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O2 outage due to expired Ericsson certificate

ericsson.com

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Re: O2 outage due to expired Ericsson certificate

#11
post #9
post #2

Why do certificates expire? How is it acceptable to have a piece of data somewhere that contains a timebomb that must be periodically defused? I do not see how this helps security, and it is particularly ridiculous that normal behavior is that one day the system works normally and is deemed secure, and the next day it is so insecure and dangerous that communication simply fails.

The problem is what is someone screws up and compromises the key? By having an expiration we ensure that in the worst case they get just a few years to do damage.

>just a few years of damage.

Something in there is telling you that you're doing the worst of both worlds, by allowing such a huge gap between renewals that people merely forget leading to outages, and such a huge gap that if a key is to expire, someone else could use it for years before someone notice and actually revoke the old key.

derefr above has the correct response.

Re: O2 outage due to expired Ericsson certificate

#13
Would be interesting to know how many people who've managed footprints for a reasonable period of time (say 5-10years) who haven't had a cert expire on them. Wouldn't be surprised if it's single digit %ages.

So many human & tech error factors lead to this occurring and they're all the same old things. Staffing changes, spam filters, ignored warnings, skipped emails...

Re: O2 outage due to expired Ericsson certificate

#15
post #2

Why do certificates expire? How is it acceptable to have a piece of data somewhere that contains a timebomb that must be periodically defused? I do not see how this helps security, and it is particularly ridiculous that normal behavior is that one day the system works normally and is deemed secure, and the next day it is so insecure and dangerous that communication simply fails.

Seriously? Any half decent administrator knows that for every SSL certificate you install, you set a date some time in the future where you need to change it out for a new one. To your comment of "one day the system works normally and is deemed secure, and the next day it is so insecure and dangerous", this is working as intended. The certificate is to establish trust and identity along with encrypting the data in tr…

Expiry dates are in years, if a key is compromised, then an adversary has _years_ to exploit a MITM.

However we already mitigate this with revocation lists. But if we can revoke certificates why do we have expiration dates?

Seems to me expiration dates are rent seeking behaviour by certificate vendors.

Re: O2 outage due to expired Ericsson certificate

#16
post #7
post #4

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I agree with you, but I suspect the intention is to prevent another type of timebomb. One where one day the system works and everything is considered secure, and then 25 years later nobody has given it a second thought.

Yes. Even then, a few years is too long, because you forget about the need for renewal. I would say that the "proper" use of certificate expiry is the way LetsEncrypt and other ACME providers do it: it's set so low that you need an automated renewal process in order to make the certificate at-all useful.

But if it's automated, aren't we back to "forget about it for 25 years"?

Re: O2 outage due to expired Ericsson certificate

#17

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Seriously? Any half decent administrator knows that for every SSL certificate you install, you set a date some time in the future where you need to change it out for a new one. To your comment of "one day the system works normally and is deemed secure, and the next day it is so insecure and dangerous", this is working as intended. The certificate is to establish trust and identity along with encrypting the data in tr…

Expiry dates are in years, if a key is compromised, then an adversary has _years_ to exploit a MITM. However we already mitigate this with revocation lists. But if we can revoke certificates why do we have expiration dates? Seems to me expiration dates are rent seeking behaviour by certificate vendors.

One good reason is that if you buy a domain name that somebody else has used in the past, they don't have an infinite valid SSL certificate for your domain.

Re: O2 outage due to expired Ericsson certificate

#18
post #13

Would be interesting to know how many people who've managed footprints for a reasonable period of time (say 5-10years) who haven't had a cert expire on them. Wouldn't be surprised if it's single digit %ages. So many human & tech error factors lead to this occurring and they're all the same old things. Staffing changes, spam filters, ignored warnings, skipped emails...

I know it's happened to every company where I've worked. It happens so rarely, though, that people don't have enough opportunity to learn from it. Even at Google they were on their Nth such outage for a large value of N before it became apparent that no certificate should ever expire at 23:59:59 on December 31, or otherwise outside of normal operating hours. Seriously 20 years of organizational knowledge required to get the company to understand that certs should expire at noon on a Wednesday to minimize time-to-repair in the inevitable event that one is allowed to lapse.

Re: O2 outage due to expired Ericsson certificate

#19
post #2

Why do certificates expire? How is it acceptable to have a piece of data somewhere that contains a timebomb that must be periodically defused? I do not see how this helps security, and it is particularly ridiculous that normal behavior is that one day the system works normally and is deemed secure, and the next day it is so insecure and dangerous that communication simply fails.

Cryptography is basically a computational treadmill: you want to make it cheap enough that it's not burdensome for the actual users, but that reversing the information without the key is computationally expensive. Processing power, especially for the highly parallelizable task of grinding through potential keys, follows an exponential curve; ergo, even the present exponential gap is not a long-term protection mechanism.

The expiry date of a certificate was present in the original implementation of X.509 certificates; the infrastructure for certificate revocation lists was added later. Furthermore, a certificate revocation list includes every certificate ever revoked that has yet to expire. If you relied on certifcate revocation for expiring old certificates as well, that would be a nasty long file you'd have to download before you can start connecting to any website.

Re: O2 outage due to expired Ericsson certificate

#20
post #13

Would be interesting to know how many people who've managed footprints for a reasonable period of time (say 5-10years) who haven't had a cert expire on them. Wouldn't be surprised if it's single digit %ages. So many human & tech error factors lead to this occurring and they're all the same old things. Staffing changes, spam filters, ignored warnings, skipped emails...

I know it's happened to every company where I've worked. It happens so rarely, though, that people don't have enough opportunity to learn from it. Even at Google they were on their Nth such outage for a large value of N before it became apparent that no certificate should ever expire at 23:59:59 on December 31, or otherwise outside of normal operating hours. Seriously 20 years of organizational knowledge required to…

Instead of waiting last minute, you'd think a large company would have planning to renew certificates X amount of time before they expire. Alas I understand it's not that simple.
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