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Serious Chrome zero-day

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Re: Serious Chrome zero-day

#231
post #62

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It is fast, responsive, has much better security history and architecture than all others, super convenient if you have multiple computers. I have absolutely no problems with Chrome, I already trusted my information with Google, so I always stay signed in as well, never had any issues.

Caveat: if something’s “free,” you’re the product. Google wants to pull as much metadata from you as possible. I don’t trust anyone who gives me something for free. I therefore limit how I use it.

Firefox is free as well. You're not making your point very well.

Re: Serious Chrome zero-day

#232
post #223

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Let's just collectively admit it, finally - you can't write safe C++ in a codebase this complex. And so, as they say, we should all be using Rust. But allow me to explain why I don't yet. Rust has one really outstanding feature -- a borrower checker that makes it memory safe. Adding that to C++ would be a compatibility-breaking change. So then, while they were at it, they changed lots of other things. It's a whole…

Different standard library is kind of unavoidable because you need standard library interface understood by borrow checker.

That's the compatibility-breaking part. Doesn't mean the replacement function or object can't have the same name, purpose, time complexity, etc.

You could potentially even continue to support the existing ones but regard them as unsafe and have the compiler warn if they're used.

Re: Serious Chrome zero-day

#233

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> What I'm saying is that Chrome is an example of a project with more security funding than just about any other project out there, and it still can't save users from the footguns of C++. You can certainly make that argument but this doesn't seem to really be a compelling example. They had one security issue caused by a use-after-free over a decade. That's... a pretty fucking stellar track record and does not at all…

This is not the first chrome security issue in over a decade.

Not by a long shot either. The current stable version of Chrome (72) came with 58 security fixes, including a dozen UAFs, albeit several of those are in third party dependencies.

https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2019/01/stable-channel...

Re: Serious Chrome zero-day

#234

I'll be that guy. Chrome has probably invested > 1 billion dollars into their codebase at this point. Certainly >100million into security. They sandbox their code aggressively . They build this project with security in mind from day 1 - it's been architected for it. The Chrome security team(s) has a lot of power for a product security org. They fuzz. They invent new fuzzers. They cluster their fuzzers. They have a wo…

> Let's just collectively admit it, finally - you can't write safe C++ in a codebase this complex.

I work on Chrome. The working assumption is there always exists a bug that allows remote code execution in the renderer.

Re: Serious Chrome zero-day

#235

I'll be that guy. Chrome has probably invested > 1 billion dollars into their codebase at this point. Certainly >100million into security. They sandbox their code aggressively . They build this project with security in mind from day 1 - it's been architected for it. The Chrome security team(s) has a lot of power for a product security org. They fuzz. They invent new fuzzers. They cluster their fuzzers. They have a wo…

Let's just collectively admit it, finally - you can't write safe C++ in a codebase this complex. Do they distrust their own coders to the same degree they distrust the processes they sandbox? I suspect the answer to this is "no" but I would like to hear from someone who actually codes there. I think the truth is more like this: You can write safe C++, just like you can keep a secret. It's just that the odds that you…

> Do they distrust their own coders to the same degree they distrust the processes they sandbox? I suspect the answer to this is "no" but I would like to hear from someone who actually codes there.

Actually, the answer is yes. That's why the renderer process is sandboxed.

Re: Serious Chrome zero-day

#236
Updating Chrome is a vaccination, which is great, but people already affected by this exploit need a cure. I'd like to know more about who was exploiting this and for what purpose, and how to undo it.

Re: Serious Chrome zero-day

#237
post #223

I'll be that guy. Chrome has probably invested > 1 billion dollars into their codebase at this point. Certainly >100million into security. They sandbox their code aggressively . They build this project with security in mind from day 1 - it's been architected for it. The Chrome security team(s) has a lot of power for a product security org. They fuzz. They invent new fuzzers. They cluster their fuzzers. They have a wo…

> Let's just collectively admit it, finally - you can't write safe C++ in a codebase this complex. And so, as they say, we should all be using Rust. But allow me to explain why I don't yet. Rust has one really outstanding feature -- a borrower checker that makes it memory safe. Adding that to C++ would be a compatibility-breaking change. So then, while they were at it, they changed lots of other things. It's a whole…

They are working on it. The analogue to the borrow checker in C++ is called the "lifetime profile checker" and (an incomplete version) is included in MS Visual C++, but last time I checked (in January) it seemed to still have too many false positives to be practical.

In the mean time, I think "the minimum necessary changes" to achieve memory and data race safety is to replace all your unsafe C++ elements (pointers, arrays, vectors, string_views, etc.) with compatible substitutes from the SaferCPlusPlus library [1]. You don't even need to replace them all at once. You can replace them incrementally and your code will continue to compile and run throughout the process. And where needed, maintain maximal performance as well [2].

[1] shameless plug: https://github.com/duneroadrunner/SaferCPlusPlus

[2] https://github.com/duneroadrunner/SaferCPlusPlus-BenchmarksG...

Re: Serious Chrome zero-day

#238

I'll be that guy. Chrome has probably invested > 1 billion dollars into their codebase at this point. Certainly >100million into security. They sandbox their code aggressively . They build this project with security in mind from day 1 - it's been architected for it. The Chrome security team(s) has a lot of power for a product security org. They fuzz. They invent new fuzzers. They cluster their fuzzers. They have a wo…

The real problem is that the web is now too complex to the point that it's impossible to safely implement it. And W3C keeps trying to add new features to it. At some point we have to stop and consider whether all this cruft is even necessary.

Re: Serious Chrome zero-day

#239

I'll be that guy. Chrome has probably invested > 1 billion dollars into their codebase at this point. Certainly >100million into security. They sandbox their code aggressively . They build this project with security in mind from day 1 - it's been architected for it. The Chrome security team(s) has a lot of power for a product security org. They fuzz. They invent new fuzzers. They cluster their fuzzers. They have a wo…

> Let's just collectively admit it, finally - you can't write safe C++ in a codebase this complex. I work on Chrome. The working assumption is there always exists a bug that allows remote code execution in the renderer.

Slightly OT: revert the ugly design introduced in Chrome 71 (or 70).

Re: Serious Chrome zero-day

#240

Hmm. Is the developer version affected too? Iam running Version 74.0.3717.0 (Official Build) dev (64-bit) compiled at march 5. (gentoo). Looking for an update in portage right now.

There was actually an update in portage available, running now Version 74.0.3724.8 (Official Build) dev (64-bit)
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