251–260 of 265 posts
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The simplest solution is probably a harder one practically - leave Australia. Sadly one doesn't simply leave their country and immigrate to someplace else in addition to any personal concerns - it might not be an option, let alone a desirable one but it has its merits.
Come to Canada :) We'll hire you.
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I think they were trying to say "how do I know the Australians submitting PRs aren't secretly working for the govt?" Of course this raises (but does not beg) the question, "how do I ever know anybody submitting PRs isn't trying to sabatoge me?" You just have to judge people by their fruits and hope they do the right thing or stop associating with Australians at all.
>or stop associating with Australians at all. As an Australian, I hope people do this. Internationally speaking, the tech community is not very good at drawing lines in the sand, we tend to want to please everyone. I was really hoping that when it was shown how much the US was spying on traffic crossing it's borders, other countries would modify their routes to ensure their nations data didn't transit the US unless i…
This is not good for international relations at all.
While I understand why they didn't mention this (because it's not clear if this interpretation of the bill is correct -- given there is currently no common law around it), I would like to point out what is the most concerning thing (to me) about this legislation. It potentially allows the government to turn employees into saboteurs. According to s.317C(6), a "designated service provider" can be someone who has develo…
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I was worried about this as well which is why I read the law and commented above. The short answer is: 1. Non-compliance with a TAN/TCN is a civil not a criminal mater 2. As I stated above the law clearly says that it is a defence for non-compliance if a TAN/TCN would compel you to commit a crime in a foreign country. The issue is whether you can be compelled to commit an act in Australia, which would be a crime in a…
Well, I'm working on software systems that are precisely the sort of thing that the Australian government will target with this law (transportation systems), and it is highly likely that these systems will be targeted with a TAN/TCN. In fact, I'm pretty sure that the software segment that I currently work on is going to be hit by this law, and hard, within the next year or so. If I don't get a TAN/TCN request, I'm al…
If you're already overseas (including NZ), it should be a pretty easy ride:
"You may be eligible to apply if you ... will acquire citizenship of another country as soon as your application to renounce Australian citizenship is approved" [0]
From what I remember, there's basically an agreement between all countries stating that a stateless person in your borders must be offered safe harbour... or something to that affect, and that might be triggering the "We will not approve your application to renounce your citizenship if you do not have another foreign citizenship" spiel.
Talk to a lawyer to get it straight though.
[0] https://immi.homeaffairs.gov.au/citizenship/give-up-citizens...
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I think that, for long-term security, we need to have devices that are resilient to orchestrated sabotage by the vendor. The current approach by Apple is great, until Apple is compromised in one way or another. I have some idea for how this could be done (TPM-resident signing keys on each device, which have to sign all binaries before they can execute). I might end up writing a blog post about the idea.
Sounds like applocker in windows
1. Paths (like AppArmor).
2. Publisher (which I think is a signature, but is a signature of the publisher not the machine itself -- so a compromised publisher could give you a bad update silently).
3. Hash (which is _okay_ but arguably requires more maintenance of the "good hash" list than requiring a specific signature -- though the nice thing with hashes is that you can disallow old ones).
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What proportionality test? Lets go with how the law is actually written. Say they decide hn is a den for hackers. I mean, it's right there in the name! Hacking attracts a >3yr sentence - hence, we need the data of all hn users, they're all potential hackers!
The bill states: The Director General of Security or the chief officer of an interception agency must not give a technical assistance notice to a designated communications provider unless the Director General of Security or the chief officer, as the case requires, is satisfied that: (a) the requirements imposed by the notice are reasonable and proportionate; and (b) compliance with the notice is: (i) practicable; and…
Yes, really.
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I think they were trying to say "how do I know the Australians submitting PRs aren't secretly working for the govt?" Of course this raises (but does not beg) the question, "how do I ever know anybody submitting PRs isn't trying to sabatoge me?" You just have to judge people by their fruits and hope they do the right thing or stop associating with Australians at all.
>or stop associating with Australians at all. As an Australian, I hope people do this. Internationally speaking, the tech community is not very good at drawing lines in the sand, we tend to want to please everyone. I was really hoping that when it was shown how much the US was spying on traffic crossing it's borders, other countries would modify their routes to ensure their nations data didn't transit the US unless i…
This is one case where the corporate capture of the US government works in our favor. Tech is an absolutely massive portion of the US economy (compared to Australia), and the tech companies will fight this tooth and nail. If the government couldn't do it in the 1990s (they tried) when tech companies were far less influential, they certainly won't be able to do it now.
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Sounds like applocker in windows
My experience with AppLocker is that it doesn't really work. As high-school students we would trade ways to break it to play games on our laptops (we were given school laptops which had AppLocker). If high-school students were able to figure out how to break it, I have no doubt there are more serious issues. In addition, I believe you can only whitelist based on: 1. Paths (like AppArmor). 2. Publisher (which I think…
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The bill states: The Director General of Security or the chief officer of an interception agency must not give a technical assistance notice to a designated communications provider unless the Director General of Security or the chief officer, as the case requires, is satisfied that: (a) the requirements imposed by the notice are reasonable and proportionate; and (b) compliance with the notice is: (i) practicable; and…
When thinking about such unprecedented powers, I prefer to consider the worst-case scenario of the laws as written, rather than what seems currently acceptable. Because even if the current government is harmless, the next regime might not be, and these powers are basically the equivalent of a nuclear bomb with respect to privacy. They move the pendulum far away from what many would consider reasonable for a free soci…
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When thinking about such unprecedented powers, I prefer to consider the worst-case scenario of the laws as written, rather than what seems currently acceptable. Because even if the current government is harmless, the next regime might not be, and these powers are basically the equivalent of a nuclear bomb with respect to privacy. They move the pendulum far away from what many would consider reasonable for a free soci…
I agree with all of your sentiments, I just don't think that tactically this approach results in a useful outcome.
I'm hoping that if more people realize the implications of this horrible law, there's more chance of the lobotomized public actually exerting some pressure on our supposed representatives to actually represent us.
It's unlikely given the media has been painfully silent on the horrible implications of this terrible law.