Earlier quoted context omitted.
And an unknown and unknowable attack surface. At least with the switch if the mic doesn't work you just check for magnets around it and that's it.
I'd argue the T2 chip is actually more secure than your method. Magnets can be removed. The T2 chip cannot. Not without rendering the computer unusable and the data irrecoverable. The chip provides a hardware disconnect for the microphone, just like your idea. Except it's baked into the silicon instead of an additional large part in the body of the computer. Regardless, if your attack model is "T2 chip is compromised…
If someone can physically modify your laptop, you've already been hacked, T2 chip or not.
if your attack model is "T2 chip is compromised"
I think the more realistic attack model is "Apple enables the undocumented 'turn on mic while closed' feature that it was required to add through a national security letter that they can't talk about."
And then that secret hack is either discovered (or stolen) by other government.