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I don't want to be harsh, but Apple really should walk the talk regarding privacy. It has its heart in the right place but bugs like this show how careless they are.
Privacy is concerned with the company purposefully spying on its users, like Google, MS or Facebook do.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Facetime calls are end to end encrypted so I doubt a modified client would work.
How would E2E encryption stop a modified client? E2E protects against MITM. But we're not talking about MITM.
I'm always curious how a bug like this ships. I mean QA & Testing should catch it, sure. But even before then. Some engineer wrote code for FaceTime that has it open the microphone before the call is accepted. And transmit the audio over the network before the call is accepted. Who did that? And why? I'm not suggesting malice but I do wonder at the lack of defensive programming.
- audio and video capture has to start going before call is actually established at signaling level, in order to minimize call establishment delay. Audio maybe going through Bluetooth, for example, and waking up Handsfree mode of BT may take 1-2 sec
- most of the group calling functionality was developed by a separate team, and group calling signaling may be loosely integrated at UI level, where, once UI triggers a switch to a group call - internally, the whole new library may kick in and get the current 1-1 call state transferred to it.
- when this “transfer” happens, the state of the first 1-1 call gets affected (at either local or remote side (due to signaling), which leads to either remote side think that the call was answered (a lack of protection in the call signaling state machine to ensure it was users UI action) or local side thinks it’s ok that remote users answers the call (in this case FT must have streamed audio even during 1-1 call establishment phase)
- lack of a check for your own phone number added to a call. This, due to having the same IDs/tokens twice in a group call, may lead to unexpected call signaling state machine switch
- lack of manual testing with focus on edge cases (like the described flow to repro the bug may not be the main flow for how users start group calls on FT)
I never worked at Apple, but I built VoIP stuff for the past 20 years.
Is it just me, or does it seem Apple can't secure their services as well as Google? There's always 'concerns' about Google spying, but no proof, meanwhile there's been major hacks involving Apple that are quickly forgotten because the CEO claims to be all about privacy.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Also, you can bypass screen lock in Ubuntu by removing the HDD [1]. The bug still is not fixed. [1] https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/unity/+bug/1777415
Honestly, I wouldn’t but that in the same class if bugs as those that preceded it because if the attacker he removed the HDD he will have access to your contents anyway (unless the HDD is encrypted) and it’s not a quick and convenient process either (unlike tapping backspace multiple times). That said, I also don’t agree that this bug should never get fixed either.
Anything that caches anything to anywhere other than disk will be accessible. Your memcache, your redis, some databases, keychains, your non-userdata browser sessions.
Isn't it fantastic that the exact same bug works on 2 different OSes?
>My teen found a major security flaw in Apple’s new iOS. He can listen in to your iPhone/iPad without your approval. I have video. Submitted bug report to @AppleSupport...waiting to hear back to provide details. Scary stuff! #apple #bugreport @foxnews
[0] https://twitter.com/mgt7500/status/1087171594756083713?s=21
Security and privacy are two big parts of the marketing for the iPhone. I'm curious how they can mitigate the reputational damage. Edit: It gets worse: https://www.theverge.com/2019/1/28/18201383/apple-facetime-b... If the recipient rejects the call by pressing the power button, it starts sending video.
As someone who bought an iPhone specifically for privacy reasons, I'm not really upset about this. What I'm concerned about is passive, mass-scale corporate surveillance, not a one-off bug that allows an individual with mal-intent to listen through my microphone for a few seconds and also let me know about it.