Put all Boeing engineers flying nonstop around the globe in Max 8 planes until someone breaks down and speaks up :)
Why only the engineers? Shouldn't management and the rest of executives also be on the planes?
Rudder issue that plagued the Boeing 737 throughout the 1990s
301–310 of 368 posts
Re: Rudder issue that plagued the Boeing 737 throughout the 1990s
#302To add a human element to this story, I'm from north of Pittsburgh and the crash of flight 427 is one of the events from my childhood that I can determinedly recall. One of my classmates--eight or nine years old--lost her father in that crash. Our class planted a tree outside our middle school with a plaque to memorialize him. I bother saying this only because, while air travel is impressively safe overall (hats off…
I ended up finding my way to that after reading TFA and Googling 427.
Not just that, but the fact that they had audio all the way down, and the pilots utter disbelief that they plane was responding to his inputs in the way that it was.
The idea that they were not actually supposed to pull up in the scenario but leave the stick level and just turn hard right is unbelievable. The amount of training to be able to react like that instinctively would be tremendous.
The plane hit 3 or 4 G and apparently the copilot could be heard straining on the tape. They were analyzing the pilot’s gasping to deduce how he way applying rudder because the black box didn’t record rudder inputs at the time.
All of this is inconceivable. The sheer speed of the event and how quickly that 30 second video is over is probably the most shocking.
This one showing the pilot inputs is even more terrifying:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/99/USAir_Fl...
Re: Rudder issue that plagued the Boeing 737 throughout the 1990s
#303I wrote this, not happy it got picked up and posted here without credit. Here's the original Reddit thread: https://www.reddit.com/r/CatastrophicFailure/comments/adl0jk...
That’s the internet for you.
Re: Rudder issue that plagued the Boeing 737 throughout the 1990s
#304Earlier quoted context omitted.
To a HN reader, posting the Reddit thread would have been less useful than the imgur album, because the reader would have to click through to the album. Maybe you should edit the album and link it back to the reddit thread?
Can't edit the albums more than 12 hours after posting unfortunately, take it up with Imgur's website design department lol. I didn't expect these to be read off of Reddit so I didn't make that convenient (until recently).
For all the effort you put in these posts, I think it would be very much appreciated if you could (re)post it on a blogging platform like WordPress.com. Reddit/imgur content are not made to last but stuff like this definitely is.
Re: Rudder issue that plagued the Boeing 737 throughout the 1990s
#305> A new car built by my company leaves somewhere traveling at 60 mph. The rear differential locks up. The car crashes and burns with everyone trapped inside. Now, should we initiate a recall? Take the number of vehicles in the field, A, multiply by the probable rate of failure, B, multiply by the average out-of-court settlement, C. A times B times C equals X. If X is less than the cost of a recall, we don't do one. -…
Re: Rudder issue that plagued the Boeing 737 throughout the 1990s
#306> A new car built by my company leaves somewhere traveling at 60 mph. The rear differential locks up. The car crashes and burns with everyone trapped inside. Now, should we initiate a recall? Take the number of vehicles in the field, A, multiply by the probable rate of failure, B, multiply by the average out-of-court settlement, C. A times B times C equals X. If X is less than the cost of a recall, we don't do one. -…
What is the alternative to a cost benefit analysis though? We could spend an infinite amount on diminishing safety gains.
There is a difference between proactively pursuing safety, which will yield diminishing returns sooner or later, and acting to correct a known defect that puts human lives at risk via a clearly understood mechanism.
Re: Rudder issue that plagued the Boeing 737 throughout the 1990s
#307Earlier quoted context omitted.
Boeing's more general attitude of dismissing signs that there was a problem with the equipment Having worked in software for decades, I've noted a particular sort of bias in myself and other developers. We tend to feel that our creations are like our children, and we are far too ready to blame the user. I've caught myself doing this. I've been caught out by QA doing this. I've caught fellow developers doing this, whe…
That's why dogfooding is so powerful. The best way to first hand experience the shortcomings of your product is to use it. This makes me wonder if anyone at Google is using G-Suite themselves.
I’ve used software that’s so bad and thought there’s no way anyone at the company that made this has ever used this.
Re: Rudder issue that plagued the Boeing 737 throughout the 1990s
#308I wrote this, not happy it got picked up and posted here without credit. Here's the original Reddit thread: https://www.reddit.com/r/CatastrophicFailure/comments/adl0jk...
How cute, he thinks he “owns” some text he shared online in 2019.
Re: Rudder issue that plagued the Boeing 737 throughout the 1990s
#309Earlier quoted context omitted.
What is the alternative to a cost benefit analysis though? We could spend an infinite amount on diminishing safety gains.
There is a difference between proactively pursuing safety, which will yield diminishing returns sooner or later, and acting to correct a known defect that puts human lives at risk via a clearly understood mechanism.
I’m not sure that’s right. Proactively searching for risks would cost more, but the same reasoning still applies. I think we know that if we limited cars’ top speed to 10mph, they would be much safer. But it’s not worth it.
I think it would make sense to require the disclosure of known flaws though, if it isn’t required already.
Re: Rudder issue that plagued the Boeing 737 throughout the 1990s
#310Wow. The quote from Capt Ray Miller is particularly telling: “I have been told by my company . . . that the FAA and Boeing (were) aware of the problems with the spurious rudder inputs but considered them to be more of a nuisance problem than a flight safety issue. I was informed, that so far as everyone was concerned, the rudder hardovers were a problem but that the `industry' felt the losses would be in the acceptab…
I wonder what solutions there are to these liability/blame problems. I have seen a similar case in Australia, where a parking barrier was an extreme danger as it cross over a biking path, and was hard to see until the last minute. It caused a crash that took a mans leg, and the legal proceedings took years. During that time the barrier remained in place, still a danger, because removing it would have admitted fault.
I think it's different in the US. Post-incident efforts to repair usually aren't considered an admission of responsibility in US tort law. Social policy reason is to encourage repair of hazards, rather than reinforce the circumstance you note.