Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's not the same scenario at all. If there's no route to the destination then the packet will necessarily be dropped, but with no matching NAT state table entry for a packet all that happens is that the dst header field is left alone. There will still be an IP in the dst header field! The router will still deliver the packet to that IP, subject to all the usual constraints (e.g. it needs a valid route etc). NAT won'…
And in practice what that means is that the router's own IP is the destination and the packet ends up at a closed port. Unless of course you're talking about using NAT outside the context of the RFC1918/internet boundary, in which case you're absolutely right, but that wasn't what was being discussed.
Even NAT in combination with RFC1918 doesn't give you security. The use of RFC1918 would certainly limit the set of people that could connect to your LAN machines, but it would be hard to call the result secure since anybody sharing your upstream L2 network, plus your ISP and anyone who can trick, force or coerce them into cooperating could still access your network.
And what does NAT add to the situation? Certainly not any security, since any connections that were possible before you added the NAT will still be possible afterwards too. In fact a lot more connections will become possible, so it seems like it reduces the security rather than improves it.