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We can confirm that there was a successful 51% attack on Ethereum Classic

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Re: We can confirm that there was a successful 51% attack on Ethereum Classic

#271
post #245
post #242

Earlier quoted context omitted.

He said pseudonymous, not anonymous... It's censorship resistant in its use. It only becomes an issue in terms of actually cashing out -- but that's not necessarily required.

> He said pseudonymous, not anonymous... That's why I said it's dangerous: telling people a word which sounds like anonymous but actually means “irrepudiable proof of identity” is setting them up to make decisions under the belief that they are closer to anonymous than they actually are. Given how proponents like to proclaim benefits for people in countries with repressive governments, that's just irresponsible. > It…

Well, they're two concepts with quite different meanings -- I'm not sure how you do better than explaining it that way. I've always explained bitcoin that way, and I think most people understand it that way now.

"the network" is a concept that doesn't necessarily mean "the public internet". Also, it really doesn't require everyone to be on the network -- it requires a network to exist. And pseudonymity can be "good enough".

The point was that the entire ecosystem can exist independent of cashing it out to fiat -- that point can be somewhat controlled, but it's not necessarily required.

Re: We can confirm that there was a successful 51% attack on Ethereum Classic

#272
post #241

Earlier quoted context omitted.

And yet we have multiple Proof of stake coins that seem to work just fine.

Until they don't. There have been proof-of-stake failures before, and there will be more. Every proof-of-stake system is either (a) known to be broken, or (b) too complicated to analyze to show how it is broken. As the exploitable order depth in category (b) increases, it becomes worthwhile to invest the hours, days, weeks, months it takes to develop attacks against these Rube Goldberg contraptions and they get moved…

That's an assertion that I haven't seen any data to back.

I don't believe either (a) or (b) applies to either xtz or to ada, though ada hasn't yet deployed POS.

I can well believe that there are broken POS implementations, there have been a lot of broken implementations of a lot of things in the space -- but claiming every system is known to be broken or cannot be analyzed is a very bold claim to make.

Re: We can confirm that there was a successful 51% attack on Ethereum Classic

#273
post #240

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You change the POW function in the fork to eliminate the attack.

Perhaps if the attack was done using ASICs, but when done with GPUs it can be repeated indefinitely. See discussion https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/707h3b/can_anyone...

Yes, you have to address that kind of attack differently.

Re: We can confirm that there was a successful 51% attack on Ethereum Classic

#274
post #271
post #245

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> He said pseudonymous, not anonymous... That's why I said it's dangerous: telling people a word which sounds like anonymous but actually means “irrepudiable proof of identity” is setting them up to make decisions under the belief that they are closer to anonymous than they actually are. Given how proponents like to proclaim benefits for people in countries with repressive governments, that's just irresponsible. > It…

Well, they're two concepts with quite different meanings -- I'm not sure how you do better than explaining it that way. I've always explained bitcoin that way, and I think most people understand it that way now. "the network" is a concept that doesn't necessarily mean "the public internet". Also, it really doesn't require everyone to be on the network -- it requires a network to exist. And pseudonymity can be "good e…

> pseudonymity can be "good enough".

Which is to say, it's not good enough for anything which matters, especially in any case where censorship is a relevant concern.

> "the network" is a concept that doesn't necessarily mean "the public internet". Also, it really doesn't require everyone to be on the network -- it requires a network to exist.

This is similarly meaningless: if you're talking Bitcoin, you're by definition saying you need to be on the regular internet and if you're running some private network you either have the exact same problems with trust & monitoring or you don't need a blockchain in the first place because you have some other trusted communications channel.

Re: We can confirm that there was a successful 51% attack on Ethereum Classic

#275
post #274
post #271

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Well, they're two concepts with quite different meanings -- I'm not sure how you do better than explaining it that way. I've always explained bitcoin that way, and I think most people understand it that way now. "the network" is a concept that doesn't necessarily mean "the public internet". Also, it really doesn't require everyone to be on the network -- it requires a network to exist. And pseudonymity can be "good e…

> pseudonymity can be "good enough". Which is to say, it's not good enough for anything which matters, especially in any case where censorship is a relevant concern. > "the network" is a concept that doesn't necessarily mean "the public internet". Also, it really doesn't require everyone to be on the network -- it requires a network to exist. This is similarly meaningless: if you're talking Bitcoin, you're by definit…

No, it's good enough if precautions are taken. If you apply a moderate amount of care, your identity is not hard to protect when using it.

There are a variety of ways to have private transactions across either the public internet or other networks. There are a variety of coins that use tor, for instance.

It doesn't have to be bitcoin either.

My point was that if you can avoid cashing out to fiat using well known gateways, anonymity isn't difficult to preserve. It only becomes an anonymity problem if you are careless or if you cash out using known KYCd gateways.

Re: We can confirm that there was a successful 51% attack on Ethereum Classic

#276

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I have to say, it's quite entertaining to watch. It's pretty much a car crash happening in slow motion at this point. At least it provides something else to nerd joke about by the watercooler... The above part pretty much applies to humanity as a whole, going back at least 200k years.

Yeah, except a good portion of the errors made in those 200k years at least had the excuse of being new . Blockchain stands apart as repeating every single problem the financial system solved over the last 300 years, while being driven by a community best defined by their arrogant dismissal of that very financial system they are reinventing, piece-by-piece. Turns out civil society (i. e. laws, courts, institutions, e…

i think it is evolving tho. somewhat like beliefs in: tribe shaman -> pharaon -> church -> state -> algo -> .... Is it a successful branch of evolution? Who knows, I would definitely not bet against or for it at this point.

Re: We can confirm that there was a successful 51% attack on Ethereum Classic

#277

Earlier quoted context omitted.

so to be safe, an exchange should require more confirmations depending on size of deposit. Basically the number of confirmations you could finance an attack for with the deposit.

Shouldn’t any sale/transaction be considered “not final” (goods can’t be shipped, for example) until the official chain has progressed to a point where you can be sure the cost of producing a censored fork is higer than the transaction in question? That is: you buy something expensive then it might not ship for a month or two. I guess you could buy a hundred gadgets at $100 each from a hundred places in one day and t…

you can't predict that - the alternative chain is mined privately and it is a matter of amount at stake how long this mining will continue.

Re: We can confirm that there was a successful 51% attack on Ethereum Classic

#278
post #275
post #274

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> pseudonymity can be "good enough". Which is to say, it's not good enough for anything which matters, especially in any case where censorship is a relevant concern. > "the network" is a concept that doesn't necessarily mean "the public internet". Also, it really doesn't require everyone to be on the network -- it requires a network to exist. This is similarly meaningless: if you're talking Bitcoin, you're by definit…

No, it's good enough if precautions are taken. If you apply a moderate amount of care, your identity is not hard to protect when using it. There are a variety of ways to have private transactions across either the public internet or other networks. There are a variety of coins that use tor, for instance. It doesn't have to be bitcoin either. My point was that if you can avoid cashing out to fiat using well known gate…

> It only becomes an anonymity problem if you are careless or if you cash out using known KYCd gateways.

This means you can't use it for currency transactions, with anyone you don't trust, or on any system which might be compromised by the authorities you're trying to evade. If you ever make a mistake, all of that not only won't help you but will be strong evidence of intention. There are very few threat models where “use cash” is not a much safer answer.

Re: We can confirm that there was a successful 51% attack on Ethereum Classic

#279
post #85

I think I would be satisfied with the distributed consensus model in these blockchain systems if someone could solve the non-repudiation problem. In many of these blockchain systems, the 51% attacks only applies to money in motion. I can't move all of your funds out of 'your account' unless I have stolen your wallet, and if I have stolen your wallet I don't need to change anything else about the network. I can just s…

> If the network was degraded a revote is possible.

That's kinda the essential problem. If you can trigger a revote, then the attacker will stuff the ballot to make their's the winner.

Re: We can confirm that there was a successful 51% attack on Ethereum Classic

#280
post #272

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Until they don't. There have been proof-of-stake failures before, and there will be more. Every proof-of-stake system is either (a) known to be broken, or (b) too complicated to analyze to show how it is broken. As the exploitable order depth in category (b) increases, it becomes worthwhile to invest the hours, days, weeks, months it takes to develop attacks against these Rube Goldberg contraptions and they get moved…

That's an assertion that I haven't seen any data to back. I don't believe either (a) or (b) applies to either xtz or to ada, though ada hasn't yet deployed POS. I can well believe that there are broken POS implementations, there have been a lot of broken implementations of a lot of things in the space -- but claiming every system is known to be broken or cannot be analyzed is a very bold claim to make.

How would you expect a statement that certain mechanisms have become too complex for review to be backed by data? What observations could I convey to you over a HN comment other than “go look for yourself”?

For a write up of the general, unavoidable problems of proof of stake, see Andrew Poelstra’s proof of stake FAQ.

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