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Slack enables customers to control their encryption keys in enterprise version

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Re: Slack enables customers to control their encryption keys in enterprise version

#41
post #14

I am not sure slack can ever meaningfully become encrypted while having persistence. All it takes is for a admin (or hacked admin account) to change the password of the target slack user and login as said user to view all their private messages. The encryption is mostly pointless as far as I can tell when all of it is circumvented by a changed password.

If you really want encryption with only access by the people in the room, you can use Matrix: it's not based on your password, but on the keys. If you have your keys (and encryption has been enable in the room), you and only you/your devices can read the messages.

So if someone else changes the password it doesnt show them? What if you legitimately chang your own password how does that work? I think I like the proof concept from Keybase unfortunately their name makes it sound like an SSH key repo and not an all in one chat and file sharing service. Also not quite as open as Matrix in the sense that people can choose other servers.

Re: Slack enables customers to control their encryption keys in enterprise version

#42

Isn't this just shifting partly your trust from Slack to Amazon?

While the encryption keys would be at amazon the slack data would be on "slack's servers" (AWS or elsewhere) meaning that both slack and AWS location of the keys would have to be compromised and then somehow associated to each other.

Re: Slack enables customers to control their encryption keys in enterprise version

#43
post #40
post #31

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't know slack internals. but I assume the employer having the key means that they now have a way to rewrite history in a way that looks cryptographically correct.

Ok, lets just make this clear: Slack is not the tool you'd want to use for anything but the most innocent work-related messages. For that it is kind of usable, not good but one of the better that will get approved by management.

I didn't suggest it was.

Again, I don't know the internals. But generally, an entity that has keys can forge messages. There's an incremental difference between the ability to snoop and the ability to forge. There's docs on the slack API, but none for the protocol, and not much is said about the new functionality.

It's certainly possible that was already there via other means, but a change in key control seems significant enough to warrant a UI indicator to me.

Re: Slack enables customers to control their encryption keys in enterprise version

#44
post #33

This is a good thing for computing freedom: it puts more control in the hands of customers instead of requiring them to outsource encryption to Slack. It's a small step, since it's Amazon KMS and since presumably Slack still sees cleartext in transit. But it goes in the direction of restoring the security profile that a customer did when they ran their own internal IRC server, and that's a good thing.

The article says it’s only open to enterprise customers. Computing freedom you have to pay a ton for is not really freedom. It’s really not even close to the control of IRC.

Re: Slack enables customers to control their encryption keys in enterprise version

#45

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>All it takes is for a admin (or hacked admin account) to change the password of the target slack user and login as said user to view all their private messages. An admin cannot change a user's password. You can enable an account wide feature which allows admins to view all messages but that's separate and costs money. Also not what you described.

I don't think that's true. In the corporate world, Slack is authenticated with AD/SAML/etc. and Slack has no idea who is changing passwords on that backend system. The reality is that IT administrators are the root of trust at all organizations. This new feature doesn't change that.

>The reality is that IT administrators are the root of trust at all organizations.

Is this true?

Re: Slack enables customers to control their encryption keys in enterprise version

#46

Isn't this just shifting partly your trust from Slack to Amazon?

I think it's very smart of Slack.

AWS Encryption SDK[1] is a well designed, battle tested data encryption library. Amazon KMS is a well audited service used by AWS to manage all sorts of keys and even supports external HSM integration.

For slack to build all this from the ground up would be time consuming. Hard part being 3rd party validation, penetration testing and certification.

[1]: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/encryption-sdk/latest/developer-...

Re: Slack enables customers to control their encryption keys in enterprise version

#47
post #3

At this point, between no encryption, horrible clients, mistreatment of irc users, and questionable corporate behavior there's nothing in Slack that's worth saving it for me. Superior free software alternatives exist that bring the same or better functionality while also giving the user full control.

Please elaborate on "questionable corporate behavior". Everything else you said is matter of opinion and slack's growth would speak to the exact opposite.

"no encryption" - There is encryption, not end to end but data is encrypted at rest: https://slack.com/security

"horrible clients" - I disagree. They're not perfect but they work and are consistent 99.999% of the time.

"mistreatment of irc users" - People need to get over this. It's not IRC. That's like being upset that email doesn't support fax well enough.

Re: Slack enables customers to control their encryption keys in enterprise version

#50

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>All it takes is for a admin (or hacked admin account) to change the password of the target slack user and login as said user to view all their private messages. An admin cannot change a user's password. You can enable an account wide feature which allows admins to view all messages but that's separate and costs money. Also not what you described.

I don't think that's true. In the corporate world, Slack is authenticated with AD/SAML/etc. and Slack has no idea who is changing passwords on that backend system. The reality is that IT administrators are the root of trust at all organizations. This new feature doesn't change that.

IT administrators may handle the root of trust, but IT administrators are closely subservient to management. Management, in the business of control, knows this, and pushes at many opportunities. In the US courts, management whim controls any asset, not de-facto key holders.
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