Earlier quoted context omitted.
Sure. But the Ray Miller quote suggests that the issue was not that a modification to make the rudder mechanism more reliable was itself prohibitively expensive from an engineering point of view. Rather, the concern was that making such a modification could open up liability issues, as it would be an acknowledgement that the plane was faulty, and the FAA and Boeing were anxious to avoid being held liable. That is wha…
This looks like a system set up for catastrophic failures. I mean, if everybody involved that has means and knowledge to do anything about safety faults has a huge incentive to not do anything about them, how we expect not to have very bad outcomes? I think it'd be smart to move on from "boo selfish people, how could they!A" to "we must redesign the system so people are not hugely disincentivized from doing the thing…
This may well be applicable to the earliest B737 rudder incidents, for example.
Acting to rectify the (previously unsuspected) fault should not increase the company's liability for a problem it was unable to anticipate.
But once a problem has been discovered/reported, if the company does not act to rectify it in a timely way, its liability for any further problems that occur should rise rapidly. And once several serious in-flight emergencies related to the B737 rudder had occurred, it seems (judging by the story as presented here) like Boeing was probably guilty of this and should be severely penalized.