So what's the most likely outcome for all the grounded planes at this point? As someone who has some fear of flying I'll definitely make sure none of my trips include a 737 max in the future, no matter how many patches or upgrades boeing releases
How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system
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Re: How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system
#42Unvetted image comparison of the cockpits 737 MAX 8 Cockpit - https://i2.wp.com/thepointsguy.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/0... 737 800 Cockpit - https://i.imgur.com/eRULoST.jpg I don't really know my way around an airliner but the key displays seem to be quite different and there's a lot fewer knobs on the MAX 8.
Most of those knobs below the glare shield are things like dimming the displays, setting what appears on each display (notable as there was an AIRS report from a pilot who struggled with the displays and presentation).
But the key controls in these accidents are identical. Namely the electronic trim on the yoke, the trim wheels in the middle and the cut-off switches to the right and below the throttles.
Re: How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system
#43Earlier quoted context omitted.
Unfortunately, regulation doesn't fit with the narrative of self-determination and "pull yourself up by your bootstraps" Instead the narrative is about big, bloated bureaucracies, ignoring the fact that they got so big by having to respond and add additional layers every time someone figured out a new way to screw things up, as with Boeing.
I've never heard anyone criticizing the size of the FAA or calls for airplane manufacturers to be deregulated. Do you have examples of this? Or are you just making a general politicized point about deregulation? On the other hand I've seen many people complain about "regulatory capture" between FAA + Boeing repeatedly. That's even on the Wikipedia for FAA. > The FAA has been cited as an example of regulatory capture,…
Yes, I have an example. The parent comment was about regulation in general, and mine was in response to that. However, there was the massive deregulation of the FAA in 1978 due to this sort of pressure. It had one effect of creating more competition in the industry, but it arguably went too far and has had an impact on safety as well. [0]
[0] https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/perspective-on-airline-sa...
Re: How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system
#44>FAA for pushing engineers to 'delegate' reviews of certain components back to Boeing themselves. How much more proof do we need as a society that self regulation is a fool's errand?
Unfortunately, regulation doesn't fit with the narrative of self-determination and "pull yourself up by your bootstraps" Instead the narrative is about big, bloated bureaucracies, ignoring the fact that they got so big by having to respond and add additional layers every time someone figured out a new way to screw things up, as with Boeing.
The free market answer would be insurance.
As an individual, you probably want some kind of life insurance in the event of catastrophe. Your insurance carrier may require you only ride in such and such certified aircraft (eg, an aircraft that is insured against loss of life). An aircraft may only obtain insurance if it meets certain requirements, etc.
Unfortunately, we've got a regulatory body asleep at the wheel, telling people things are safe when they're not. This is distorting the insurance marketplace.
In a system with regulations, there has to be some meaningful method of enforcing penalties, and IMO this is particularly needed in the are of liability.
It shouldn't matter if Boeing got a defective part from a manufacturer, or bad software, or what have you from a 3rd party. It's still their primary responsibility to ensure safe travels. If that means certifying each and every nut and bolt that comes into their supply chain, then so be it.
$50m per dead passenger should be a suitable amount. We'll see just how confident they are in this MCAS and all this automation nonsense then.
Re: How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system
#45Earlier quoted context omitted.
Hopefully it will also fall in part on the FAA, which greenlit the thing for use without checks that might have caught this.
And will it also fall in part on the passengers who demand cheap and cheaper air fares? (Not only to the detriment of their own safety but also to further increasing ecological debts).
On the passengers directly I wouldn't expect so, the passengers didn't keep demanding reuse of the same old airframe.
It might fall on the airlines, especially Southwest which refuses to fly anything but 737 and thus keeps demanding new ever more altered revisions of the same original frame without type change.
But even then at the end of the day if Boeing can't fulfil those demands properly and ethically they are the ones to blame.
In the aggregate, consumers will likely flock to the cheaper version of commodities, that doesn't mean it's legal let alone ethical to e.g. sell talc full of asbestos because that's cheaper than selling asbestos-free talc.
Re: How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system
#46Earlier quoted context omitted.
Unfortunately, regulation doesn't fit with the narrative of self-determination and "pull yourself up by your bootstraps" Instead the narrative is about big, bloated bureaucracies, ignoring the fact that they got so big by having to respond and add additional layers every time someone figured out a new way to screw things up, as with Boeing.
I've never heard anyone criticizing the size of the FAA or calls for airplane manufacturers to be deregulated. Do you have examples of this? Or are you just making a general politicized point about deregulation? On the other hand I've seen many people complain about "regulatory capture" between FAA + Boeing repeatedly. That's even on the Wikipedia for FAA. > The FAA has been cited as an example of regulatory capture,…
> I've never heard anyone criticizing the size of the FAA or calls for airplane manufacturers to be deregulated. Do you have examples of this?
Numerous aspects of the FAA have been politicized for decades (going back to at least the ATC strike under Reagan). The FAA also has a number of complex and lengthy programs (https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/ etc) that are have drawn extensive criticism from Congress, industry, and airport operators due to the cost, delays, and scope of proposed regulation etc. Even FAA reauthorization is a politically contentious issue.
Re: How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system
#47So what's the most likely outcome for all the grounded planes at this point? As someone who has some fear of flying I'll definitely make sure none of my trips include a 737 max in the future, no matter how many patches or upgrades boeing releases
They'll be patched to take input from both angle-of-attack sensors (it has two, but the MCAS only used input from one of them) and limit how much the MCAS can override pilot input.
I'd be more concerned by the regulatory capture that permitted this to happen than the specific model of aircraft.
Re: How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system
#48So what's the most likely outcome for all the grounded planes at this point? As someone who has some fear of flying I'll definitely make sure none of my trips include a 737 max in the future, no matter how many patches or upgrades boeing releases
It is very unlikely they will be scraped. There isn't just a handful out there, but more than 300. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Boeing_737_MAX_order...
My uninformed assumption is that once a suitable issue is isolated some sort of remediation (training/software/airframe/cockpit) all under the onset of various international gov bodies. No idea if the is a 1 year or 5 year process.
Re: How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system
#49This article seems to be second-hand reporting some of the information originally broken here [1]. There's a lot of damning information, not only for Boeing, but also a lot of negligence at the FAA for pushing engineers to 'delegate' reviews of certain components back to Boeing themselves. [1] https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/faile...
AFAIK, the FAA, like many regulating bodies take everything at face value, making sure they are not getting lied to isn't their jobs.
An audit usually goes like: "I see that you mentioned a change in document X, show me the corresponding test report", "who is responsible for that part?", "does document Y match document X, as required by norm Z?".
They will never check that you actually did the tests, or that the analysis is correct. Only that the paperwork is done correctly and that the person responsible is identified. Their field of expertise is in the process, not software or mechanical engineering.
But now that they have a list of names, and if one of them rubberstamped something that wasn't actually done, things won't go well for him. It can get really serious, possibly resulting in prison time, so managers usually don't that this duty lightly.
Re: How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system
#50Earlier quoted context omitted.
> has a chance of facing a stall at lower speeds than earlier 737 variations No, that's not the issue. The issue is that, because of the pitch up moment created by the engines, at higher angles of attack the force required to move the yoke decreases instead of increasing. That's (a) a highly undesirable characteristic since the changing feedback confuses pilots and makes it hard for them to know when a stall is immin…
You're correct, however without MCAS it could be easier for the pilot to accidentally pitch into a stall when flying manually. That is why the requirement for consistent feedback, as you say. So the people who say the MAX engine placement makes it "more prone to stall" are not entirely wrong. The media has done a poor job of communicating exactly what MCAS does and why it was developed. With today's media motivated b…
> the people who say the MAX engine placement makes it "more prone to stall" are not entirely wrong.
Agreed. But "more prone to stall" in this sense ("easier for the pilot to accidentally pitch into a stall") is not the same as "stalls at lower speeds", which is what the post I responded to was claiming.