2FA is a user interface disaster, exporting the failures of software security as a huge annoyance on to users. I would rather be hacked than deal with 2FA.
I'd argue that it's exporting the failures of human psychology, not software security.
Sure, there are some pretty egregiously bad technologies underlying a lot of industry standard encrypted-communication/authentication/identity-management systems (including HTTPS). No argument that the tools and practices on the technical side could be way better.
But even if technical security was executed 100% perfectly, if the inputs to those systems remain usernames and passwords, people will be incredibly vulnerable. It's just too easy to [re]use weak usernames/passwords, too easy to write them down, and too easy to forget them (requiring "forgot password" attack vectors).
I agree with you that MFA is much more inconvenient than traditional U/P authentication. But I don't think it's inconvenient because of a failure in software security; it's inconvenient because it's extra work, and it has to be extra work because, well, people suck at diligence and security.