Are you absolutely certain of that conclusion?
I'll agree with the sentiment that memory safe languages are less prone to security holes because by nature they entirely remove a whole class of issues related to managing memory...
but I can't help but think that it still stands to be the case that finding and patching the remaining holes that aren't related to memory management would still break the economics.
Perhaps the one thing I could imagine that might make a difference is regulations coming into force that mandated pentests / fuzzing for companies producing software doing a certain amount in revenue. It's been my experience that that stuff gets done but it's once in a blue moon. And stuff is always turned up. I'm yet to work anywhere where it is part of a regular process.
Even if it were I'm always blown away by security researchers who spend months and months attacking something and finally crack it then give a presentation about how they did it. There can't even be that many people on Earth with the level of skillset required.
I dunno... the economics of it seem to play out like "let's just deal with the fallout of an incident when it happens because that's cheaper than investing in security"
The asymmetric nature of finding holes vs not creating them combined with the asymmetric nature of the business value of investing in security is just a mildly awful combination.