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Death and Valor on an American Warship Doomed by Its Own Navy

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Re: Death and Valor on an American Warship Doomed by Its Own Navy

#61

My brother had a carrier deployment in the Pacific end a week or so after the Fitzgerald collision. We asked him and his girlfriend (also a sailor) about it and they genuinely had no idea what we were talking about. It was a revelatory moment for me. I can understand how the Navy wouldn't be excited to disseminate that kind of demoralizing news internally (though I still assumed they would one way or another). But sa…

I'm a long distance trucker. A few weeks ago I heard a couple truckers talking about a day long nationwide work stoppage, to occur this coming April. I'd never heard a thing about it, and I have almost as much internet as I want, through my phone (as long as I'm not driving).

I don't use Facebook, so that's probably part of the reason I hadn't heard about it. But also, news about my industry is beyond the last things I'm looking for on the internet.

I just drive. Your brother probably just does his maintenance and stands his watches, and keeps up with friends and family on Facebook, most of whom would not even notice an article about something as foreign as the military.

Re: Death and Valor on an American Warship Doomed by Its Own Navy

#62

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Hanlon's razor at work... "Never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity"

I like to remind people that Hanlons razor is a logical fallacy, and really shouldn't be used nearly as much as it is, especially the way it is (in an isolated context)

I would disagree. Seeing corruption everywhere is your brain trying to assign order to chaos.

The reality is that big military bureaucracy is among the dumbest of organizations and is capable of feats of illogic almost impossible to appreciate.

Re: Death and Valor on an American Warship Doomed by Its Own Navy

#63
Key 'grafs:

> Although the Fitzgerald radars did not show them, more than two dozen ships surrounded the destroyer, all close enough to track. Three of them, large vessels off the starboard bow, posed a grave danger to the warship. They were closing in. Quickly.

> But the ships didn’t appear on the combat room’s key radar, the SPS-67, because neither Combs, nor Woodley, nor anyone else, realized that it had been set to a mode designed to scan the seas at a greater distance. With the SPS-67 button taped over, only specialized technicians could change the tuning from another part of the ship.

Re: Death and Valor on an American Warship Doomed by Its Own Navy

#64
> The 26-year-old officer of the deck, who was in charge of the destroyer at the time of the crash, had navigated the route only once before in daylight. In a panic, she ordered the Fitzgerald to turn directly into the path of the Crystal.

Just a random comment:

She may well have panicked, but depending on proximity, that may have been the correct move, if executed correctly and in time. In other words, the move may have come from training, and it may merely have been inconsequential if executed too late.

A ship turns by moving its back end left to turn right, and vice versa. That's how the rudder affects the ship. "Right full rudder" moves the back end left, pointing the entire ship in a more rightward direction.

I've directly observed this maneuver used in an emergency. I was enlisted, on a Knox class fast frigate. We were refueling underway next to an oiler. The two ships steam forward side by side, and lines are sent across, to eventually get hoses across from the oiler to the receiver (us).

One of our junior officers was in command. The captain was also on the bridge, observing and monitoring. I was there in case what I was responsible for broke, otherwise I wasn't normally on the bridge.

The junior officer allowed our ship to drift to the right, too close to the oiler. At some point the propellers of the large ship started to suck us in even closer.

The captain identified himself and declared himself in command, ordered right full rudder, toward the oiler, and full speed ahead. An alarm was also sounded, "emergency breakaway" or something like that. The maneuver immediately moved most of our ship away from the oiler, and we shot past the oiler (they were also executing their side of the emergency breakaway).

Not saying the two incidents are the same, only that "steering toward the other ship" wasn't necessarily the wrong maneuver. But they were doomed no matter what, as just about everything else relevant that could go wrong was or already had gone wrong.

Re: Death and Valor on an American Warship Doomed by Its Own Navy

#65
post #26

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> How the hell does a first-line warship of the United States Navy get into a state like this? Command negligence at very high levels, a high optempo without adequate attention to readiness and discipline. > Based on the article it sounds like the excuse they've settled on is just blaming everything on the crew Unless you are including the chain of command above the ship's commander up through and including the 7th F…

Yup, from the article: The Navy inquiries determined that there had been widespread problems with leaders regarding shortfalls in training, manning and equipment in the 7th Fleet. The Navy fired admirals, captains and commanders, punished sailors and criminally prosecuted officers for neglecting their duties. Adm. John Richardson, head of the Navy, called the two collisions “avoidable tragedies.” The ships’ commander…

> But at the end of the day, our commanders make decisions

One of the decisions not practically available to the captain is to stay in port because he declares his ship not ready.

If a crash happens, like it did, he's legally responsible and his career ends.

But if he declares his ship unfit, then he's also declaring himself unfit, because he didn't ensure that his ship was ready. And under the "operational pace" that's been described in all the articles about these incidents, you can easily imagine the unspoken order that "you will not take your ship out of service." Even though that also is his legal responsibility, if appropriate.

We've all seen or experienced "get it done, just don't tell me how you do it."

My assumption is if all ships in the 7th fleet took themselves offline until training and resources were merely acceptable, there'd be no 7th fleet.

And we're not even at effing war! At least not in the Western Pacific. Imagine the shitshow that will be a shooting war in the Western Pacific.

Re: Death and Valor on an American Warship Doomed by Its Own Navy

#67
post #58
post #55

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> having one person watch both sides of the ship might be marginally possible - if they were only doing that I'm not sure even that is possible, at least not at night in a crowded shipping channel. A lookout under those circumstances should be focused on one field of view, not having to move around. > teaching someone else while on watch might be marginally possible - if you only had one side of the ship to watch As…

> if push comes to shove, having more experienced supervision on the bridge during a challenging transit is more important than getting in some more training that day. Think of any bureaucracy. The training or lack is documented. Paperwork must be done, and the activities backing that paperwork must be done, because that's what gets measured, since the measurers can't be on board to watch. Sloppy procedures you might…

> The incentives are pathologically perverse.

Yes, and that's a higher-up leadership problem. A military unit's primary purpose is to fight, not to do paperwork. The captain of a ship is supposed to understand that, so he can make the right tradeoffs when he has to, and the higher-up leaders over him are supposed to as well, so they can make sure they incentivize ship captains properly.

Re: Death and Valor on an American Warship Doomed by Its Own Navy

#68

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Were you doing such essential tasks the other 19 hours of the day that it made sense to only get 5 hours of sleep, or was much of that 19 hours wasted on bullshit? Personally, I'd say that if there's so much work to do that between work and eating everyone is up for 19 hours, then you're undercrewed.

Excellent question. I'd love to go into detail to paint a clearer picture but I don't think it would be prudent. So let's work with this thought experiment which is definitely not out of the ordinary: We're in a condition where half of the watch team has to be standing watch at a time. As a result, we have a rotation of 5 hours on, 5 hours off, 7 hours on, 7 hours off. In addition to standing watch, training has to b…

Been there. Knew my time with the Navy would be coming to an end after three straight nights of 2 hrs sleep. Followed by a maintenance evolution. Finally got a chance to get some decent sleep, but was racked out again because I had left a small discarded tube in the work area. I think back and wonder how the Navy was able to function at all with all of the chaos going on during a normal work day. So much of the chaos was self inflicted.

Re: Death and Valor on an American Warship Doomed by Its Own Navy

#69

Not that it changes anything, but is it known what the Crystal was attempting? The animation looks like it kept trying to pass ahead of the Fitzgerald for an impossible port to port passage. Or was the Crystal totally unaware of the Fitzgerald?

It's possible that nobody was on the bridge. Loads of tankers are driven by autopilot. Additionally, the USN ship wasn't transmitting AIS so they were essentially invisible.

Re: Death and Valor on an American Warship Doomed by Its Own Navy

#70

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Corruption my friend. Direct from a deployed friend's mouth: "When laser printers would run out of toner on base in Iraq, we wouldn't order more toner (we couldn't) - we'd order another entire printer and use the toner cartridge in the new one, and shoot at the printer on the range." Your tax dollars at work.

That's more systematic incompetence and happens all of the time. The reason is easy -- capex for new equipment is easier to get and more nebulous. The new printer may have started life on a budget spreadsheet as a truck. Opex is hard. It usually works like this: Some poor clerk had no fricking idea how many toner cartridges or replacement staplers were needed, so he wrote down a bullshit number. Some upstream beancou…

With all of the above behavior being caused by regulations imposed in the name of cost control.
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