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From their research paper at https://vuvuzela.io/static/vuvuzela.pdf : > Vuvuzela can support 1 million users exchanging text messages (up to 240 bytes each) with an end-to-end latency of 37 seconds, achieving a throughput of 68,000 messages/sec. Unfortunately, 37 seconds, even for a privacy-aware service, seems too slow to deliver instant messages.
Cool, but having to give data to Google to create an account is a major detractor.
Cool, but having to give data to Google to create an account is a major detractor.
Sorry about that. I need some way to prevent someone from quickly registering many email addresses. Do you have any other ideas?
Anyone else receive an error when attempting to register? `Failed to generate new Alpenhorn client: fetching latest dialing config: config expired on `
Personally, I found the research section more enlightening. It lists two papers which talk about their approach: https://vuvuzela.io/research
Cool, but having to give data to Google to create an account is a major detractor.
Sorry about that. I need some way to prevent someone from quickly registering many email addresses. Do you have any other ideas?
How do you consider that in the threat model of the research paper?
> Vuvuzela is the first system that provides strong metadata privacy while scaling to millions of users. Previous systems that hide metadata using Tor (such as Pond) are prone to traffic analysis attacks. Pardon my ignorance here, so how is something like my IP hidden from the centralized server? I would assume "strong metadata privacy" would include the most obvious metadata, IP, and keep it from the server like Tor…
> Vuvuzela is secure against adversaries that observe and tamper with all network traffic, and that control all nodes except for one server. Vuvuzela’s key insight is to minimize the number of variables observable by an attacker, and to use differential privacy techniques to add noise to all observable variables in a way that provably hides information about which users are communicating. Someone watching all traffic…
Noise to thwart traffic analysis is wholly unrelated to endpoint obfuscation.
How would you say your privacy + tech measure up against Signal and WhisperSystems? I love those folks and what they build and have been using Signal primarily for texting for a while now.
Cool, but having to give data to Google to create an account is a major detractor.
Sorry about that. I need some way to prevent someone from quickly registering many email addresses. Do you have any other ideas?
I ask because the 2M (concurrent?) users would be a very small limit in a hypothetical whatsapp/telegram/etc replacement.
So my question is not a critique, but an honest question. I imagine either this is purely research, or that 2M limitation is intended to be setup for communities, where you'll have many 2M instances running. Though, many 2M instances running seems prone to isolating one group of individuals.
Thoughts?