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You're mixing up NAT and ingress blocking. A stateful firewall doesn't depend on NAT, we're just used to ingress blocking as a side effect of NAT.
No, I think that argument makes perfect sense. A stateful firewall doesn't depend on NAT but you get all the downsides of NAT from a working stateful firewall in default-deny mode: you still have to talk the firewall into allowing the relevant traffic through, and without that you still have connections that work in one direction and not the other. The only thing that's different is address discovery, but you can sol…
For one thing lack of NAT makes it much easier to deal with multi-homed systems. For various reasons, multi-home is much more common with IPv6 than IPv4. Without NAT I can discover thing like what an address's scope is without querying the network. Having to ask a remote server to discover a global address turns what should be an atomic operation into a potentially troublesome state machine.
NAT also create annoying corner cases when there are local peers reachable via an address which also has a NATed global address. You may not be able to tell that the peer's address is not globally reachable, which is a problem if you want to advertise that peer to others.