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Johnson and Johnson knew for decades that asbestos lurked in its Baby Powder

reuters.com

71–80 of 94 posts

Re: Johnson and Johnson knew for decades that asbestos lurked in its Baby Powder

#71

We shouldn't be surprised that this sort of thing happens from time to time. What are the incentives? If you're an exec in charge of some product, you want to sell the product. You don't want to be pulling it, you'll never get promoted like that. And you know more about how to move product than about asbestos testing results, that's for sure. And chances are nothing will be discovered. And if it is discovered it will…

> Not saying I have an answer.

Well, I do have a simple one. You take each person that you can show that knew about the problem, propose a punishment proportional to the power they had, and send them into a judicial system where they can defend themselves before facing the punishment.

The fact that things do not seem to work this way is disconcerting.

Re: Johnson and Johnson knew for decades that asbestos lurked in its Baby Powder

#72

We shouldn't be surprised that this sort of thing happens from time to time. What are the incentives? If you're an exec in charge of some product, you want to sell the product. You don't want to be pulling it, you'll never get promoted like that. And you know more about how to move product than about asbestos testing results, that's for sure. And chances are nothing will be discovered. And if it is discovered it will…

I've worked in quality control in another industry (brewing) as a process physical chemist. There is always going to a a conflict of interest when you test internally, and the results aren't what the management want to see. However, there are ways to mitigate this.

You can split the tests into three main categories: cosmetic, financial and safety, with different allowed variances for each.

As a financial example, we had to pay excise duty on the alcohol, so the tests for ABV were stringent and cross-checked by reference laboratories. All internal tests were done with robust internal controls using gas chromatography and every few months, a random set of samples would be cross-checked with a reference laboratory by distillation. The internal results could be trusted because they were routinely validated, and the instrumentation calibration was checked for every single run.

When it came to safety, this was also taken seriously. Two incidents I recall were a hoax call from someone claiming they had contaminated the water supply with paraquat (weedkiller) and another where some stainless steel tanks had developed microfractures which caused coolant (high concentration KCl) to leach into the product. In both cases all the stops were pulled out to collect samples and get them checked by a reference laboratory. No one wants the bad publicity or being sued because the product was contaminated with something nasty.

Things were a bit laxer for cosmetic checks (colour, taste, CO2 concentration etc.). However, there was a clear specification for each test detailing min/optimal/max for each metric, and it required management sign off to allow non-conforming batches to be passed through. They were usually blended with higher quality batches to bring it in line with the specification.

So overall, the point I want to make is that where there were legal or safety requirements, having regulations and financial penalties in place did cause the company to care very, very deeply about accurate testing, including having internal tests cross-checked by an independent external laboratory. And for every product defect, there was a chain of accountability via management sign-off, with the understanding that the QC department was independent and impartial. We used to rigourously check every single batch at every stage of production, including multiple replicates for critical tests, and also including the packaged end product. Reading the story about talc, this didn't happen on any appreciable scale. The question I have for talc is this: why didn't they do this level of testing, taking samples from each lorry load out of the mine, after processing and refinement, and after packaging? The testing might not have been as accurate as they might have liked, but they didn't even seem to try to get an impartial picture of the level of asbestos contamination, perhaps because they didn't really want to know, and instead stuck their heads in the sand and pretended the problem didn't really exist. That's what seems wilfully negligent here.

We also had an entire department which stored a few tens of bottles/cans/kegs of each batch, and we would test one of each every few months to check changes throughout and beyond the nominal shelf-life. The story mentions testing a single package of talc from the company museum. The question here is, why didn't they have a library of stored packages from every batch ever made? This would have permitted re-analysis over time. It might have even reduced their liability since they could prove which batches were contaminated and which were not.

Re: Johnson and Johnson knew for decades that asbestos lurked in its Baby Powder

#73

We shouldn't be surprised that this sort of thing happens from time to time. What are the incentives? If you're an exec in charge of some product, you want to sell the product. You don't want to be pulling it, you'll never get promoted like that. And you know more about how to move product than about asbestos testing results, that's for sure. And chances are nothing will be discovered. And if it is discovered it will…

The answer is simple. Gargantuan fines and imprisonment for top executives.

Re: Johnson and Johnson knew for decades that asbestos lurked in its Baby Powder

#74

We shouldn't be surprised that this sort of thing happens from time to time. What are the incentives? If you're an exec in charge of some product, you want to sell the product. You don't want to be pulling it, you'll never get promoted like that. And you know more about how to move product than about asbestos testing results, that's for sure. And chances are nothing will be discovered. And if it is discovered it will…

> Not saying I have an answer. Well, I do have a simple one. You take each person that you can show that knew about the problem, propose a punishment proportional to the power they had, and send them into a judicial system where they can defend themselves before facing the punishment. The fact that things do not seem to work this way is disconcerting.

Cause they will always say "i didn't know" and you can't prove anything

Re: Johnson and Johnson knew for decades that asbestos lurked in its Baby Powder

#75
If it can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that people died because of this, and that execs knew the results and danger and ignored them, why shouldn't the state(s) charge them personally with murder /manslaughter ? In the end someone, a living, breathing human being, made the final decision to ju$t keep going.

Let them explain it to the jury. Asbestos was found in powder and people died because of it (assuming both can be proven--a judge will have to convinced first and then it goes to trial.)

Money is one part of the equation, you can be jailed for life for murder and asked to pay $15million for killing that person.

Re: Johnson and Johnson knew for decades that asbestos lurked in its Baby Powder

#76

Everybody knew? Talc deposits often occur near asbestos deposits. There's a govt standard for 'cosmetic' talc that addresses asbestos content, that's been around since 1973.

Did you read the entire article? The FDA was guided by J&J to set the standard at 10x higher than their original proposal, and to reduce testing to an inexpensive test that only detects the least common type of asbestos. Basically, the article contends, the standard that "everybody knew" about is meaningless and was not much more than positive press for J&J.

The solution to regulatory capture isn’t “create more regulations.”

Re: Johnson and Johnson knew for decades that asbestos lurked in its Baby Powder

#77

We shouldn't be surprised that this sort of thing happens from time to time. What are the incentives? If you're an exec in charge of some product, you want to sell the product. You don't want to be pulling it, you'll never get promoted like that. And you know more about how to move product than about asbestos testing results, that's for sure. And chances are nothing will be discovered. And if it is discovered it will…

"from time to time"

"knew for decades"

This apparently happened over and over again, regarding a single product.

Re: Johnson and Johnson knew for decades that asbestos lurked in its Baby Powder

#78

The legal discovery process is an interesting one here - we are seeing documents almost 50 years old here, paper records of what, prima facie is damning behaviour. But who keeps records for fifty years any more? My BigCo Employers delete my mails after a quarter usually. The idea of my emails being dragged up in 20 years is crazy Edit: I meant to say that new practises like deleting emails are likely to ensure that c…

Emails are one thing, but product QC results and related communications might well be retained for decades. Not just for liability reasons, but because trends in process behaviour and performance can be observed and acted upon, and correlated with changes to suppliers, machinery, workers' shift patterns, and other factors. This can affect the bottom line.

Re: Johnson and Johnson knew for decades that asbestos lurked in its Baby Powder

#79
post #35

We shouldn't be surprised that this sort of thing happens from time to time. What are the incentives? If you're an exec in charge of some product, you want to sell the product. You don't want to be pulling it, you'll never get promoted like that. And you know more about how to move product than about asbestos testing results, that's for sure. And chances are nothing will be discovered. And if it is discovered it will…

Will it make money? Will it kill people? If the answers are yes, and not too many, most companies will go ahead.

The problem is "not too many" becomes a highly variable number: guns beer opioids cars

Re: Johnson and Johnson knew for decades that asbestos lurked in its Baby Powder

#80
I am speculating about motives here, but it seems to me that this sort of behavior is an example of an all-too-common form of the 'banality of evil', Hannah Arendt's observation / thesis that the holocaust was enabled and implemented by a large cadre of rather ordinary people who were 'just doing their jobs'. In this case, there was no nucleus of genocidal, powerful and violently coercive psychopaths driving the process; it may have been almost self-organizing out of people 'just doing their jobs' in response to the initial mistake of shipping a tainted product, and either not thinking of the ethical issues, or actively suppressing them (some of both, I imagine), all helped along by a dose of self-interest.

This is not intended to be in any way an excuse for what happened here; if anything, it is a cautionary tale, as any of us might, one day, be faced with a choice between just doing our job and doing the right thing.

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