Earlier quoted context omitted.
>The reason the login form is delivered as web content is to increase development speed and agility You saved some sprints but invalidated the purpose of the project. Very agile. >Ultimately I think we can have web content from accounts.firefox.com be just as trustworthy as, say, a Mozilla-developed addon which might ship in the browser by default, which is a pretty high bar. We're not there yet, but it seems worth p…
"Every time" for this use case is once per browser install, at the moment you perform the authentication with Firefox Sync, which is the same as the number of times you'd want to verify the binary right before authenticating. The tradeoff they made here has essentially zero impact on the number of times you need to verify their code, it's just a matter of whether you'd have to verify browser native authentication cod…
In order to compromise firefox native code, they would have to compile malicious code and ship it to everyone. My distro maintainers would need to include the malicious binary in their repos, including a signed hash of the compromised binary, and I'd need to install it, where my package manager would verify the hash.
In order to compromise a single user's browser session, they'd simply need to fingerprint the user's browser and then serve them different content than everyone else gets. No hashes or signatures on javascript, no safety in numbers, etc.