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DARPA Is Building a $10M, Open-Source, Secure Voting System

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Re: DARPA Is Building a $10M, Open-Source, Secure Voting System

#211
post #60

Why does this keep coming up? What is the compelling argument against paper ballots? There is no need for results to be known immediately, so how does making voting an exercise done by computers make anything better, particularly when computers are much more vulnerable to remote interference?

In Switzerland the swiss Post is implementing something similar => my thoughts are very similar to yours (we can even vote by letter, and an electronic vote might in comparison save me at most 5 seconds out of the avg 3 hours of debate with friends and family & reading & watching debates on TV for each round of voting).

The swiss Post organized recently a public review (with awards to identify bugs - see another older thread on HN) for the software that they'll try to launch.

On one hand the swiss Post's solution would allow me to actively check if my vote was part of the total, which I think is absolutely fantastic.

On the other hand I did access the source repository of the new potential voting system but I didn't even start digging into it as soon as I saw that it was written in Java.

I thought that such a software, which is the foundation to the future of a nation (voting system), would have as its foundation 1) a language that leaves very little room for technical and functional bugs (e.g. something used in the aerospace industry?), 2) would be structured using an extremely well-known-for-its-reliability workflow-engine and 3) was submitted to testing covering basically ALL possible combinations at ALL levels (not just e.g. "10000 cycles of randomness" but all possible input-values, for all layers).

When I saw that it was written in Java (nothing against Java - same thing for e.g. C/C++) I immediately gave up because, even if that SW is made to be absolutely unhackable >>nowSummarized: I'd like such a system, but I would need it to implemented in an extremely strict way that is able to survive times of low budgets and/or bad employees and/or bad management and/or of course corruption, which is when coincidentally a stable solution would be needed the most.

I usually (have to) choose between dark- or light-grey when I vote, but in this case, to replace the current system, it's one of the rare occasions for which I would need a "pure white" solution :)

Re: DARPA Is Building a $10M, Open-Source, Secure Voting System

#212
Not to sound overly cynical but open source isn't a panacea. Yes, it adds transparency. That's a positive. But that doesn't ensure it'll work.

As for secure, if it's connected to the internet, then it's always going to be a target.

It seems to me, that - if voting integrity is priority #1 - a return to traditional analogue voting should be given strong consideration.

Re: DARPA Is Building a $10M, Open-Source, Secure Voting System

#214

> Kiniy said Galois will design two basic voting machine types. The first will be a ballot-marking device that uses a touch-screen for voters to make their selections. That system won’t tabulate votes. Instead it will print out a paper ballot marked with the voter’s choices, so voters can review them before depositing them into an optical-scan machine that tabulates the votes. Galois will bring this system to Def Con…

I hate being outright dismissive but it sounds like an expensive html/pdf form with a printer attached. I do agree that the paper trail is a great thing. I'm not fundamentally against electronic voting, but I haven't heard of a system that can really compete with the simplicity and verifiability of the immutablility you get from paper ballots inside ballot boxes being watched over by interested parties on all sides.

> I hate being outright dismissive but it sounds like an expensive html/pdf form with a printer attached.

I don't think you're being dismissive enough, it's an expensive pencil and paper.

Re: DARPA Is Building a $10M, Open-Source, Secure Voting System

#216

Earlier quoted context omitted.

How will the voters who are (reportedly) unable to obtain ID be able up get their prints into the verification system? I have been informed by social scientists that requiring voter ID is racist, so it seems that fingerprint checks would also be racist via the same logic.

> I have been informed by social scientists that requiring voter ID is racist Do you have a personal opinion on that? I don't see it as racist in any way, because it applies equally to everybody. We have a few basic rules for voters in this country, one is that they are citizens, two is that they are registered. Being able to demonstrate that you are the registered voter you claim to be seems to me to be essential to…

No strong opinion! But I understand there exists a legal precedent of disparate impact, such that a policy "applies equally to everyone" can end up being illegal because it effectively targets a protected class even though it doesn't have any language to that extent.

Re: DARPA Is Building a $10M, Open-Source, Secure Voting System

#218
Anyone building or designing voting systems should first be familiar with the concept of _software independence_.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Software_independence

It's an extremely important and useful concept, and should form the basis of the first question (or one of the first) asked of any voting system provider.

Re: DARPA Is Building a $10M, Open-Source, Secure Voting System

#219

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I have been informed by social scientists that requiring voter ID is racist Do you have a personal opinion on that? I don't see it as racist in any way, because it applies equally to everybody. We have a few basic rules for voters in this country, one is that they are citizens, two is that they are registered. Being able to demonstrate that you are the registered voter you claim to be seems to me to be essential to…

>Do you have a personal opinion on that? I don't see it as racist in any way, because it applies equally to everybody. “The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.” In practical terms, there are a lot of people in the US that simply cannot afford to buy an ID - both because of the actual cost and because of the logistics an…

Usually you need that ID to exercise your constitutional right to bear arms. If we can demand an ID for a right that is actually listed in our constitution, then surely we can demand one for voting.

If requiring the ID is really so discriminatory, then it has to go away for bearing arms as well. Is this something you want?

BTW, in terms of potential hazard, voting is a lot worse. Voting can lead to wars.

Re: DARPA Is Building a $10M, Open-Source, Secure Voting System

#220
post #60

Why does this keep coming up? What is the compelling argument against paper ballots? There is no need for results to be known immediately, so how does making voting an exercise done by computers make anything better, particularly when computers are much more vulnerable to remote interference?

> What is the compelling argument against paper ballots?

To play devil's advocate...

Paper is just a medium. With apologies to Claude Shannon, critical properties of information are best ensured through secure protocols, not by picking a particular medium.

E.g., if the property you want is security, encryption is more provably secure than invisible ink. The properly encrypted message can be stored on paper, radio, magnets, or neurons, it doesn't matter.

The properties we want from ballots are somewhat uncommon and therefore very unintuitive. They are still properties of information. Availability and deniability simultaneously? (So you can personally confirm, but never provably sell your vote).

We could design a cryptographic protocol to meet those unique design goals. But not using paper alone, because the math would be too hard.

Paper appears to guarantee availability and privacy, just as invisible ink appears to guarantee security. In practice, each often fall short. Ballot boxes disappear. Absentee ballots travel through the postal system, which is a bit like blasting one unencrypted UDP packet and hoping for the best. No individual can take their paper ballot and later confirm how it was counted.

You could do these things with electrons though. It would require some fast math, like almost all useful protocols in information theory.

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