Hey Larry $$
Don't you think maybe he's heard this a few times already?
We detached this comment from https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18271880 and marked it off-topic.
61–70 of 71 posts
Hey Larry $$
Don't you think maybe he's heard this a few times already?
We detached this comment from https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18271880 and marked it off-topic.
Isn't this a click-baitish title? I would say that this is a configuration issue and not "exactly" a vulnerability and basically get off my lawn. Reading blueimp's and larry's comments here I envy their constructivity, open mindedness and professionalism.
But although the title is somewhat click-bait, I still think this counts as a vulnerability in my project, since there is a possible combination of default Apache setting and default project files that is exploitable.
Haven't seen this sample code, but in general letting your users set the filename of anything on your server is a bad plan. If the upload script just generated a random filename (046359905445.bin), and then stored the mime type, users filename, other metadata, etc. in a database, that would be a much better design.
However the PHP code was written as easy-to-use sample code and I did not want to introduce a database as dependency and keeping the sanitized filename plus extension keeps the meta information intact.
If I had provided better information about how to securely configure the Webserver to allow all file types for upload, using the original - but sanitized - filenames would not be an issue.
Another apache disaster, blueimp's plugin has nothing to do with it: it's common for script kiddies to try to upload php executables on php sites, and sometimes it works.
However I wish Apache would have changed their default config in a way that would have signalled an error if an .htaccess file is present but not applied.
Something that HA user fulafel also pointed out here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18272407
What other vulnerabilities did this backwards-incompatible Apache change cause? Probably many people rely on .htaccess, for example to disable access to non-public files or disable php execution on a DIY CMS file sharing area. Sounds like the risk from this is not widely known. Probably the correct solution for Apache would have been to detect presence of now-ignored .htaccess files and signal an error.
I think one of the reasons nobody reported this earlier was that people simply assumed that .htaccess support was the default - Larry Cashdollar, the security researcher, also confirmed this: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18271880
So this afect only apache? Anyone have any thoughts on nginx, IIS and other web servers like tomcat, websphere?
Author of jQuery File Upload here. The vulnerability is a combination of Apache v.2.3.9's default setting to not read .htaccess files and my mistake of relying on .htaccess to enforce security of the sample PHP upload component. To give you some context on how this could happen: - As the project name implies, this started as a client-side jQuery plugin, with a dummy PHP script to echo out the uploaded file - Over tim…
are other web servers vulnerable ? for example, wildfly jboss server,??
Please refer to the vulnerability documentation here to see if you are affected: https://github.com/blueimp/jQuery-File-Upload/blob/master/VU...
Author of jQuery File Upload here. The vulnerability is a combination of Apache v.2.3.9's default setting to not read .htaccess files and my mistake of relying on .htaccess to enforce security of the sample PHP upload component. To give you some context on how this could happen: - As the project name implies, this started as a client-side jQuery plugin, with a dummy PHP script to echo out the uploaded file - Over tim…
I'm curious as to how this could be a widely known exploit in the hacker community, but no one reported it until 3 years after its publicity.