This seems pointless but I'll clarify the main thing in case you really haven't understood my point.
> You've failed to show that receipt freeness introduces something else that fundamentally "breaks" which wasn't in the original system, despite repeatedly claiming this is so (see also "They fix this issue and introduce others", a claim made with absolutely zero evidence).
The issues that are introduced are exactly all that attack surface that I described how to exploit. You keep insisting that the math checks out but that's not in dispute. The mathematical properties of a well designed electronic system are fine. It's the actual engineering realities of such a system that makes it massively easier to exploit. All those examples I gave and many more are now failure modes you have and didn't before.
> Are you asking what the advantages of e-voting are?
Yes. I live in a country that has heavily invested in e-government but runs very efficient paper elections. I go in on a Sunday at my convenience and get the results for the whole country 2 or 3 hours after the polls close, extremely accurate predictions maybe an hour after. I know of no advantage electronic voting would bring that would be worth the extra cost, let alone the risk and complexity. It's a (very poor) solution looking for a problem.