Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don't know if it should or it shouldn't, but it absolutely is not the norm for companies to announce those vulnerabilities publicly. Every year, most moderate-and-up-sized tech companies (really, a pretty big swathe of the Fortune 500 outside tech, as well) contract multiple penetration tests, and those tests turn up thousands upon thousands of sev:hi vulnerabilities, none of which are ever announced. An obligation…
While that is true, it's worth pointing out that Google's Project Zero has a "disclose by default" approach to vulnerabilities they find, even if there is no proof that they were exploited. The default P0 timeline is 90 days... do we know when Google found this vulnerability in Google+? Does Google apply the P0 deadline to their own vulnerabilities? Is it fair to expect them to?
Google Exposed User Data, Feared Repercussions of Disclosing to Public
111–120 of 277 posts
Re: Google Exposed User Data, Feared Repercussions of Disclosing to Public
#112Company finds a security vulnerability caused by a bug. Logs show that it has never been used by anyone. It patches the vulnerability. [Honest question] Should the company announce it publicly? PS: Keeping in mind that this is part of the Murdoch vs. Google war going on for about 10 years: https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2009/11/murdoch_vs_google... https://www.thedrum.com/news/2017/03/28/timing-everything-ru... h…
"Logs show that it has never been used by anyone" Is it 100% confirmed that the logs would show it? What they said was "We found no evidence that any developer was aware of this bug, or abusing the API, and we found no evidence that any Profile data was misused." That seems only to say they couldn't find anything. Not that it absolutely didn't happen.
Re: Google Exposed User Data, Feared Repercussions of Disclosing to Public
#113Company finds a security vulnerability caused by a bug. Logs show that it has never been used by anyone. It patches the vulnerability. [Honest question] Should the company announce it publicly? PS: Keeping in mind that this is part of the Murdoch vs. Google war going on for about 10 years: https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2009/11/murdoch_vs_google... https://www.thedrum.com/news/2017/03/28/timing-everything-ru... h…
"Logs show that it has never been used by anyone" Is it 100% confirmed that the logs would show it? What they said was "We found no evidence that any developer was aware of this bug, or abusing the API, and we found no evidence that any Profile data was misused." That seems only to say they couldn't find anything. Not that it absolutely didn't happen.
The answer is clearly no as they only had two weeks worth of logs out of the three years during which this bug has existed. Here's what they're saying:
"We made Google+ with privacy in mind and therefore keep this API’s log data for only two weeks. That means we cannot confirm which users were impacted by this bug. However, we ran a detailed analysis over the two weeks prior to patching the bug [...]"
https://blog.google/technology/safety-security/project-strob...
Re: Google Exposed User Data, Feared Repercussions of Disclosing to Public
#114Company finds a security vulnerability caused by a bug. Logs show that it has never been used by anyone. It patches the vulnerability. [Honest question] Should the company announce it publicly? PS: Keeping in mind that this is part of the Murdoch vs. Google war going on for about 10 years: https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2009/11/murdoch_vs_google... https://www.thedrum.com/news/2017/03/28/timing-everything-ru... h…
Some other article I saw quoted somewhere said that they only kept logs for a short time for this service. I wonder how they ruled out exploits older than the logs?
Re: Google Exposed User Data, Feared Repercussions of Disclosing to Public
#115Company finds a security vulnerability caused by a bug. Logs show that it has never been used by anyone. It patches the vulnerability. [Honest question] Should the company announce it publicly? PS: Keeping in mind that this is part of the Murdoch vs. Google war going on for about 10 years: https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2009/11/murdoch_vs_google... https://www.thedrum.com/news/2017/03/28/timing-everything-ru... h…
That's not true. The logs show that it has never been used by anyone the two weeks they had logs for. It looks like the vulnerability existed for about three years. Given this is Google+ we're talking about, it's entirely believable that someone widely exploited the bug in the past, but stopped because Google+ is dead and no one updates it anymore.
> [Honest question] Should the company announce it publicly?
Yes, and they did. They just waited for six months to do it.
Re: Google Exposed User Data, Feared Repercussions of Disclosing to Public
#116>We made Google+ with privacy in mind and therefore keep this API’s log data for only two weeks. That means we cannot confirm which users were impacted by this bug. Wait, so they only keep two weeks worth of logs and within these logs they did not find anyone abusing this flaw. How can they be certain for any time period from two week prior ?
Re: Google Exposed User Data, Feared Repercussions of Disclosing to Public
#117Related discussion here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18169243 . Normally we'd treat these as dupes of each other (and initially we did that), but there seem to be two stories here: one about the data breach and one about Google+. So I guess we'll leave both of them up.
Re: Google Exposed User Data, Feared Repercussions of Disclosing to Public
#118Earlier quoted context omitted.
> believed-to-be-unexploited vulnerabilities you cannot prove the negative (realistically). If you have a vulnerability, you must treat it as though it has been exploited.
Sometimes you can, if you have comprehensive logs that cover it. edit: Within reason, anyway. Obviously if your vulnerability includes write access to logs or something then you're poked.
> We made Google+ with privacy in mind and therefore keep this API’s log data for only two weeks. That means we cannot confirm which users were impacted by this bug. However, we ran a detailed analysis over the two weeks prior to patching the bug, and from that analysis, the Profiles of up to 500,000 Google+ accounts were potentially affected. Our analysis showed that up to 438 applications may have used this API.
^ the above statement, but couched with this:
> We found no evidence that any developer was aware of this bug, or abusing the API, and we found no evidence that any Profile data was misused.
Re: Google Exposed User Data, Feared Repercussions of Disclosing to Public
#119Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don't know if it should or it shouldn't, but it absolutely is not the norm for companies to announce those vulnerabilities publicly. Every year, most moderate-and-up-sized tech companies (really, a pretty big swathe of the Fortune 500 outside tech, as well) contract multiple penetration tests, and those tests turn up thousands upon thousands of sev:hi vulnerabilities, none of which are ever announced. An obligation…
While that is true, it's worth pointing out that Google's Project Zero has a "disclose by default" approach to vulnerabilities they find, even if there is no proof that they were exploited. The default P0 timeline is 90 days... do we know when Google found this vulnerability in Google+? Does Google apply the P0 deadline to their own vulnerabilities? Is it fair to expect them to?
P0 "competes" on an even playing field with everyone else doing public vulnerability research and, to a reasonable approximation, has access to the same information that everyone else does. Internal security assessment teams have privileged information not available to public researchers, and rely on that information to get assessment work done in a reasonable amount of time.
When P0 discovers a bug, it has (again, to an approximation) proven that any team of researchers could reasonably find that same bug --- everyone's using roughly the same sources and methods to find them (albeit P0's are done at a much higher level of execution than most amateur teams). That's the premise under which P0 bugs are announced on a timeline: what P0 has done is spent Google engineering hours surfacing and refining public information.
If you want to go a little further into it: the 90 day release window has a long history in vulnerability research. It's the product of more than a decade of empirical results showing that if you don't create a forcing function, vulnerabilities don't get patched at all; vendors will back-burner them indefinitely. Google's internal teams don't have that problem: when Google bugs get found by internal teams (and, presumably, by external ones), they get fixed fast. There's no incentive problem to solve with an announcement window.
Another lens to look at this through is the P0 practice of announcing after the publication of patches, regardless of where the window is. That's because, again, P0 is doing public research. Typically, when a P0 bug is patched, the whole world now has access to a before/after snapshot that documents the bug in enough detail to reproduce it. At that point, not announcing does the operator community a disservice, because the bug has been disclosed publicly, just in a form that is only "available" to people motivated to exploit the bug.
And again: not at all the case with internal assessments.
Re: Google Exposed User Data, Feared Repercussions of Disclosing to Public
#120Companies internally find and fix security bugs all the time and dont talk about it if no known breach occured. Is there a requirement to do this? Maybe there should be a requirement to document that due diligence occurred to understand if it was exploited?
I don't see the benefit. We'd all just end up with a barrage of emails we don't really care about.