UC Berkeley to build open-source secure enclave using RISC-V
1–10 of 54 posts
Re: UC Berkeley to build open-source secure enclave using RISC-V
#2uh, no. it might be a game changer for open source, though. maybe.
Re: UC Berkeley to build open-source secure enclave using RISC-V
#3> This is a game changer for security. uh, no. it might be a game changer for open source, though. maybe.
Re: UC Berkeley to build open-source secure enclave using RISC-V
#4> This is a game changer for security. uh, no. it might be a game changer for open source, though. maybe.
Ya, secure enclaves have been available for a while now (and for decades in the form of HSM's), but AFAIK none have been open source.
All that's necessary is a way to enroll new keys, and when new keys are enrolled all the secure storage is wiped. This allows for free use of your own hardware, while also keeping secrets safe from attackers.
Re: UC Berkeley to build open-source secure enclave using RISC-V
#5Re: UC Berkeley to build open-source secure enclave using RISC-V
#6Re: UC Berkeley to build open-source secure enclave using RISC-V
#7Secure enclaves are only really useful at allowing people who don't own the device from preventing those who do own it from taking certain actions.
Re: UC Berkeley to build open-source secure enclave using RISC-V
#8Re: UC Berkeley to build open-source secure enclave using RISC-V
#9Earlier quoted context omitted.
Ya, secure enclaves have been available for a while now (and for decades in the form of HSM's), but AFAIK none have been open source.
It should be noted (and this is one of the biggest concerns with open hardware) is that you often cannot change said hardware -- after all it's a physical object. But this means that if the hardware has keys baked into it which you cannot change, it can be rendered non-free even though you have the chip design. So while secure enclaves will be very useful for many things, and I am hoping we can get some even more amb…
Re: UC Berkeley to build open-source secure enclave using RISC-V
#10Earlier quoted context omitted.
It should be noted (and this is one of the biggest concerns with open hardware) is that you often cannot change said hardware -- after all it's a physical object. But this means that if the hardware has keys baked into it which you cannot change, it can be rendered non-free even though you have the chip design. So while secure enclaves will be very useful for many things, and I am hoping we can get some even more amb…
Umm, I'm pretty sure it has that? Why would you make an HSM with a set of predefined unchangeable keys, that's retarded.