to throw a rider. The free market is not a panacea that solves every problem. It does so…

Large ships did have insurance. > There were no insurance markets for potential injury due to riding a horse, no private certification of stables that lent horses to ensure animals were fit and free of issues of temperament that might cause them to throw a rider. Insurance markets have appeared for all manner of things now. This argument doesn't really make any sense. > The free market is not a panacea that solves ev…

Was that insurance for the cargo, the ship itself, or the lives of the crew?

Re: How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system

#92
These crashes are captivating, especially given how astonishingly safe air travel has been in the past decade or so. If I remember correctly 2017 was the safest year in the history of aviation.

And airplanes, particularly modern jets, are fascinating no matter what they're doing. I remember twenty, thirty years ago looking out the towering floor-to-ceiling windows at the airport, marveling at how many different technological fields had to come together to make air travel possible: materials, energy, engineering, radio, logistics, physics, process control, weather prediction, mapping, software development—nowadays even spaceflight and the freakin' theory of relativity come into play where GPS is in use. As a budding geek it was (and still is) catnip.

And then these two MAX jets go down within months of each other. Three hundred and forty six people killed. Three hundred and forty six families shattered, forever. When I think about them, I'm reminded that these weren't just malfunctions to be debugged in my terminal, these were three hundred and forty six tragedies that will ripple out to their friends, families, coworkers, and beyond, for decades to come.

I wonder if we are being hasty in our speculation about the causes. I know we are all intensely curious—that intense curiosity is, I think, a defining feature of the community that frequents this site, and something a lot of us owe our successes to. I notice though a tendency for speculation to evolve into factual claims through repetition, and I wonder if we should be more careful not to allow repetition to take the place of evidence.

Accident investigation is a slow process, and slow processes are frustrating. Information comes in a trickle. It's natural to want to piece together whatever details we have, wherever we can find them. In our hunger to find out what happened, how these 346 people lost their lives, let's not lose sight of the fact that the information we have right now is incomplete.

Let's also not lose sight of the fact that we are talking about people. For the loved ones, this isn't an interesting puzzle; this is a gut-wrenching sorrow. I try to keep that at the center whenever someone asks me what I think about these crashes.

I'm glad the MAX is grounded. And I'm intensely curious about what happened. I try to temper my thoughts on the matter according to the amount and quality of information I have, and the degree of knowledge and experience I've acquired. I don't always succeed. But I can at least rest easy knowing that the investigative team has access to a wealth of information and experience, and that they will make their data and findings public when their work is complete.

Re: How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system

#93
How did Boeing decide to kill the 757 and to continually delay the "New Midsize Airplane", and to progressively extend and modify the 737 until it reached 757 size in the 737 MAX 9?

I would bet good money that there is a wonderful book to be written about competing design teams, rival marketing plans, and mahogany row politics at Boeing about events resulting in the MAX kludge.

Also: "An airline pilot reveals why a plane Boeing discarded 12 years ago is the one they desperately need"

https://www.businessinsider.com/boeing-757-pilot-reveals-737...

Re: How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system

#94
post #9
post #3

So this is the equivalence of “let the software engineers do the QA” thing.

Nope, software engineers at least have a sense of proper QA. This is the equivalence of “let the product manager do the QA” thing.

Even "give the users a beta or MVP product but don't tell them . We'll fix the bugs if they find any"

Re: How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system

#95
post #58
post #49

Earlier quoted context omitted.

AFAIK, the FAA, like many regulating bodies take everything at face value, making sure they are not getting lied to isn't their jobs. An audit usually goes like: "I see that you mentioned a change in document X, show me the corresponding test report", "who is responsible for that part?", "does document Y match document X, as required by norm Z?". They will never check that you actually did the tests, or that the anal…

That might be true for the FAA, but it's not true for the FDA. They will ask companies for original data and then replicate analyses.

But do they replicate how that "original data" was generated or gathered?

Re: How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system

#96
post #54

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I started to compose a reply to your comment, and it turned out to be a deceptively hard question to answer. My attempt at a succinct answer is that carbon should be more expensive, and that Boeing very likely moved too aggressively to meet the market with a more fuel efficient plane. In some ways – based on my probably naive understanding – consumer desire for a cheaper flight results in increased fuel efficiency, s…

> However, better fuel efficiency resulting in cheaper flights leads to people flying more. That's bad. This part sounds complicated. It might be good for the people but bad for the environment. On the other hand, it probably also displaces some long-distance driving, and we have to estimate how much that is. Even if the environmental impact of reduced driving doesn't cancel out the cost of added flights, it's probab…

> This part sounds complicated.

It's also extremely well known especially in environmental economics, if not well understood / solved: it's Jevon's Paradox (more efficient use of a resource can lead to an increase in demand which causes an increase in total resource consumption).

Re: How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system

#97
post #61

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If we're discussing a failure of the FAA, that's the right context to bash regulation, not "self regulation".

That is misleading at best. The FAA was instructed to let the industry to regulate itself more, a typical republican/libertarian belief. Boeing being allowed to self regulated created this mess. https://www.forbes.com/sites/marisagarcia/2019/03/18/did-tru... >Still, the US DOT mandated that the FAA begin the process of review to reduce regulations. The FAA assigned this task to ARAC, effectively putting the question…

Not to diminish the role of the FAA in this, but do other nations not do their own certifications of new aircraft? Is it a nation of origin thing? e.g. Boeing is regulated by the FAA and everyone trusts the FAA, then Airbus gets regulated by EASA and everyone trusts EASA?

Re: How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system

#99
post #93

How did Boeing decide to kill the 757 and to continually delay the "New Midsize Airplane", and to progressively extend and modify the 737 until it reached 757 size in the 737 MAX 9? I would bet good money that there is a wonderful book to be written about competing design teams, rival marketing plans, and mahogany row politics at Boeing about events resulting in the MAX kludge. Also: "An airline pilot reveals why a p…

Because having a single "Type Rating" allows pilots to work 3 generations of 737 at a given time, meaning airlines don't need to train their pilots as much or hire new ones with the required type ratings.

Re: How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system

#100
post #61

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That is misleading at best. The FAA was instructed to let the industry to regulate itself more, a typical republican/libertarian belief. Boeing being allowed to self regulated created this mess. https://www.forbes.com/sites/marisagarcia/2019/03/18/did-tru... >Still, the US DOT mandated that the FAA begin the process of review to reduce regulations. The FAA assigned this task to ARAC, effectively putting the question…

Not to diminish the role of the FAA in this, but do other nations not do their own certifications of new aircraft? Is it a nation of origin thing? e.g. Boeing is regulated by the FAA and everyone trusts the FAA, then Airbus gets regulated by EASA and everyone trusts EASA?

That's basically how it works for complex aircraft. The 777 was the first airliner to receive automatic EASA approval after FAA acceptance.

Smaller nations follow FAA or EASA. Russia and China have their own certification systems but defer largely to the Big Two for imports. However it is notable that the Chinese regulator took a long time and much persuading before they accepted the Max.

Why it isn't done at an international level I don't know. Small aircraft could still be certificated nationally if they're not intended for export.

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