There is a big difference between how you behave when you're calm, vs how you behave when you're under stress. Basically, you start hitting sub-sentient "defaults." You default to your training. You default to inherited flight or fight behaviors. Emergency procedures and training need to be designed with this in mind, or they will fail. (Presentation preparation is like this. My last presentation failed because by se…
How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system
31–40 of 195 posts
Re: How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system
#32>, “Boeing 737-800 pilots were required to receive some additional training on the MAX 8, which included an hour lesson on some differences. Additional training was not required, as the 737-800 and the MAX 8 have same type certification.” How are those type certifications determined? It seems to me that there should be an instance checking if the type certifications make sense. Or perhaps they did, and they just real…
It makes sense that very minor differences don't require extra training if the differences have no meaningful impact on cockpit design or flight characteristics. But in this case, flight characteristics were clearly different, and MCAS was supposed to compensate for those differences. I don't know how they measure such differences, but you'd think that different engines, different aerodynamics, and a new control syst…
Re: How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system
#33This will all fall on the shoulders of Boeing. They installed a feature without properly notifying pilots and airlines. Thus when things went haywire, the pilots had no idea what was going on.
Re: How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system
#34>, “Boeing 737-800 pilots were required to receive some additional training on the MAX 8, which included an hour lesson on some differences. Additional training was not required, as the 737-800 and the MAX 8 have same type certification.” How are those type certifications determined? It seems to me that there should be an instance checking if the type certifications make sense. Or perhaps they did, and they just real…
y, sounds like a change like this: The system, known as the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, or MCAS, was incorporated because the plane has larger engines placed further forward on the craft, and so has a chance of facing a stall at lower speeds than earlier 737 variations. Would require more training than a few hours.
Re: How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system
#35737 MAX 8 Cockpit - https://i2.wp.com/thepointsguy.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/0...
737 800 Cockpit - https://i.imgur.com/eRULoST.jpg
I don't really know my way around an airliner but the key displays seem to be quite different and there's a lot fewer knobs on the MAX 8.
Re: How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system
#36>FAA for pushing engineers to 'delegate' reviews of certain components back to Boeing themselves. How much more proof do we need as a society that self regulation is a fool's errand?
Instead the narrative is about big, bloated bureaucracies, ignoring the fact that they got so big by having to respond and add additional layers every time someone figured out a new way to screw things up, as with Boeing.
Re: How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system
#37This will all fall on the shoulders of Boeing. They installed a feature without properly notifying pilots and airlines. Thus when things went haywire, the pilots had no idea what was going on.
But in the past there have been worse incidents and Boeing lied and cheated their way out of them without seeing any large penalties: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19389983
Re: How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system
#38>FAA for pushing engineers to 'delegate' reviews of certain components back to Boeing themselves. How much more proof do we need as a society that self regulation is a fool's errand?
Unfortunately, regulation doesn't fit with the narrative of self-determination and "pull yourself up by your bootstraps" Instead the narrative is about big, bloated bureaucracies, ignoring the fact that they got so big by having to respond and add additional layers every time someone figured out a new way to screw things up, as with Boeing.
On the other hand I've seen many people complain about "regulatory capture" between FAA + Boeing repeatedly. That's even on the Wikipedia for FAA.
> The FAA has been cited as an example of regulatory capture, "in which the airline industry openly dictates to its regulators its governing rules, arranging for not only beneficial regulation, but placing key people to head these regulators."
Which is an entirely different problem than a culture of "pulling up your bootstraps".
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Aviation_Administratio...
Re: How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system
#39This will all fall on the shoulders of Boeing. They installed a feature without properly notifying pilots and airlines. Thus when things went haywire, the pilots had no idea what was going on.
Hopefully it will also fall in part on the FAA, which greenlit the thing for use without checks that might have caught this.
Re: How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system
#40Unvetted image comparison of the cockpits 737 MAX 8 Cockpit - https://i2.wp.com/thepointsguy.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/0... 737 800 Cockpit - https://i.imgur.com/eRULoST.jpg I don't really know my way around an airliner but the key displays seem to be quite different and there's a lot fewer knobs on the MAX 8.
Here you have another max 8 with a completely different layout on those screens: http://www.driven-technologies.com/images/bt_portfolio/52/or...