I'll be that guy. Chrome has probably invested > 1 billion dollars into their codebase at this point. Certainly >100million into security. They sandbox their code aggressively . They build this project with security in mind from day 1 - it's been architected for it. The Chrome security team(s) has a lot of power for a product security org. They fuzz. They invent new fuzzers. They cluster their fuzzers. They have a wo…
> Let's just collectively admit it, finally - you can't write safe C++ in a codebase this complex. I work on Chrome. The working assumption is there always exists a bug that allows remote code execution in the renderer.
I listed a subset of the things Chrome does to help mitigate the fact that C++ bugs will make it out. It's because they don't trust C++ that this is the case.
What is interesting is that, in the case of the first itw exploit, the root case appears to be memory safety. That despite the many millions invested, memory safety was still what an attacker went after and managed to leverage into an exploit against users.
That's all.