Earlier quoted context omitted.
In my electoral system, yes. I'm in Europe and it's a paper ballot. In the US, no in many places. And not being able ask for a recount when there's any degree of suspicion about the outcome is an absolute disgrace IMHO. As to the other point you raised, you may want to check this video, which outlines research that tears your hopes apart: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iit5WdLYwns And per my initial comment, if you…
>if you can access your vote through a code, then your vote or that of others can be bought // Isn't that the status quo, currently it can be bought but no one can verify; under my system it can be verified by the person in the poll both. If someone paid you then you give them the "vote code" that corresponded, for you, at the time you voted, they falsely verify and you can still actually verify - in most votes just…
While you cast your ballot, there are trustworthy observers who keep an eye on the transparent ballot box, and have been doing so from the moment the poll opens until when it closes. They then watch as the box gets opened, and overlook the shoulders of those who count as the votes get tallied. Depending on whether there are enough volunteers around, there can be occasional or systematic spot checks to boot. And when it's all tallied, the ballots are put in a sealed box and stored in the event anyone requests a recount down the road, making the entire process auditable.
This process is meant to avoid things like the box arriving pre-filled with some ballots before the polls open, voters stuffing multiple ballots in the box, the box getting replaced during or after the vote, votes being ignored or misrepresented during the count, etc.
And just for clarity, I've little idea of how it's working where I live, because I'm not entitled to vote there. But this is how it's supposed to be working, and having worked in the sector a bit I'd want electronic voting to offer a similar set of guarantees before accepting it as a viable alternative to paper ballots.