The author's reasons are specific to Oracle. I believe other vendors have shown themselves to be worthy of the trust required to for such cooperative disclosure schemes to work.
As to your own more general arguments, they lead me to believe you're somewhat manichaean, and possibly a bit too eager to assign guilt and follow up with punishment.
Specifically, punishing users for "not demanding higher security" is a suggestion that can only be made when the metric ("high security") has become an objective by itself, completely divorced from real-world outcome that spawned it, namely to avoid people being harmed.
It's unclear if punishing users could reliably work as a proxy to get vendors to increase security. Thus, it is already assured that there will be some users that will be harmed by your idea with no positive effect possibly justifying that harm.
If, however, the mechanism works as envisioned by you, it would work just as well without helping it along: the very same effect will occur organically, whenever insecurity results in harm. And where it doesn't, nothing is lost. Quite the opposite: insecurity that does not result in harm is quite obviously something good.
It's a well-known failure mode of the human mind to so fully engage with some intermediate task that one forgets the initial motivation. Hence police officers arresting 6-year olds and soldiers "just following orders". Here, your suggestion is the result of fetishising one specific quality of software, namely security. Secure software, created in a process so beautiful it is a piece of art by itself, does not only shed its initial justification: Its pursuit suddenly legitimises actions specifically intended to injure those you once set out to protect.
Yeah, plus, you know: that mechanism assumes that fast disclosure harms users. So you're kinda contradicting all those other points about fast disclosure being helpful.
As to (5): You're not giving any reasons why early disclosure would result in more harm to the vendor, except for the very idea of responsible disclosure itself, namely lowering real-world harm by having a patch or other mitigation ready at the moment of disclosure. Here, you are falling into the same trap of being more interested in vengeance than justice, much like the first officer arriving at the crime scene putting another bullet in the victim to ensure that horrible criminal will face trial for murder, and not just assault.