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In Estonian parliamentary election, 44% of the votes were cast online

zdnet.com

101–110 of 208 posts

Re: In Estonian parliamentary election, 44% of the votes were cast online

#101
post #100
post #99

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> What about absentee ballots? How do you make sure they were mailed by the right person? You have to sign the outer envelope, which can be verified (and is not anonymous). > Think about it... anyone can just as easily bring a ton of paper ballots and stuff the box that way. There are a lot of controls in place that prevent that. Number one, the ballot box is never attended by just one person. Number two, the count o…

You can cryptographically sign things with your private key on your device also, which is put there when you register to vote. Either way, someone can theoretically forge your signature. You don’t have to get a list of those who didn’t vote. You just take the pile of punched ballots or whatever and replace them with your pile. All the matching of counts etc. can be done electronically too.

> You can cryptographically sign things with your private key on your device

Unless your device is compromised.

> Either way, someone can theoretically forge your signature.

They could forge your signature, but to be effective, they need to forge thousands of signatures.

> You don’t have to get a list of those who didn’t vote. You just take the pile of punched ballots or whatever and replace them with your pile.

No, the ballots all have unique numbers and the list of numbers is stored separately. You'd have to buy off all the poll workers to pull that off, and you'd have to reconstruct all the records to match your fake ballots.

> All the matching of counts etc. can be done electronically too.

Sure it can be, but not securely, and security (and integrity) is the number one goal of a voting system. Convenience and speed are secondary.

Let's put it this way -- the State of California only does paper ballots. No voting machines are allowed in the most populous state. Why? Because they engaged many security consultants and couldn't figure out a way to vote electronically that was safer than paper.

It takes over a month to certify a California election, because every ballot is cross checked with the precinct records, they randomly recount various boxes of ballots, they check that the outcomes are in line with the polling data, and they verify every single signature on every absentee envelope.

Re: In Estonian parliamentary election, 44% of the votes were cast online

#102
post #39
post #32

"The system has been designed to ensure that voters' computers are not infected by any kind of malware that could change or block their vote." I'm sure this cannot be subverted by an attacker with the resources of USA/China/India/.., or with access to the supply chain from the chip fab onward (don't forget about malware hidden in USB cables!), or or,... And you'd have to be dead sure , because, unlike with physical v…

>few-to-none signs of subversion You could make it so you can view your vote and check it was registered the way intended. If you voted A and it came out B that would be a sign.

They've done this, you can download a phone app for iOS or Android, where you can scan a QR code you see when you vote to verify your vote. A vote can be checked after i-voting for up to three times during half an hour.

Further reading: https://www.valimised.ee/en/internet-voting/checking-i-vote

Re: In Estonian parliamentary election, 44% of the votes were cast online

#103
post #39

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>few-to-none signs of subversion You could make it so you can view your vote and check it was registered the way intended. If you voted A and it came out B that would be a sign.

It seems simple for theoretical malware to show you the vote you believe you cast, so you'd have to log in and check your vote on a second device?

This is actually what is done, you can download a phone app for iOS or Android, where you can scan a QR code you see when you vote to verify your vote. A vote can be checked after i-voting for up to three times during half an hour.

Further reading: https://www.valimised.ee/en/internet-voting/checking-i-vote

Re: In Estonian parliamentary election, 44% of the votes were cast online

#104
post #95
post #32

"The system has been designed to ensure that voters' computers are not infected by any kind of malware that could change or block their vote." I'm sure this cannot be subverted by an attacker with the resources of USA/China/India/.., or with access to the supply chain from the chip fab onward (don't forget about malware hidden in USB cables!), or or,... And you'd have to be dead sure , because, unlike with physical v…

Really, it strikes me how luddite people are when it comes to voting. In every other case, people welcome technology making stuff easier. But in this area, all I hear is complaints how far the voting booth is, how you need ID, how there is no national holiday and so on. What about absentee ballots? How do you make sure they were mailed by the right person? Listen, if an attacker can subvert 30% of the votes, don’t yo…

I trust the bank because it has zero interest in subverting it’s own security. A government that doesn’t want to be removed from power has both motive and ability to do so. Paper Ballots allow Opposition Parties to count votes, an electronic voting system (wich would require the production of custom hardware in a government–owned facility to be remotely secure) would require the opposition to check for dopant-level chip defects.

Re: In Estonian parliamentary election, 44% of the votes were cast online

#105
post #32

"The system has been designed to ensure that voters' computers are not infected by any kind of malware that could change or block their vote." I'm sure this cannot be subverted by an attacker with the resources of USA/China/India/.., or with access to the supply chain from the chip fab onward (don't forget about malware hidden in USB cables!), or or,... And you'd have to be dead sure , because, unlike with physical v…

> there will be few-to-none signs of subversion

One thing the Estonian system does is that you can verify your vote on a mobile device by scanning a qr code that you see when you cast the digital vote. A vote can be checked after i-voting for up to three times during half an hour.

I imagine if any mismatch was detected the country would shut off i-voting immediately.

Further reading: https://www.valimised.ee/en/internet-voting/checking-i-vote

Re: In Estonian parliamentary election, 44% of the votes were cast online

#107
post #96
post #95

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Really, it strikes me how luddite people are when it comes to voting. In every other case, people welcome technology making stuff easier. But in this area, all I hear is complaints how far the voting booth is, how you need ID, how there is no national holiday and so on. What about absentee ballots? How do you make sure they were mailed by the right person? Listen, if an attacker can subvert 30% of the votes, don’t yo…

Banks aren’t anonymous.

Also, banks can react to observed attacks quickly, but changes to voting systems has to go through slow political processes (for good reason).

Re: In Estonian parliamentary election, 44% of the votes were cast online

#108
post #100

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You can cryptographically sign things with your private key on your device also, which is put there when you register to vote. Either way, someone can theoretically forge your signature. You don’t have to get a list of those who didn’t vote. You just take the pile of punched ballots or whatever and replace them with your pile. All the matching of counts etc. can be done electronically too.

> You can cryptographically sign things with your private key on your device Unless your device is compromised. > Either way, someone can theoretically forge your signature. They could forge your signature, but to be effective, they need to forge thousands of signatures. > You don’t have to get a list of those who didn’t vote. You just take the pile of punched ballots or whatever and replace them with your pile. No,…

And how do they verify every single signature on every absentee envelope?

I think that, once you start there, you will see that you can compromise those just as easily as a bunch of random iPhones.

Re: In Estonian parliamentary election, 44% of the votes were cast online

#109
post #108

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> You can cryptographically sign things with your private key on your device Unless your device is compromised. > Either way, someone can theoretically forge your signature. They could forge your signature, but to be effective, they need to forge thousands of signatures. > You don’t have to get a list of those who didn’t vote. You just take the pile of punched ballots or whatever and replace them with your pile. No,…

And how do they verify every single signature on every absentee envelope? I think that, once you start there, you will see that you can compromise those just as easily as a bunch of random iPhones.

They pull the physical signature card from when you registered and compare them by hand. Then they have a second person do it another room.

I think you're too enamored with technology to see that in this case it isn't being luddites about it that is the problem -- it's that very smart people have tried to solve this for a long time and come up with nothing.

It may be time to admit that the hundreds of security professionals with thousands of years of combined experience may just know more than you about election security.

Re: In Estonian parliamentary election, 44% of the votes were cast online

#110
post #74

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You can film yourself voting now. Vote buying is not a serious problem, and can be readily solved by stiff jail time for attempting it, and large monetary rewards for reporting on people doing it. If you get 10 years in prison for trying to buy votes, and the government offers a standing reward of say, $100,000 for evidence that leads to a conviction, all of the sudden you have to pay substantially more than $100k/vo…

Those kinds of penalties and worse don't stop organized crime, for instance. Politicians also tend to do all sorts of crazy, risky and/or illegal things to get elected or for personal profit. Nixon and Trump spring readily to mind. If the reward is large enough, someone will risk it. Sometimes the reward doesn't even have to be large at all -- witness rich celebrities shoplifting, for instance. People can also be com…

None of that makes any kind of sense. You can't risk it when the equilibrium is that bad for you. Remember, to make any appreciable dent in an election outcome, you need to convince thousands of people to vote for you, and not turn you in, despite the 100k reward. There is zero chance of that ever succeeding.
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